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T he annual CD4CDM Perspectives Series features a topic of pivotal importance to the global carbon market. The series seeks to communicate the diverse insights 
and visions of leading actors in the carbon market to better inform the decisions of 
professionals and policymakers in developing countries. The third theme of the series 
explores how mitigation actions in developing countries in the context of sustainable 
development may be supported by technology, financing and capacity development in 
a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner. Eight authors with a background as 
negotiators representing developing countries, Designated National Authorities, 
business and researchers cover two overall issues: national and policy perspectives 
and the carbon market for sectors including sector approaches in 
transport, buildings and industry. The aim is to present new ideas and 
solutions with a focus on the role of existing and emerging carbon 
markets to finance nationally appropriate mitigation actions in 
developing countries.
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The	role	of	carbon	markets	in	scaling	up	mitiga-
tion	actions	in	developing	countries	in	the	post-
2012	climate	regime	is	the	topic	of	Perspectives	
2009:	NAMAs and the Carbon Market - Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions of Developing Coun-
tries.	 The	 eight	 papers	 presented	 explore	 how	
mitigation	 actions	 in	 developing	 countries,	 in	
the	context	of	sustainable	development,	may	be	
supported	 by	 technology,	 finance	 and	 capacity	
development	 in	 a	 measurable,	 reportable	 and	
verifiable	manner.	Key	 issues	 discussed	 are	 the	
pros	and	cons	of	market	and	non-market	mecha-
nisms	in	raising	private	and	public	finance,	and	
the	 appropriate	 governance	 structures	 at	 the	
international	 and	 national	 levels.	 The	 aim	 of	
this	 publication	 is	 to	 present	 possible	 answers	
to	these	questions,	with	a	specific	focus	on	the	
role	of	existing	and	emerging	carbon	markets	to	
finance	NAMAs.
Since	 2005,	 when	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 entered	
into	 force,	 the	 Clean	 Development	Mechanism	
(CDM)	has	involved	developing	countries	in	the	
creation	of	a	global	carbon	market.	As	of	Octo-
ber	2009	there	were	about	5000	projects	in	the	
pipeline,	which	were	projected	to	generate	a	total	
issuance	of	1.2	billion	tonnes	of	Certified	Emis-
editOrial 
sion	 Reductions	 (CERs)	 by	 2012.	 In	 2008,	 the	
issuance	of	carbon	credits	from	CDM	reached	a	
volume	of	138	million	CERs,	representing	a	value	
of	 about	2	billion	USD	at	 an	 assumed	price	of	
15USD/tCO2.	 This	 is	 up	 from	74	million	CERs	
and	about	1	billion	USD	in	2007	(www.cdmpipe	
line.org).	Compared	to	public	finance	raised	for	
climate	change	 in	developing	countries,	mainly	
through	the	Global	Environmental	Facility	(GEF)	
serving	as	 the	financial	mechanism	to	both	the	
Convention	and	the	Protocol,	countries	received	
only	about	1	billion	USD	over	a	four-year	period	
from	2007-10	through	these	channels.	As	such,	
the	carbon	market	has	made	a	considerable	con-
tribution	to	mitigating	climate	change	in	develop-
ing	countries.	In	addition,	the	CDM	has	created	
human	capacity	and	institutional	infrastructure	
in	 more	 than	 eighty	 developing	 countries	 that	
are	hosting	projects.	These	results	constitute	the	
success	of	 the	CDM,	which	 is	considered	 to	be	
one	of	the	most	innovative	elements	of	the	Kyoto	
Protocol.	
Challenged	by	its	success,	however,	the	CDM	has	
encountered	a	number	of	weaknesses,	including	
concerns	 about	 environmental	 integrity,	 tech-
nology	transfer,	its	unequal	geographical	distri-
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bution	 of	 projects,	 complex	 governance	 proce-
dures	 and	 questions	 about	 its	 contribution	 to	
sustainable	 development.	 Solutions	 to	 these	
weaknesses	were	discussed	in	last	year’s	Perspec-
tives	2008:	How to reform the CDM in a post-2012 
climate regime	(available	at	www.cd4cdm.org).	Re-
alising	that	the	CDM	needs	to	be	improved	and	
possibly	complemented	by	new	mechanisms	for	
low-carbon	development,	the	challenge	ahead	is	
how	to	create	the	right	incentives	to	significantly	
up-scale	mitigation	actions	in	developing	coun-
tries.	 To	 avoid	 dangerous	 warming	 above	 2°	 C	
from	 pre-industrial	 levels,	 setting	 developed	
country	targets	in	line	with	science	would	send	
the	 right	 market	 signal	 to	 stimulate	 enhanced	
cooperation	with	developing	countries.
In	the	context	of	the	negotiations	for	an	agreed	
outcome	at	Copenhagen	in	December	2009,	the	
issue	of	NAMAs	 is	being	discussed	 in	 the	Con-
vention	track	for	Long-term	Cooperative	Actions	
(AWG-LCA).	 Under	 this	 track	 a	 NAMA	 credit-
ing	mechanism	 has	 been	 proposed	 to	 increase	
emission	 reductions	 either	 under	 the	 existing	
governance	 structure	or	under	a	new	structure	
to	be	 supervised	by	 the	Conference	of	 the	Par-
ties	(COP).	Further,	in	2007	the	Bali	Action	Plan	
(BAP)	 defined	 a	 structure	 for	 the	 negotiations,	
which	clearly	distinguishes	the	nature	and	legal	
status	of	enhanced	action	on	mitigation	by	de-
veloped	countries	in	paragraph	1	(b)	(i)	on	quan-
tified	 emission	 limitation	 and	 reduction	 objec-
tives	(QELROs)	from	that	of	developing	countries	
in	paragraph	1	(b)	(ii)	on	nationally	appropriate	
mitigation	 actions	 (NAMAs).	 This	 distinction,	
however,	 has	 since	 been	 challenged,	 though	
with	little	success,	by	some	developed	countries	
making	 new	 proposals	 for	 general	 mitigation	
actions	by	all	Parties	based	on	national	circum-
stances	 rather	 than	 Annex-1	 or	 non-Annex	 1	
status.	
In	this	context,	some	of	the	key	questions	to	be	ad-
dressed	are	how	to	agree	on	aggregate	developed-
country	emission-reduction	targets	and	substan-
tial	deviation	from	Business	as	Usual	(BAU)	in	de-
veloping	countries	in	line	with	science	scenarios	
to	stay	below	2°C	warming.	Bottom-up	approaches	
based	 on	 national	 circumstances	 and	 national	
laws	specific	to	all	Parties	have	been	proposed	by	
a	number	of	developed	countries,	while	top-down	
approaches	 for	 internationally	 binding	 commit-
ments	 are	 being	 proposed	 by	 other	 developed	
countries,	 as	 well	 as	 most	 developing	 countries.	
The	 question	 of	 how	 to	 differentiate	 the	 global	
emission-reduction	burden	among	developed,	de-
veloping	and	all	Parties	according	to	common	but	
differentiated	 responsibilities	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	
the	NAMAs	negotiations.	The	aggregate	emission-
reduction	targets,	along	with	the	rules	of	mecha-
nisms	for	how	to	achieve	these,	eventually	decide	
the	 demand	 for	 carbon	 credits.	 Market-based,	
offset	mechanisms	are	typically	favoured	by	devel-
oped	countries,	as	they	offer	a	cost-effective	means	
to	achieve	targets.	However,	a	major	flaw	of	exist-
ing	offset	mechanisms	is	that	they	do	not	contrib-
ute	to	overall	global	emission	reductions.	Hence,	
many	 developing	 countries	 argue	 for	 domestic	
emission	reductions	and	favour	public	sources	of	
finance	and	non-market	based	mechanisms.	How	
to	achieve	the	right	balance	between	market	and	
non-market	mechanisms	in	order	to	leverage	both	
private	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 NAMAs	 is	 a	 key	
question	that	needs	answering.
Providing	answers	 to	 these	questions	 is	 far	 from	
simple.	Eight	authors	each	contribute	with	their	
own	perspectives	as	negotiators	 from	developing	
countries,	Designated	National	Authorities,	busi-
ness	 and	 researchers.	 They	 address	 two	 overall	
issues:	
7
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Introduction
Policy based NAMAs
With	a	Chinese	perspective	on	how	•	
NAMAs	could	to	be	defined	and	catego-
rised,	Teng	explains	how	NAMAs	may	
be	measured,	reported	and	verified	in	a	
differentiated	manner	according	to	dif-
ferent	types	of	actions	and	how	finance	
may	be	raised	for	their	implementation.	
The	paper	concludes	that	two	precon-
ditions	exist	to	up-scale	mitigation	
actions	by	developing	countries:	1)	
adequate	up-front	financing;	and	2)	an	
effective	mechanism	to	reduce	risk	in	
case	of	a	failure	to	obtain	support	after	
implementation.	The	current	carbon	
market	cannot	meet	any	of	these	pre-
conditions.	
As	a	lead	negotiator	on	behalf	of	de-•	
veloping	countries	in	the	G77+	China	
group,	Muller offers	her	personal	per-
spective	on	the	role	of	NAMAs	under	
the	Bali	Action	Plan.	The	paper	does	
not	represent	a	particular	national	per-
spective,	though	Muller	comes	from	the	
Philippines.	The	paper	demonstrates	
that	NAMAs	will	happen	on	a	voluntary	
basis	only,	as	there	are	no	obligations	
in	the	Convention	for	developing	coun-
tries	to	do	so.	Furthermore,	it	is	shown	
that	there	is	no	need	for	any	new	mech-
anisms	outside	the	UNFCCC	to	govern	
NAMAs.	Rather,	existing	mechanisms	
under	the	Convention	may	be	further	
elaborated	so	as	to	undertake	NAMAs.
From	a	southern	African	perspective,	•	
Zhakata	from	Zimbabwe	considers	
how	NAMAs	may	be	designed	so	as	to	
work	for	the	benefit	of	African	coun-
tries.	Existing	market	mechanisms	for	
carbon	trading,	particularly	the	Clean	
Development	Mechanism,	are	found	
to	have	largely	bypassed	African	coun-
tries.	Yet,	the	paper	argues	that,	in	a	
future	climate	regime	post-2012,	market	
mechanisms	could	be	designed	so	as	to	
improve	the	commercial	viability	of	mit-
igation	investments,	which	also	holds	
out	a	promising	means	to	leverage	pri-
vate	finance	and	technology	for	African	
countries	in	moving	towards	their	clean	
development.
Focusing	on	the	trust-building	role	of	•	
NAMAs,	Zevallos	from	Peru	explores	the	
role	of	NAMAs	from	three	perspectives:	
1)	global	mitigation	and	the	ongoing	
negotiations;	2)	the	achievement	of	
sustainable	development	at	the	nation-
al	level;	and	3)	synergies	between	miti-
gation	and	adaptation.	The	paper	finds	
that	trust	has	been	lost	among	nations	
in	the	ongoing	climate	negotiations.	In	
order	to	facilitate	an	ambitious	agree-
ment	in	Copenhagen	2009,	trust	needs	
to	be	restored	and	NAMAs	can	play	a	
key	role	in	this	trust-building	process.’
Sectoral NAMAs
Exploring	the	technical	feasibility	of	•	
a	Sector	No-lose	Target	(SNLT)	in	the	
transport	sector	in	China,	Ellermann,	
who	is	employed	by	Ecofys	in	Germany,	
presents	a	case	study	of	the	sub-sector	
of	urban	transport	in	Beijing	to	road-
test	the	SNLT	template.	The	paper	finds	
that	this	kind	of	sectoral	approach	
could	work	as	a	NAMA	in	China.
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A	new	approach	for	a	NAMA	framework	•	
is	presented	by	Cheng and Zhu,	who	are	
employed	as	researchers	at	the	UNEP	
Risø	Centre	in	Denmark.	The	build-
ing	sector	is	used	as	an	example	to	il-
lustrate	how	NAMA	measures	such	as	
energy	efficiency	standards,	training,	
certification	and	awareness-raising	can	
be	registered	based	on	national	specific	
circumstances.	The	paper	points	out	
how	this	new	framework	may	unlock	
the	enormous	potential	for	low-cost	
emission	reductions	in	the	dispersed	
energy	end-use	sectors	in	developing	
countries.
Coming	from	business,	•	 Marcu	offers	a	
visionary	perspective	on	how	a	global	
carbon	market	can	develop	in	a	post-
2012	regime.	Through	the	gradual	link-
ing	of	existing	domestic	and	regional	
cap	and	trade	schemes	–	including	
future	cap	and	trade	schemes	in	devel-
oping	countries	for	sectors	–	a	global	
price	on	carbon	can	be	achieved	for	the	
post-2020	era.
In	 a	 broader	 perspective	NAMAs	 in	 developing	
countries	offer	the	opportunity	to	change	unsus-
tainable	development	paths	towards	the	vision	of	
a	 Green	 Economy.	 Led	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	
Environmental	 Program	 (UNEP),	 the	 objective	
of	the	Green	Economy	Initiative	(www.unep.org/
greeneconomy)	 is	 to	motivate	governments	and	
business	 to	 significantly	 increase	 investment	 in	
low-carbon	development	and	the	environment	as	
an	engine	for	economic	recovery,	decent	job	cre-
ation	and	poverty	reduction	in	the	21st	century.	
Supporting	this	initiative,	UNEP	and	the	UNEP	
Risø	Centre	(www.uneprisoe.org)	play	leading	roles	
in	 CDM	 analytical	 development	 and	 capacity-
building	and	are	well	positioned	to	support	the	
development	and	 implementation	of	mitigation	
actions	such	as	NAMAs.
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abstract: 
This paper seeks to facilitate multilateral 
understanding of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMAs) and Measurement, Reporting 
and Verification (MRV) as important aspects of 
the Bali Action Plan (BAP). NAMAs and MRV have 
become keen issues of debate in international 
negotiations. This paper therefore considers 
different opinions and provides a perspective from 
the Chinese side covering several major design 
elements of NAMAs and MRV: the definition and 
scope of NAMAs, frameworks of measurement, 
reporting and verification of action and support, 
a channel to provide finance resources and 
institutional arrangements to facilitate NAMAs.
The	Bali	Action	Plan	(UN,	2007)	calls	for	nation-
ally	 appropriate	mitigation	 actions	 (NAMAs)	 to	
be	taken	by	developing	countries,	which	will	be	
supported	and	enabled	by	the	provision	of	sup-
port	from	developed	countries	in	terms	of	tech-
nology	 transfer,	 finance	 and	 capacity-building.	
Both	actions	and	supports	should	be	subject	to	
the	 requirement	 to	 be	 measurable,	 reportable	
and	verifiable.	Half	of	200	pages	of	negotiating	
text	under	long-term	cooperative	action	(LCA)	is	
dedicated	to	mitigation,	mostly	for	NAMAs	or	so-
called	1b(ii)	in	BAP.
With	 Copenhagen	 approaching,	 there	 are	
still	 quite	 different	 views	 among	 parties	 on	
the	 scope	 and	 definition	 of	 NAMAs,	 means	 of	
implementation	 and	 ways	 to	 measure,	 report	
and	 verify	 actions,	 together	 with	 institutional	
arrangements	for	providing	support	and	revealing	
outcomes.	Current	debate	about	NAMAs	reflects	
different	 understandings	 on	 NAMAs,	 especially	
the	requirement	for	MRV	(Ellis	and	Larson,	2008;	
Farson	et	 al.,	 2009;	Winkler,	2008).	This	paper	
aims	 to	 explain	 how	 NAMAs	 and	MRV	 are	 un-
China’s Experience and Perspective
NatiONally aPPrOPriate MitigatiON actiONs:
Fei	TENG	
Institute of Energy, Economy 
and Environment, 
Tsinghua University
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derstood	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	developing	
country	and	how	they	contribute	to	solving	the	
dilemma	over	NAMAs.
This	 paper	 begins	 with	 a	 brief	 introduction	 to	
the	practice	of	mitigation	actions	in	China	and	
describes	 the	 many	 lessons	 learnt	 from	 these	
practices.	The	second	section	aims	to	highlight	
the	 debates	 over	 the	 scope	 and	 definition	 of	
NAMAs,	 debates	 that	 are	 sometimes	 due	 to	
different	 understandings	 of	 MRV.	 The	 third	
section	 begins	 with	 comparison	 of	 different	
MRV	 systems	 under	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 and	
Clean	Development	Mechanism	and	 is	 followed	
by	 an	 in-depth	 discussion	 of	 the	 MRV	 system,	
including	its	scope	and	context.	The	fourth	and	
fifth	sections	discuss	the	linkage	between	NAMAs	
and	 carbon	 markets	 and	 institutional	 issues	
related	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 NAMA	
cycle.	 The	 last	 section	 concludes	 this	 paper.	
	
Mitigation actions in china: 
Practice and experience
The	 best	 way	 to	 consider	 mitigation	 actions	
in	 developing	 countries	 is	 to	 survey	 existing	
practice	 and	provide	 corresponding	 support	 to	
enhance	 its	 implementation	 in	 terms	 of	 scale,	
scope	and	intensity.	Some	developing	countries	
such	as	China	have	adopted	mitigation	actions	
by	 using	 domestic	 resources	 to	 control	 their	
GHG	emissions	and	contribute	to	global	efforts	
to	cope	with	climate	change.
The	 review	 of	 existing	 practice	 in	 China	 (Teng	
et	 al.,	 2009)	 confirms	 the	 following	 conclu-
sions.	 Firstly,	 most	 current	 actions	 are	 self-
funded	 mitigation	 actions	 within	 the	 context	
of	 sustainable	 development.	 These	 mitigation	
actions	differ	significantly	as	a	result	of	varying	
circumstances	 and	 policy	 tools.	 For	 example,	
mitigation	 actions	 in	 the	 building	 sector	 are	
mainly	based	on	energy	codes	 and	 regulations,	
while	those	in	renewable	energy	mainly	focus	on	
development	 goals	 and	 preferable	 tax	 policies.	
There	 is	 no	 one-fit-all	 solution	 for	 mitigation	
actions.	Mitigation	actions	taken	by	developing	
countries	should	reflect	the	specific	development	
priority	of	each	country.
Secondly,	 not	 all	 mitigation	 actions	 will	 result	
in	 direct	 or	 quantifiable	 emission	 reductions.	
For	example,	it	is	difficult	to	quantify	mitigation	
benefit	from	an	energy	efficiency	R&D	program.	
Some	mitigation	 actions	 have	 limited	 emission	
reduction	potential	in	the	short	term	but	have	an	
overarching	 impact	 on	 the	 long-term	 emission	
path,	 e.g.	 urban	 planning	 and	 mass	 transit	
programmes	in	large	cities	(See	Fig.	1).	Mitigation	
actions	should	not	only	 focus	on	those	actions	
that	have	quantifiable	and	immediate	mitigation	
benefits,	 but	 also	 should	 place	 greater	 empha-
sis	on	those	with	slow	but	increasing	mitigation	
benefits,	 which	 are	 often	 invisible	 to	 current	
carbon	markets.
Thirdly,	 a	 domestic	 statistics,	 monitoring	 and	
evaluation	 system	 has	 been	 established.	 Such	
Time Scale
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systems	have	similar	ideas	about	the	requirement	
to	 be	 measurable,	 reportable	 and	 verifiable	
and	have	been	used	 to	measure	 and	assess	 the	
progress	of	 energy	 intensity	 targets	 and	energy	
saving	in	key	enterprises.	The	evaluation	system	
not	only	 focuses	on	quantifiable	outcomes,	but	
also	 on	 other	 qualitative	 elements	 such	 as	 in-
tuitional	 arrangements,	 training	 and	 capacity-
building.	
scope of NaMas
The	debate	surrounding	the	definition	of	NAMAs	
has	 become	 a	 barrier	 blocking	 the	negotiation	
process	(McMachon,2009).	Developing	countries	
and	 developed	 countries	 have	 quite	 different	
understandings	 on	 this	 new	 term,	 which	 has	
been	introduced	by	BAP.
Some	proposals	 in	 the	negotiating	 text	 suggest	
dividing	 NAMAs	 into	 the	 following	 three	
categories:
•	 Unilateral	actions	funded	by	domestic	
resources	and	without	outside	support
•	 Actions	with	support	from	developed	
countries;	and
•	 Actions	that	could	be	credited	and	linked	
to	the	carbon	market.
Most	 developing	 countries	 disagree	 with	 such	
definitions	 and	 categories	 of	 NAMAs,	 since	
they	 only	 count	 those	 actions	 with	 support	
from	developed	 countries	 as	NAMAs.	 They	 also	
discovered	 that	 a	 lot	 of	 self-funded	 unilateral	
mitigation	 actions	 (but	not	NAMAs)	have	been	
undertaken	 by	 developing	 countries	 and	 con-
sider	that	these	actions	should	be	recognized	by	
the	international	community	but	not	be	subject	
to	MRV.
Most	 developing	 countries,	 including	 China,	
also	 think	 that	 emission	 reductions	 from	
NAMAs	should	not	be	used	to	offset	quantified	
emission	 reduction	 limitation	 and	 objectives	
(QERLO).	 They	 regard	 emission	 reductions	 as	
a	 new	 contribution	 on	 the	 part	 of	 developing	
countries	and	NAMAs	as	different	from	existing	
offset	mechanisms	 like	 the	 Clean	Development	
Mechanism	(CDM).
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 most	 developed	 countries	
agree	 with	 the	 wider	 definition	 of	 NAMAs	 and	
argue	 that	 unilateral	 actions	 are	 also	 NAMAs	
that	 should	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 requirement	 to	
be	 measurable,	 reportable	 and	 verifiable.	 They	
have	also	put	forward	several	proposals	to	credit	
emission	 reductions	 from	 NAMAs	 and	 suggest	
using	 it	as	an	offset	mechanism	to	 leverage	the	
required	finance.
The	 debate	 about	 the	 definition	 and	 scope	 of	
NAMAs	 is	 basically	 a	 debate	 about	 whether	
unilateral	actions	by	developing	countries	should	
be	measured,	reported	and	verified	internationally.	
Thus	 the	 central	 question	 of	 the	 debate	 over	
NAMAs	is	in	fact	not	the	definition	of	NAMAs	but	
the	definition	of	MRV.
Measurement, reporting and verification
There	are	three	MRV	requirements	in	BAP:	MRV	
of	 the	 mitigation	 commitment	 of	 developed	
countries,	 MRV	 of	 the	 mitigation	 actions	 of	
developing	 countries,	 and	MRV	 of	 the	 support	
“Mitigation actions taken by developing 
countries should reflect the specific 
development priority of each country.”
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related	 to	 these	 actions.	Most	 of	 the	 literature	
and	discussion	has	focused	on	the	second	MRV,	
i.e.	MRV	of	the	mitigation	actions	of	developing	
countries.	The	introduction	of	MRV	can	enhance	
confidence	among	parties	to	make	sure	that	real	
actions	 have	 been	 undertaken	 and	 promised	
supports	 have	 been	 delivered.	 The	 idea	 of	
MRV	 can	 facilitate	 cooperative	 actions	 among	
developing	 countries	 and	 developed	 countries	
in	a	long-term	view.	Verification	is	at	the	centre	
of	MRV	 not	 only	 because	 of	 its	 important	 role	
in	building	confidence,	but	also	because	 it	 is	a	
controversial	concept	among	the	parties.
An	 MRV	 system	 exists	 in	 national	 or	 regional	
carbon	markets	 like	 the	European	Union	Emis-
sion	Trading	Scheme	(EU-ETS),	in	which	the	aim	
of	 the	 verification	 is	 to	 ensure	 a	 high	 level	 of	
assurance	that	the	emission	report	is	fairly	stated	
and	that	the	installation	is	in	conformity	with	its	
GHG	permit,	monitoring	methodology	and	other	
relevant	requirement.	Thus	 the	emission	report	
data	are	 to	be	verified	based	on	5%	materiality	
requirement	and	high	assurance.
Verification	 is	 a	 very	 sensitive	 word	 in	 politics	
and	has	various	understandings	among	the	par-
ties.	 One	 extreme	 may	 be	 the	 ‘United	 Nations	
Monitoring,	 Verification	 and	 Inspection	
Commission	(UNMOVIC)’,	which	was	created	to	
check	Iraq’s	compliance	with	its	obligation	not	to	
reacquire	weapons	of	mass	destruction.	UNMOVIC	
has	 the	 right	 to	 undertake	 unconditional	 and	
unrestricted	inspections	without	any	limitations.	
Such	‘‘verification’’	is,	of	course,	not	acceptable	
in	 the	 case	 of	NAMAs	 in	 developing	 countries.	
A	clear	definition	of	‘‘verifiable’’	is	thus	essential	
for	 the	 establishment	 of	 not	 only	 common	
understandings	but	also	of	MRV	systems.	Confi-
dence	should	be	built	up,	but	with	the	condition	
that	 the	 sovereign	 rights	 of	 the	 host	 countries	
are	respected.
The	most	important	questions	may	include:	What	
are	the	objects	to	be	verified?	What	is	the	scope	of	
verification?	Who	will	undertake	the	verification	
process?	Is	the	verification	process	is	consistent	
with	 domestic	 laws	 and	 regulations	 to	 protect	
sovereign	rights?	During	the	negotiations,	some	
Table 1 Comparison of different MRV systems at the international level
emission reduction 
commitment of annex b
clean development Mechanism
Measurement National GHG Inventories Project Design Document
reporting National communication, in-
depth review report, report on 
demonstration of progress
PDD, validation report, 
verification report
verification Expert review of methodological 
issues
Before registration: validation 
report prepared by DOEs
After registry: verification report 
prepared by DOEs
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parties	have	suggested	merging	the	discussion	of	
MRV	between	1b(i)	 and	1b(ii)	 and	 argued	 that	
they	should	be	based	on	the	same	system.	Before	
considering	 answers	 to	 these	 questions,	 it	may	
be	helpful	to	review	the	current	system	under	the	
framework	of	MRV.
The	 comparison	 between	 the	 ‘compliance	
procedures’	of	Annex	I	countries	and	the	‘certi-
fication	procedures’	 of	CDM	 indicates	 that	 the	
design	of	the	MRV	system	is	determined	by	the	
objective	of	that	system.	The	requirement	of	the	
MRV	 of	 CDM	 projects	 is	 much	 stronger	 than	
that	 of	 the	 commitment	 of	 Annex	 B	 countries	
simply	because	it	is	directly	linked	to	the	carbon	
market,	 which	 requires	 precise	 measurements	
of	 emission	 reductions.	 These	 two	 systems	 are	
different	in	various	ways.	Firstly,	the	‘compliance’	
procedure	 only	 measures	 emissions,	 not	 emis-
sion	reductions.	The	inventory	is	an	aggregate	of	
emission	sources	by	sector,	not	an	aggregate	of	
mitigation	actions,	and	thus	only	an	account	of	
emissions.	The	PDD	not	only	measures	‘emissions’	
(including	 project	 emissions	 and	 baseline	
emissions)	 but	 also	 emission	 reductions	 which	
can	contribute	totally	to	the	mitigation	actions	
in	the	proposed	projects.	It	can	then	ensure	that	
every	unit	of	emission	reduction	is	due	to	mitiga-
tion	efforts,	not	to	economic	recession	or	other	
natural	variables.	The	most	important	difference	
between	inventory	and	PDD	is	that	the	inventory	
only	 measures	 ‘emissions’	 while	 PDD	 measure	
‘emission	 reductions’.	 Such	 differences	 are	
important	because	some	proposals	suggest	using	
national	inventory	as	a	tool	to	measure	‘emission	
reductions’	from	NAMAs.	It	is	still	not	clear	how	
the	inventory	could	be	used	to	measure	‘emission	
reductions’.
Secondly,	 the	 ‘verification’	procedure	 for	natio-
nal	 communications	 of	 Annex	 I	 countries	 are	
in	 fact	 in-depth	 reviews	 made	 by	 an	 expert	
review	 team	 (ERT).	 The	 ERT	 assesses	 whether	
the	 communication	 followed	 the	 UNFCCC	
reporting	 guidelines,	 for	 example,	 whether	 the	
national	 communication	 contains	 all	 the	 parts	
required	 (completeness),	 whether	 the	 national	
communication	 has	 been	 submitted	 in	 timely	
fashion	(timeliness),	and	whether	the	information	
contained	 in	 the	 national	 communication	
is	 clear	 and	 transparent	 (transparency).	 The	
verification	 process	 in	 CDM	 is	 more	 stringent	
than	 that	 in	 national	 communication.	 DOEs	
will	 not	 only	 verify	 the	 completeness	 and	
transparency	of	 information	related	to	projects,	
but	also	will	‘audit’	the	original	data	sources	and	
implementation	of	the	monitoring	plan.	Thus	the	
design	and	content	of	the	MRV	system	is	highly	
dependent	 on	 the	 objective	 of	MRV.	 Thus,	 the	
MRV	 system	 for	 quantified	 emission	 limitation	
and	reduction	objectives	(QELROs)	by	developed	
countries	is	quite	different	from	the	MRV	system	
for	 NAMAs	 by	 developing	 countries	 with	 the	
support	of	developed	countries.
The	MRV	requirement	is	also	not	clear	with	re-
spect	to	whether	it	should	relate	to	international	
MRV	 or	 domestic	 MRV.	 For	 some	 developing	
countries,	a	domestic	system	has	been	established	
to	fulfill	the	function	of	MRV.	For	example,	China	
has	 established	 a	 national	 Monitoring,	 Assess-
ment	 and	 Evaluation	 (MAE)	 system	 based	 on	
an	 enhanced	 energy	 statistics	 system.	 In	2008,	
an	energy	statistics	department	was	established	
in	the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	to	enhance	
the	 function	 of	 the	 investigation,	 collection	
and	 analysis	 of	 energy	 statistics	 data,	 to	 carry	
China’s Experience and Perspective
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out	 inspections	 and	 assessments	 of	 the	 quality	
of	energy	statistics	data,	and	to	monitor	energy	
consumption	and	production	in	key	sectors	and	
key	enterprises.
But	 it	 is	 almost	 impossible	 to	 open	 the	 existing	
system	to	international	entities.	The	Law	of	Statis-
tics	in	China	prescribes	that	‘Statistics	institutions	
or	statisticians	that,	in	violation	of	the	provisions	
of	this	Law,	disclose	…	data	or	commercial	secrets	
of	 an	 investigated	 unit	 or	 individual	 and	 thus	
cause	losses	shall	bear	civil	liability’.	The	boundary	
of	commercial	secrets	is	not	defined	by	the	bureau	
of	statistics	but	by	enterprises.	Most	enterprises,	
especially	 energy-intensive	 industries,	 regard	
energy=related	 data	 as	 commercial	 secrets	 and	
ask	 the	 statistics	 institutions	 not	 disclose	 these	
data	 to	 third	 parties,	 not	 even	 to	 other	 govern-
mental	agencies.
Subject	 to	 domestic	 law,	 unilateral	 mitiga-
tion	 actions	 only	 can	 be	 MRVed	 by	 domestic	
agencies.	 In	 most	 cases,	 the	 domestic	 MRV	
system	 has	 a	 more	 stringent	 requirement	 than	
the	international	system.	
The	 MRV	 requirement	 in	 BAP	 means	 MRV	 at	
the	international	level,	which	is	only	applicable	
to	 mitigation	 actions	 supported	 and	 enabled	
through	 the	 provision	 of	 finance,	 technology	
and	 capacity-building	 by	 developed	 countries.	
The	 following	 discussion	 only	 refers	 to	 an	
international	 MRV	 system	 for	 NAMAs,	 that	 is,	
mitigation	actions	with	support	from	developed	
countries.
The	 MRV	 system	 should	 aim	 at	 supporting	
sustainable	development	policies	 and	measures	
in	 developing	 countries	 while	 contributing	 to	
the	global	effort	to	cope	with	climate	change.	To	
be	successful,	an	MRV	system	must	be	attractive	
to	 both	 developing	 countries	 and	 developed	
countries.	The	main	criteria	 for	an	MRV	system	
should	 be	 credibility,	 cost-effectiveness,	 time-
liness	 and	 a	 simple	 and	 clear	 procedure	which	
gives	 enough	 flexibility	 for	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
mitigation	actions.
What	 is	 being	measured,	 reported	 and	 verified	
may	be	roughly	categorized	into	three	types:
•	 Type	one:	action	and	support	is	fairly	
stated,	but	emission	reductions	are	diffi-
cult	to	estimate	because	of	disagreements	
over	methodology.
•	 Type	two:	emission	reductions	from	
supported	action	can	be	estimated	but	
may	be	difficult	or	costly	to	measure	
precisely.
•	 Type	three:	emission	reductions	from	
supported	action	can	be	quantified	and	
measured	with	a	high	degree	of	certainty	
in	a	cost-effective	way.
One	example	of	type	one	may	include	the	adoption	
of	 an	 energy	 tax	 or	 carbon	 tax	 in	 developing	
countries.	Although	the	mitigation	benefit	from	
such	actions	can	be	estimated	theoretically,	there	
is	 no	 consensus	 on	 the	 methodology	 because	
there	are	also	other	factors	that	affect	fossil	fuel	
consumption	besides	tax.	But	everyone	agrees	that	
the	adoption	of	a	fossil	fuel	tax	can	reduce	fossil	
fuel	consumption	and	related	carbon	emissions.	
An	example	of	category	two	may	be	the	promotion	
of	energy-saving	lamps	in	developing	countries.	
A	sampling	method	can	be	used	to	monitor	the	
typical	family	and	estimate	the	mitigation	benefit	
from	such	promotion	activity,	but	it	will	be	costly	
“.. most developed countries agree with 
the wider definition of NAMAs ..”
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to	give	a	precise	estimate	if	the	sample	is	larger.	
A	renewable	energy	development	program	is	one	
example	of	category	three.	Once	the	goal	of	such	
a	program	is	achieved,	emission	reductions	can	
be	more	easily	estimated	based	on	existing	CDM	
baseline	methodology.
The	 output	 of	 verification	 should	 consider	 the	
flexibility	of	NAMAs	and	could	confirm	actions,	
the	estimated	range	of	emission	reductions,	and	
emission	reduction	with	a	high	assurance	 level.	
The	 input	 for	measurement	 and	 reporting	may	
also	be	flexible,	depending	on	the	choice	of	the	
developing	 countries	 themselves.	 The	 following	
table	 lists	 three	 possible	 MRV	 requirements	
available	to	developing	countries.
Developing	countries	could	select	different	MRV	
requirements	according	to	their	concrete	actions.	
The	 level	 of	 support	 could	 be	 differentiated	
among	MRV	requirements	to	give	incentives	for	
actions	with	higher	levels	of	confidence	regard-
ing	mitigation	benefits.
The	entity	who	receives	the	support	directly	will	
take	responsibility	 for	measuring	and	reporting	
the	progress	of	action	or	other	elements,	while	
the	verifier	will	verify	the	report	and	produce	a	
verification	statement	based	on	its	observations.	
The	verifier	could	be	third	parties	or	an	expert	
team	authorized	by	the	UNFCCC.
Measurement,	 reporting	 and	 verification	 for	
support	 are	 much	 easier	 than	 for	 action.	 The	
MRV	 of	 support	 could	 be	 undertaken	 together	
with	the	MRV	of	action.	The	same	verifier	could	
verify	 whether	 the	 promised	 support	 has	 been	
delivered	in	time	and	include	some	observations	
into	the	verification	statement.
Table 2. Flexible design for MRV requirement for NAMAs
confidence level Measurement reporting verification
High Status of Actions
Estimation of 
emission reduction
Progress report on 
actions
Methodology and 
related data
Data management and 
monitoring plan
Confirmation of actions
Confirmation of related 
data source
Confirmation of existence 
and implementation of 
data management and 
monitoring plan
average Status of Actions
Estimate of emission 
reduction
Progress report on 
actions
Methodology and 
related data
Confirmation of actions
Confirmation of 
estimation methodology
reasonable Status of Actions Progress report on 
actions
Confirmation of actions
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Regarding	 unilateral	 mitigation	 actions,	 deve-
loping	countries	could	improve	the	transparency	
and	 credibility	 of	 their	 actions	 in	 a	 self-
determined	 and	 appropriate	 way.	 National	
communication	 is	 an	 appropriate	 channel	 for	
the	exchange	of	such	information.
Public Finance should Play a leading 
role to enable and support NaMas
Another	 focus	 of	 debate	 is	 the	 relationship	
between	 NAMAs	 and	 carbon	 markets.	 Should	
emission	 reductions	 from	 NAMAs	 be	 credited?	
If	so,	how	should	these	credits	be	used?	Should	
NAMAs	be	used	for	an	offset	mechanism?
Before	 giving	 answers	 to	 these	 questions,	 it	 is	
better	 to	 review	 the	 existing	 regime	 because	 a	
new	mechanism	is	only	needed	when	there	is	a	
clear	gap	in	the	old	mechanism.	The	question	is,	
where	is	the	gap?
One	reason	to	link	NAMAs	with	the	international	
carbon	market	is	to	use	the	carbon	market	as	a	
financial	 mechanism	 to	 provide	 the	 necessary	
financial	 support	 and	 positive	 incentives	 for	
developing	countries.
Developing	 countries	 argue	 that	 emission	
reductions	 from	 NAMAs	 should	 not	 be	 used	
to	 replace	 or	 offset	 the	 reductions	 required	by	
developed	countries.	These	emission	reductions	
should	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 new	 net	 contribution	
from	developing	countries.	The	offset	 is	a	zero-
sum	 game	 which	 cannot	 lead	 to	 new	 emission	
reductions.	 Some	 developing	 countries	 also	
argue	that	mitigation	commitments	and	commit-
ments	to	provide	financial	support	by	developed	
countries	 are	 two	 separate	 commitments	 (see	
Fig	 2,	 dark	 green	 in	 fig	 2	 refer	 to	 domestic	
mitigation	 efforts	 in	 developed	 countries,	 light	
pink	refer	to	exiting	offset	mechanism	and	dark	
pink	 refer	 to	emission	 reduction	 from	NAMAs).	
A	 new	 offset	mechanism	may	 lead	 to	 concerns	
about	 ‘double	 counting’	 the	 commitments	 of	
developed	countries.	The	introduction	of	a	new	
offset	mechanism	will	also	weaken	the	mitigation	
efforts	of	developed	countries	and	send	negative	
signals	 to	 developing	 countries	 that	mitigation	
efforts	are	costly.	At	the	same	time,	the	evolution	
of	the	current	carbon	market	is	only	needed	to	
meet	expectations	on	 the	demand	 side,	 that	 is,	
the	 quantified	 emission	 reduction	 limitation	
and	 objectives.	 Given	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 less	
ambitious	 target	 of	 Annex	 I	 parties	 on	 the	
table,	 the	 introduction	 of	 NAMAs	 as	 an	 offset	
Figure 2 NAMAs should go beyond offset mechanism
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mechanism	 may	 also	 lead	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	
the	 carbon	 price	 and	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 finalizing	
function	 of	 the	 carbon	 market	 if	 demand	 and	
support	are	unbalanced.	
The	 carbon	 market	 has	 shown	 its	 success	 in	
driving	 mitigation	 actions	 in	 a	 least-cost	 way,	
but	it	has	also	demonstrated	disadvantage	when	
it	 comes	 to	 providing	 robust	 and	 long-term	
price	signals	to	mitigation	actions	in	developing	
countries.	 A	 long-term	 carbon	 price	 signal	 is	
essential	 for	 long-term	 investment	 decisions	 in	
developing	countries.
The	major	contribution	of	financial	resources	in	
enabling	and	supporting	NAMAs	should	mainly	
come	 from	public	finance	 through	a	 framework	
of	 international	 transfer	 payments	 from	 devel-
oped	 countries	 to	 developing	 countries.	 The	
developed	 country	 parties	 also	 could	 directly	
purchase	 international	 emission	 reduction	
credits	 as	 a	 way	 of	 balancing	 prices	 and	 going	
beyond	 offset	 mechanisms.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	
here	that	the	market	players	are	not	the	private	
sector	 but	 parties	 and	 governments.	 This	 idea	
corresponds	to	the	idea	of	government	demand	
in	 finance	 theory.	 Support	 to	 NAMAs	 should	
be	 delivered	 through	 an	 international	 transfer	
payment	 framework	 instead	 of	 only	 relying	 on	
the	 market.	 A	 developed	 party	 could	 commit	
itself	to	purchasing	credits	from	NAMAs,	and	the	
payments	 will	 be	 contributed	 to	 the	 financial	
mechanism	 to	 secure	 the	 sustained	 financial	
resource.
The	commitment	by	developed	country	parties	to	
purchase	credit	from	NAMAs	can	be	used	as	an	
approach	to	generate	part	of	the	financial	sources	
for	 support	 and	 to	 fulfill	 their	 commitments	
under	 the	 Convention.	 Such	 credit	 will	 not	 be	
used	 by	 the	 parties	 for	 compliance	 with	 their	
mitigation	 commitments.	 The	 price	 for	 these	
credits	should	be	based	on	the	idea	of	a	 ‘safety	
valve’	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	 a	 clear,	 long-term	
price	 signal	 for	 developing	 country	 parties	 to	
invest	 in	 low	carbon	 infrastructures	and	secure	
the	full	incremental	cost	of	these	investments.
The	new	mechanism	should	go	beyond	 the	off-
setting	nature	of	the	existing	flexible	mechanism	
and	enhance	the	mitigation	actions	in	developing	
countries	 through	 the	 provision	 of	 support	
in	 terms	 of	 finance,	 technology	 and	 capacity-
building	 by	 developed	 countries.	 There	 is	 one	
thing	 that	 should	 be	 noted	 here,	 namely	 that	
there	 are	diverse	mitigation	actions,	only	 some	
of	which	can	be	quantified	accurately	and	then	
credited.	 Those	 mitigation	 actions	 which	 are	
difficult	to	quantify	in	terms	of	their	mitigation	
benefits	are	also	important,	as	some	of	them	have	
an	overarching	impact	on	the	emission	paths	of	
developing	countries,	such	as	urban	planning.
institutional arrangement
The	main	source	of	funding	will	be	public	finance	
from	developed	countries	managed	under	a	finan-
cial	mechanism	to	provide	support	to	developing	
countries’	commitments	under	Article	4.1	of	the	
Convention,	 including	 mitigation,	 adaptation,	
technology	 transfer,	 and	 development	 and	
capacity-building.
The	 mechanism	 will	 be	 operated	 under	 the	
authority	 and	 guidance	 of	 the	 Conference	 of	
Parties.	 The	 COP	 will	 establish	 a	 specialized	
fund	for	mitigation,	which	may	be	advised	by	a	
mitigation	 committee	 supported	by	 a	 technical	
panel.	The	COP	will	decide	on	policies,	priorities	
and	 eligibility	 criteria	 for	 funding	 to	 eligible	
mitigation	 actions.	 Once	 the	 mitigation	 fund	
begins	 work,	 developing	 country	 parties	 could	
submit	their	NAMAs	with	applications	for	support	
China’s Experience and Perspective
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to	 the	 mitigation	 committee.	 Such	 application	
reports	may	be	prepared	by	the	host	country	and	
include	a	description	of	the	proposed	NAMA,	an	
action	 plan	 for	 implementation,	 an	 estimate	 of	
the	mitigation	benefit	and	emission	reduction	if	
possible	 and	 the	 support	 it	would	 require,	 and	
a	plan	for	MRV.	The	MRV	plan	could	be	flexible	
and	 different	 from	 case	 to	 case,	 but	 should	 be	
transparent	 enough	 to	 ensure	 international	
confidence	 in	 these	actions.	Such	a	design	will	
offer	the	flexibility	of	NAMA	choice	and	also	pro-
vide	a	sufficient	incentive	for	developing	parties	
to	strengthen	the	MRV	process.
The	 technical	 panel	 will	 review	 and	 assess	 the	
application	 and	 report	 their	 assessment	 of	 it	
back	 to	 the	 mitigation	 committee.	 Once	 the	
application	has	been	approved	by	the	mitigation	
committee,	 it	will	 coordinate	 different	 ‘funding	
windows’	to	provide	agreed,	up-front	support	to	
the	host	parties.	After	implementation,	the	NAMA	
and	 associated	 support	 will	 be	 registered	 in	 a	
registry	operated	under	the	mitigation	committee	
with	 support	 from	 the	 Secretariat.	 Every	 year,	
the	host	country	will	prepare	a	progress	report	
to	assess	the	status	of	implementation	of	NAMA	
and	its	support.	The	host	country	will	also	invite	
a	 third	 party	 to	 verify	 its	 progress	 report	 and	
submit	 a	 verification	 report	 and	 verification	
statement	 to	 the	 mitigation	 committee.	 Once	
the	progress	report	and	verification	report	have	
been	 submitted,	 additional	 annual	 support	
will	 be	 given	 to	 the	 host	 parties	 to	 ensure	 the	
continuation	of	such	actions.
The	 mitigation	 committee	 will	 summarize	 the	
implementation	 of	 all	 supported	 actions	 and	
issued	support	and	report	to	the	COP	annually.	
The	COP	will	adopt	the	report	and	adjust	policies,	
priorities	and	eligibility	criteria	accordingly.
A	coordinating	body	should	be	established	in	a	
host	 country	 to	 coordinate	 NAMAs	 within	 the	
host	country.	The	coordinating	body	will	be	re-
sponsible	for	the	submission	of	the	application	
to	the	mitigation	committee,	the	preparation	of	
the	 progress	 report,	 the	 receipt	 of	 the	 support	
delivered	and	an	invitation	to	the	third	party	for	
verification.
conclusion
NAMAs	 are	 mitigation	 actions	 undertaken	 by	
developing	 countries	 within	 the	 framework	 of	
sustainable	development	and	contingent	on	the	
support	 of	 finance,	 technology	 and	 capacity-
building	support	from	developed	countries.	
Unilateral	 mitigation	 actions	 undertaken	 by	
developing	 countries	 with	 domestic	 resources	
also	 contribute	 greatly	 to	 the	 global	 effort	 to	
cope	with	climate	change.	Such	actions	 should	
be	 recognized	 by	 the	 international	 community.	
Such	 voluntary	 actions	 are	 funded	 by	 the	
developing	 countries	 themselves,	 who	 should	
reserve	 the	 right	 to	determine	how	 to	 enhance	
the	 credibility	 and	 transparency	 of	 these	
ongoing	unilateral	mitigation	efforts.	The	way	for	
developing	countries	to	gain	recognition	should	
be	determined	by	themselves,	depending	on	do-
mestic	law	and	national	circumstances.
The	 NAMAs	 should	 go	 beyond	 being	 an	 offset	
mechanism,	but	this	goal	should	not	be	achieved	
by	shifting	the	burden	on	to	developing	countries,	
e.g.	by	setting	an	‘ambitious	baseline’.	These	ap-
“The main criteria for an MRV 
system should be credibility, cost-
effectiveness, timeliness and a 
simple and clear procedure ..”
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proaches	will	not	only	greatly	underestimate	the	
mitigation	efforts	made	by	developing	countries,	
they	are	not	incentive-compatible.	The	best	way	
is	 not	 to	 use	 emission	 reductions	 from	NAMAs	
to	displace	or	offset	mitigation	commitment	by	
developed	countries.
The	 existing	 offset	mechanism,	 like	 CDM,	 tries	
to	 measure	 emission	 reductions	 precisely.	
Thus	only	those	mitigation	actions	with	a	clear	
boundary	and	less	uncertainty	about	mitigation	
outcomes	are	feasible	for	CDM.	The	requirement	
for	 precise	 measurement	 also	 means	 higher	
transaction	costs,	which	has	became	a	barrier	for	
small-scale	mitigation	actions.	The	NAMA	should	
not	repeat	the	procedure	of	CDM	and	abandon	
the	 requirement	 for	 the	 ‘precise’	 measurement	
of	emission	reductions	but	shift	to	a	simple	and	
clear	 way	 to	 estimate	 mitigation	 benefits	 with	
some	level	of	certainty.	A	flexible	 framework	for	
NAMA	is	central	to	the	whole	cycle.	A	three-tier	
approach	has	been	suggested	in	this	paper	to	give	
enough	flexibility	for	developing	countries	to	use	
different	 types	 of	NAMA	 as	mitigation	 options.	
The	MRV	requirements	should	also	be	different	
for	different	NAMAs.
NAMAs	 should	 be	 supported	 in	 a	 holistic	 way,	
which	 can	 provide	 a	 continuous	 incentive	 for	
good	 practice.	 A	 financial	 mechanism	 with	 a	
sufficient	 and	 sustained	 finance	 resource	 is	
essential	 to	 achieve	 such	 goal.	 There	 are	 two	
preconditions	 for	 extending	mitigation	 actions	
to	 a	 larger	 scale:	 adequate	 upfront	 provision	
before	 the	 implementation	 of	 action,	 and	 an	
effective	mechanism	to	reduce	the	risk	of	failing	
to	 win	 support	 after	 the	 implementation.	 The	
current	 carbon	 market	 cannot	 meet	 these	
two	 preconditions.	 Thus,	 a	 mitigation	 fund	 or	
window	under	a	financial	mechanism	will	play	a	
more	important	role	in	providing	incentives	for	
early	actions.	The	financial	resource	can	take	the	
form	of	a	voluntary	contribution	from	developed	
countries	in	its	early	stages	and	will	come	from	an	
international	auction	of	some	reserved	emission	
permits	from	developed	countries	when	trust	has	
been	built	up	among	parties.
The	 extent	 to	 which	 developing	 countries	 will	
implement	 NAMAs	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 effec-
tive	 support	 provided	 by	 developed	 countries	
in	 terms	of	 financial	 resources	 and	 transfers	 of	
technology.	The	most	urgent	thing	to	start	NAMA	
is	 not	 an	 MRV	 system	 or	 a	 discussion	 on	 the	
definition	of	NAMAs	but	 a	 support	mechanism	
with	 ready	 support	which	 can	be	 used	 to	 start	
actions	right	now.
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abstract
This paper demonstrates that, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and relevant 
decisions taken by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention, Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) by developing countries, as contained in paragraph 1 (b) (ii) of the BAP, 
are not obligations of developing countries under the Convention. Reporting on any mitigation or 
adaptation actions taken by developing countries is entirely voluntary. The paper further demonstrates 
that there is an obligation for developed country Parties to report on their commitments on the 
provision of financial resources, the facilitation and promotion of access to and transfer of technology, 
and meeting costs of adaptation,1 and that this information is subject to review.2 There are existing 
provisions under the Convention that cover the requirement for the measurement, reporting and 
verification (MRV) of the enabling means of support for the implementation of NAMAs. There are, 
however, no provisions for the obligatory MRV of NAMAs under the Convention. The provision 
of enabling means for the implementation of NAMAs by developing countries is an obligation of 
developed countries under the UNFCCC and cannot be done through the carbon markets.
1  Article 12.3
2  Article 10.2 (b)
MitigatiON actiONs OF develOPiNg cOUNtries: 
NAMAs under the Bali Action Plan*
	 	
*   All the views expressed in this paper are the author’s alone, based on her background knowledge of the Convention and the COP decisions, and  
 there fore do not represent those of any country or groups of countries under the UNFCCC.
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1 . introduction
1 . 1 a contentious decision in bali
The	final	plenary	meeting	of	the	13th	session	of	
the	Conference	of	the	Parties	in	Bali,	Indonesia,	
in	December	2007	was	marked	by	a	series	of	dra-
matic	incidents	that	underlined	the	lack	of	con-
sensus	on	outstanding,	contentious	issues	within	
the	negotiations	under	the	Bali	Action	Plan.
One	 of	 the	most	 difficult	 issues	 for	 developing	
country	 Parties	 was	 the	 language	 in	 sub-par-
agraph	1	b	 (ii)	 of	Decision	1/CP.13	of	 the	Bali	
Action	Plan.	Negotiated	in	a	small	group	that	was	
closed	to	many	high-level	officials	of	developing	
countries,	 this	 particular	 paragraph	 prevented	
agreement	on	the	draft	decision	during	the	last	
plenary	meeting	of	the	Group	of	77	(a	UN	group-
ing	of	132	developing	countries)	and	China.	Also,	
the	draft	text	presented	to	the	final	plenary	did	
not	fully	reflect	the	understanding	of	the	devel-
oping	 country	 representatives	 who	 negotiated	
this	paragraph.	
Consensus	within	 the	G77	and	China	was	only	
reached	after	intensive	final	consultations,	when	
a	substantive	change	was	made	and	presented	by	
India	in	the	final	plenary,	placing	the	phrase	‘in	
a	measurable,	reportable	and	verifiable	manner’	
at	the	end	instead	of	the	beginning	of	the	sub-
paragraph.		The	addition	of	a	comma	in	the	final	
printed	 version	 of	 the	 decision,	 however,	 gave	
rise	 to	 conflicting	 interpretations	 of	 the	 para-
graph,	which	then	read	as	follows:
‘1. (b) Enhanced national/international action 
on mitigation of climate change, including, inter 
alia, consideration of:
…
 (ii) Nationally-appropriate mitigation actions by 
developing country Parties in the context of sus-
tainable development, supported and enabled by 
technology, financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.’
India	 also	 revised	 the	 heading	 in	 paragraph	 1	
(b)	 to	 put	 a	 slash	 between	 the	words	 ‘national’	
and	‘international’,	in	line	with	the	commitments	
under	Article	4.1	of	 the	Convention,	which	are	
either	one	or	the	other,	depending	on	the	nature	
of	the	obligation	referred	to	in	that	Article.
1 .2 a long-standing issue
Mitigation	 actions	 by	 developing	 countries,	 in	
particular	greenhouse	gas	 (GHG)	emissions	re-
ductions,	 are	 a	 long-standing	 issue	 underlying	
many	of	the	negotiations	under	the	UN	Frame-
work	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	
since	its	adoption	in	1992	and	its	entry	into	force	
in	1995.
	In	particular,	negotiations	on	guidelines	for	na-
tional	 communications	 of	 non-Annex	 I	 Parties	
to	the	Convention,	which	include	all	developing	
country	 Parties,	 have	 been	 marked	 by	 intense	
discussions	on	how	non-Annex	I	countries	would	
reflect	references	to	any	activity	relating	to	miti-
gation	in	these	communications.	
This	contentious	issue	also	arises	in	negotiations	
on	the	guidance	to	any	operating	entity	or	enti-
ties	of	 the	financial	mechanism	of	 the	Conven-
tion,	because	of	the	direct	linkage	of	the	provi-
sion	of	financial	 resources	 to	developing	coun-
tries	and	the	preparations	of	their	national	com-
munications.	These	preparations	are	financed	on	
an	agreed	 full	cost	basis,	while	all	other	 imple-
menting	measures	subject	to	cooperative	action	
covered	by	Article	4.1	are	financed	on	an	agreed	
full	incremental	cost	basis,	as	provided	for	in	Ar-
ticle	4.3	of	the	Convention.	
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Financing	for	all	climate	change	activities	under	
the	Convention	are	currently	channelled	through	
an	operating	entity	of	the	financial	mechanism	of	
the	Convention,	 the	Global	 Environment	 Facil-
ity	(GEF).	Voluntary	financing	for	other	climate	
change-related	activities	also	can	be	channelled	
through	 institutions	 outside	 the	 framework	 of	
the	financial	mechanism	of	the	Convention,	such	
as	bilateral,	regional	or	multilateral	institutions.	
1 .3 consideration of developing 
countries’ national communications
Developed	 countries	 have	 consistently	 taken	
the	position	that	developing	countries’	national	
GHG	inventories	contained	in	non-Annex	I	com-
munications	 are	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 review.	 This,	
however,	 is	 contrary	 to	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	
Convention	 and	 has	 just	 as	 consistently	 been	
rejected	by	developing	countries.	The	inclusion	
of	NAMAs	in	the	BAP	now	provides	a	further	op-
portunity	 for	 developed	 countries	 to	 insist	 on	
the	measurement	and	verification	of	these	inven-
tories	of	emissions.
2 . Nationally appropriate 
Mitigation actions (NaMas)
	
 
2 .1 voluntary actions by 
developing country Parties
By	definition,	a	NAMA	can	be	determined	by	a	
country	 for	 itself	 alone.	What	 is	 ‘nationally	ap-
propriate’	cannot	be	defined	for	one	country	by	
another,	and	particularly	not	by	an	international	
institution.	 Suggestions	 that	 internationally	
agreed	assessments	should	be	necessary	to	carry	
out	 a	 NAMA	 formulation,	 or	 asking	 whether	
NAMAs	should	be	undertaken	within	the	context	
of	the	sustainable	development	of	each	develop-
ing	 country,	 are	 entirely	 inconsistent	 with	 the	
provisions	of	the	Convention.	
There	 is	 likewise	 no	 obligation	 for	 developing	
countries	to	undertake	mitigation	actions	under	
the	Convention.	The	only	national	obligation	for	
all	Parties,	including	developing	country	Parties,	
on	 nationally	 formulated	 actions	 relate	 mainly	
to	 impact	 assessment	 and	 minimization	 of	 the	
adverse	 effects	 of	 mitigation	 and	 adaptation	
projects	and	measures.3
The	sole	provision	in	the	Convention	that	could	
be	possibly	be	interpreted	to	require	mitigation	
actions	on	the	part	of	developing	country	Parties	
to	the	Convention	is	Article	4.1	(b).	
The	heading	of	 this	Article	refers	 to	all	Parties,	
taking	into	account	their	common	but	differen-
tiated	responsibilities	and	their	specific	national	
and	 regional	 development	 priorities,	 objectives	
and	circumstances.	These	Parties	are	obliged	to	
‘formulate, implement, publish and regularly 
update national and, where appropriate, region-
al programmes containing measures to mitiga-
tion climate change by addressing anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks… 
and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation 
to climate change.’
The	obligation	is	therefore	related	to	the	prepara-
tion	and	publication	of	national	communications	
3  Article 4.1 (f)
Financing for all climate change activities 
under the Convention are currently 
channelled through an operating entity of 
the financial mechanism of the Convention, 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
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including	 information	 on	national	 programmes	
that	 contain	measures	 to	mitigate	 as	well	 as	 to	
adapt	to	climate	change,	and	their	implementa-
tion.	 Taken	 together	 with	 the	 requirements	 for	
the	contents	of	national	communications,	imple-
mentation	still	does	not	specifically	refer	to	miti-
gation	actions	by	developing	countries.
2 .2 developed country Parties’ 
mitigation commitments
In	line	with	the	principle	of	common	but	differ-
entiated	 responsibilities	 permeating	 all	 of	 the	
articles	of	 the	Convention,	Article	4.2	provides	
that	developed	country	Parties	‘commit themselves 
specifically’ to	‘adopt national policies and take cor-
responding measures on the mitigation of climate 
change…’4	(underlining	supplied)	
The	balance	between	the	differentiated	respon-
sibilities	provides	the	basis	for	the	first	element	
of	 the	 position	 of	 the	Group	 of	 77	 and	 China	
on	paragraph	1	 (b)	 (ii)	 of	 the	Bali	Action	Plan,	
namely	that	
‘nationally-appropriate mitigation actions for 
developing country Parties…are distinct from 
the mitigation commitments of developed coun-
try Parties under its paragraph a (b) (i), both in 
magnitude and in legal nature.’5 
4  Article 4.2, heading, and sub-paragraph (a)
5  Doc. no. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.1, page 84, B, Proposal 1, x.2 , 
sub-paragraph (a).
3 . Measurement, reporting 
and verification (Mrv)
 
3 .1 Only NaMas that are supported and 
enabled in a measurable, reportable and 
verifiable manner can be in turn be subject 
to measurement, reporting and verification
There	are	no	provisions	or	decisions	 related	 to	
assessments	of	the	formulation	of	national	pro-
grammes,	and	much	less	so	for	the	actions	that	
result	 from	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 meas-
ures	contained	in	these	national	programmes.	It	
should	 also	be	understood	 that,	while	 it	would	
be	possible	 for	NAMAs	 that	 are	 supported	 and	
enabled	 to	be	measured,	 reported	 and	 verified,	
what	are	 subject	 to	MRV	are	 the	actions	 them-
selves,	and	not	necessarily	the	results	or	effects	
of	these	actions.	
There	 is	 therefore	 no	 comparison	 that	 can	 be	
made	between	the	MRV	of	NAMAs	and	the	cer-
tification	of	emission	reduction	units	that	is	un-
dertaken	with	project	activities	under	the	clean	
development	 mechanism	 (CDM)	 of	 the	 Kyoto	
Protocol,	 nor	 can	 similar	 verification	 activities	
be	conducted	for	NAMAs.
3 .2 Mrv for enabling means 
and support for NaMas
The	 only	 relevant	 provision	 for	 reporting	 that	
exists	in	the	Convention	is	the	obligation	for	de-
veloped	country	Parties	to	include	‘details of mea-
sures taken in accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 
4 and 5’6, which	deal,	respectively,	with	the	pro-
vision	of	new	and	additional	resources,	including	
the	transfer	of	technology,	meeting	the	costs	of	
adaptation,	and	the	promotion,	 facilitation	and	
financing	of	 the	 transfer	of	and	access	 to	envi-
ronmentally	 sound	technologies	and	know-how,	
6  Article 12.3
By definition, a NAMA can be determined 
by a country for itself alone. What is 
‘nationally appropriate’ cannot be defined 
for one country by another, and particularly 
not by an international institution.
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particularly	to	developing	country	Parties.
In	accordance	with	this	obligation,	guidelines	for	
the	national	communications	of	developed	coun-
try	Parties	contain	specific	provisions	for	report-
ing	on	the	implementation	of	these	obligations.7	
In	 reporting	 on	 channels	 of	 such	 financing,	
Annex	 I	 Parties	 are	 called	 upon	 to	 distinguish	
clearly	 between	 the	 financing	 activities	 under-
taken	by	the	public	sector	and	the	private	sector,8	
and	also	to	distinguish	between	the	information	
on	 funding	 provided	 through	 the	Global	 Envi-
ronment	 Facility	 (GEF),	 other	 institutions	 and	
bilateral	agencies.9	
What	should	therefore	be	established	under	the	
ongoing	negotiations	are	modalities	 for	 report-
ing,	verifying	and	measuring	the	implementation	
of	 developed	 country	 Parties	 of	 their	 commit-
ments	 to	 provide	financial	 resources,	 including	
those	for	transfers	of	technology,	to	promote	and	
facilitate	access	to	and	transfer	environmentally	
sound	technologies,	and	to	meet	the	costs	of	ad-
aptation	of	particularly	vulnerable	countries,	in	
accordance	with	Articles	4.3,	4.4	and	4.5	of	the	
Convention.
It	must	be	 recalled	 that	 these	obligations	 refer	
to	 enabling	 means	 for	 developing	 countries	
to	 undertake	 both	 adaptation	 and	 mitigation	
activities.	
To	ensure	effectiveness	 and	accountability,	 this	
mechanism	 for	MRV	of	 commitments	 by	 devel-
oped	 country	 Parties	 should	 be	 placed	 under	
the	 authority	 of	 the	 COP,	 through	 the	 Execu-
7  Decision 9/CP.2, Annex, paragraph 42, sub-paragraphs (a) to (e).
8  Ibid., paragraph 43
9  Ibid., paragraph 44
tive	Board	of	the	financial	mechanism	under	the	
Convention,	as	proposed	by	the	Group	of	77	and	
China.	
3 .3 Mrv for enabled NaMas
The	Group	of	77	and	China	have	taken	the	po-
sition	 that	only	 those	NAMAs	 that	 are	 enabled	
and	 supported	 by	 measurable,	 reportable	 and	
verifiable	 financing,	 transfer	 of	 technology	 and	
capacity-building	 can	 be	 subject	 to	 any	 MRV	
procedure.10	
Modalities	 for	 the	measurement,	 reporting	 and	
verification	 of	 enabled	 and	 supported	 NAMAs	
are	 still	 to	 be	 defined	 through	 decisions	 to	 be	
taken	by	the	COP.
3 .4 Proposal on NaMas from 
the european community
The	 position	 taken	 by	 developing	 countries	
clearly	contrasts	with	that	of	the	European	Com-
munity	 (EC)	 on	 the	 formulation	 of	 ‘low-carbon	
development	 strategies	 and	 plans	 (LCDSs)’	 for	
developing	 countries,	 for	 the	 ‘linking	 of	 MRV	
action	with	support	in	a	MRV	manner.’11	
Furthermore,	the	EC	proposes	that	LCDSs	make	
a	differentiation	between	those	actions	that	can	
be	financed	domestically	 and	 those	 that	would	
need	support.	
This	proposal	not	only	denies	any	commitment	
under	the	Convention	for	the	provision	of	finan-
cial	resources	for	enabling	means	for	mitigation	
and	adaptation	actions	 in	developing	countries	
by	reducing	these	means	to	mere	‘support’,	it	also	
suggests	that	developing	countries	could	finance	
some	of	these	actions	themselves.
10  FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/IF.1, page 85, sub-paragraph (e)
11  FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.1/Add.4, pages 10 to 14.
CER Pricing:   Legal Influences
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Even	worse,	the	proposal	completely	reverses	the	
balance	 of	 differentiated	 responsibilities	 under	
the	Convention,	which	 states	 that	 the	 effective	
implementation	 of	 developing	 countries’	 com-
mitments	under	the	Convention	will	depend	on	
the	effective	implementation	of	developed	coun-
tries’	commitments	related	to	financial	resources	
and	transfers	of	technology.12
Taken	together	with	the	EC	proposal	for	a	long-
term	goal	that	would	include	emission	reductions	
by	developing	countries,	as	well	as	purchases	of	
emission	 reduction	 credits	 from	 them	 through	
the	carbon	market,	this	position	is	completely	in-
consistent	with	the	UNFCCC	and	as	such	is	prov-
ing	to	be	a	main	stumbling	block	to	any	agreed	
outcome	on	NAMAs	in	Copenhagen.
3 .5 Financing mitigation actions 
under the convention
Mitigation	 actions	 covered	 by	 the	 measures	
under	national	or	regional	programmes	are	to	be	
financed separately	 from	the	other	 implementing	
measures	 such	 as	 the	 formulation,	 publication	
and	 regular	 updating	 of	 these	 programmes,	 as	
agreed	by	Parties	 to	 the	Convention	 in	 a	 deci-
sion	taken	at	the	first	session	of	the	Conference	
of	the	Parties	in	1995.13
In	 its	 decision	 on	 the	 initial	 guidance	 to	 be	
given	to	any	operating	entity	or	entities	regard-
ing	the	financial	mechanism	of	the	Convention,	
the	 formulation	 by	 developing	 country	 Parties	
of	nationally	determined	programmes	to	address	
climate	 change	 issues	which	are	 in	 accordance	
with	national	development	priorities	 should	be	
financed,	 including	capacity-building	and	relat-
ed	activities.
12  Article 4.7 
13  Decision 11/CP.1, paragraph 1 (b) on programme priorities, sub-
paragraph (iv)
Financing	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 national	
programmes	both	for	adaptation	and	mitigation	
adopted	by	developing	country	Parties	could	be	
provided	 upon	 request.	 In	 addition,	 financing	
should	 be	 provided	 for	 the	 agreed	 activities	 to	
mitigate	climate	change	contained	in	the	nation-
al	programmes.14	
It	is	therefore	clear	that	what	are	financed	under	
the	 Convention	 are	 the	 formulation,	 capacity-
building	 and	 all	 other	 activities	 related	 to	 the	
formulation,	management	and	regular	updating	
of	national	programmes	which	are	in	accordance	
with	national	development	priorities.	Financing	
of	 the	 implementation	 of	 these	 programmes	 is	
provided	 upon request.	 In	 respect	 of	 this	 imple-
mentation,	 the	agreed	activities	 to	mitigate	cli-
mate	change	should	also	be	supported.
Moreover,	developing	country	Parties	may,	again	
on	a	voluntary	basis,	propose	projects	for	financ-
ing,	including	the	financing	of	technologies	and	
practices	needed	to	implement	measures	to	ad-
dress	 climate	 change,	 if	 possible	 together	 with	
estimates	of	all	 incremental	costs,	of	the	reduc-
tions	of	emissions	and	increments	of	removals	of	
GHGs,	and	of	any	consequent	benefits.15
Proposals	suggesting	that	NAMAs	should	be	sub-
ject	 to	MRV,	 put	 in	 place	 or	 formulated	 before	
they	can	be	enabled	and	supported	by	financing,	
technology	 and	 capacity-building	 are	 therefore	
in	direct	contravention	of	the	provisions	of	the	
Convention.
Any	listing	or	registry	that	would	be	established	
involving	NAMAs	that	are	supported	and	enabled	
in	a	MRV	manner	should	be	 instituted	through	
the	financial	mechanism	of	the	Convention,	but	
14  Ibid., sub-paragraphs (v) and (vi)
15  Article 12.4
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under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	COP	 to	 ensure	 effi-
ciency	and	accountability.
4 . enabling developing countries 
to Undertake Namas
4 .1 Provisions for enabling NaMas 
In	 Article	 4.1,	 the	 Convention	 clearly	 lays	 out	
areas	for	the	promotion	of	international	coopera-
tion	 that	 would	 enable	 all	 Parties,	 in	 particular	
developing	 country	 Parties,	 to	 develop	 national	
programmes	containing	measures	that	could	then	
be	implemented	as	nationally	determined	policies	
and	actions	for	mitigation	and	adaptation.	
Foremost	 among	 the	 obligations	 of	 all	 Parties	
is	 the	 preparation	 of	 national	 communications	
with	 specific	 provisions	 for	 developed	 country	
Parties. The	 contents	 of	 these	 communications	
are	 specified	 separately	 for	 each	 Party	 and	 for	
developed	country	Parties.	
It	 is	 evident	 that,	 without	 reliable	 information	
on	inventories	of	GHG	sources	and	sinks	in	any	
country,	 as	 well	 as	 assessments	 of	 vulnerabili-
ties,	 it	 will	 not	 be	 possible	 to	 develop	 policies	
and	measures	to	allow	mitigation	or	adaptation	
actions	 to	 be	 undertaken.	 National	 communi-
cations	are	 therefore	 the	bases	on	which	 these	
policies	and	measures	are	developed	at	 the	na-
tional	level.
The	 preparations	 of	 national	 communications	
for	developing	country	Parties	are	provided	with	
financial	resources	on	an	agreed	full	cost	basis.	
The	other	activities	are	financed	for	developing	
country	 Parties	 on	 an	 agreed	 full	 incremental	
costs	basis.	These	activities	would	enable	devel-
oping	countries	to	undertake	mitigation	actions	
and	also	adaptation	actions.
The	same	provisions	can	be	found	in	the	Kyoto	
Protocol,	 which	 focus	 mainly	 on	 international	
cooperation	 for	 mitigation.	 Provisions	 in	 the	
Protocol	 include	 information	 to	 be	 provided	
by	developing	countries	on	 ‘the abatement of in-
creases in GHG emissions, and enhancement of and 
removals by sinks, capacity-building and adaptation 
measures.’16
Financing	 for	 these	activities	 is	provided	 for	 in	
Article	11	of	 the	Kyoto	Protocol.	 Together	with	
Article	12	of	the	Protocol,	which	deals	with	the	
clean	development	mechanism	(CDM),	these	are	
the	three	articles	in	the	Protocol	that	define	the	
participation	 of	 developing	 country	 Parties	 in	
mitigation	activities.
4 .2 NaMas are not limited to 
emissions reductions
The	 national	 obligation	 under	 Article	 4.1	 (b),	
which	 is	 the	 only	 provision	 of	 the	 Convention	
which	could	possibly	be	interpreted	as	providing	
for	mitigation	 actions	 by	 developing	 countries,	
states	 that	 national	 or	 regional	 programmes	
containing	measures	to	mitigate	climate	change	
cover	 both	 sources	 of	 emissions	 and	 sinks	 and	
reservoirs.	This	is	further	reinforced	by	the	pro-
vision	on	international	cooperation	to	conserve	
and	enhance	sinks	and	reservoirs	of	GHGs,	 ‘in-
cluding biomass, forests and oceans, as well as other 
terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems.’	
As	previously	stated,	these	implementing	activi-
ties	are	to	be	provided	with	financial	resources,	
16  Article 10 (b) (ii) of the Kyoto Protocol.
There is likewise no obligation for 
developing countries to undertake 
mitigation actions under the Convention.
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including	 financing	 for	 transfers	 of	 technology	
on	an	agreed	full	 incremental	costs	basis	in	ac-
cordance	with	Article	4.3.	NAMAs	covering	the	
enhancement	of	 sinks	and	reservoirs	 should	be	
financed	and	provided	with	technology	and	ca-
pacity-building,	in	addition	to	these	activities.
The	same	consideration	is	taken	into	account	in	
the	guidelines	for	developed	country	Parties’	na-
tional	communications,	which	state,	under	poli-
cies	and	measures,	that	mitigation	actions	‘need	
not	have	as	a	primary	objective	the	limitation	of	
GHGs.’17
The	 proposal	 of	 the	 Group	 of	 77	 and	 China	
under	 the	 Bali	 Action	 Plan	 that	 the	 financial	
mechanism	 of	 the	 Convention	 be	 operational-
ized	under	the	authority	of	the	Conference	of	the	
Parties	contains	provisions	for	funds	covering	all	
mitigation	 activities,	 including	 those	 related	 to	
the	enhancement	of	sinks	and	reservoirs.		
This	proposal	also	states	that:
‘any funding pledged outside of the Convention 
shall not be regarded as the fulfilment of com-
mitments by developed country Parties under 
Article 4.3 of the Convention, and their com-
mitments for measurable, reportable and verifi-
able means of implementation, that is, finance, 
technology and capacity-building, in terms of 
paragraph 1 (b) (ii) of the Bali Action Plan.’18
17  Annex to Decision 9/CP.2, paragraph 20.
18  FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.2/Add.1, page 36, paragraph 6.
Any	 funding	 for	 NAMAs	 that	 are	 channelled	
through	financing	institutions	outside	the	frame-
work	of	the	financial	mechanism	of	the	Conven-
tion	 therefore	 cannot	 be	 considered	 or	 made	
subject	to	MRV.
5 . conclusions
NAMAs	are	voluntary	actions	by	devel-1.	
oping	country	Parties	that	are	deter-
mined	at	the	national	level,	are	under-
taken	in	accordance	with	their	sustain-
able	development	objectives,	and	are	
not	obligations	under	the	Convention.	
Only	those	NAMAs	that	are	enabled	2.	
and	supported	by	financing,	technol-
ogy	and	capacity-building	and	which	
are	measured,	reported	and	verified	
can	in	turn	be	subject	to	MRV.	Financ-
ing	channelled	through	institutions	
outside	the	framework	of	the	financial	
mechanism	of	the	Convention	cannot	
be	counted	as	financing	for	NAMAs.
Poverty	eradication	and	the	pursuit	of	3.	
sustainable	development	are	necessary	
in	order	to	undertake	mitigation	ac-
tions.	Article	3.4	provides	that	econom-
ic	development	is	essential	in	adopting	
measures	to	address	climate	change.
The	implementation	of	the	commit-4.	
ments	of	developed	country	Parties	
related	to	financial	resources	and	
transfers	of	technology	will	determine	
the	extent	to	which	developing	country	
Parties	will	be	able	to	undertake	mitiga-
tion	actions.	
What are subject to MRV are the actions 
themselves, and not necessarily the 
results or effects of these actions.
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The	financing	of	mitigation	actions	5.	
is	additional	to	the	commitment	by	
developed	country	Parties	to	provide	
to	developing	country	Parties,	on	an	
agreed	full	incremental	costs	basis,	the	
implementing	and	enabling	measures	
that	are	covered	in	Article	4.1	of	the	
Convention.
Any	further	elaboration	of	the	mecha-6.	
nisms	or	functions	of	NAMAs	under	
the	Bali	Action	Plan	should	build	upon	
existing	mechanisms	within	the	Con-
vention	and	be	fully	consistent	with	the	
principles,	obligations	and	provisions	of	
the	Convention,	as	well	as	with	the	rel-
evant	decisions	taken	by	the	COP.
Any	listing	or	registration	of	NAMAs	7.	
that	are	enabled	and	supported	in	an	
MRV	manner	should	be	placed	under	
the	financial	mechanism	set	up	under	
the	authority	of	the	Conference	of	the	
Parties.
NAMAs	should	be	financed	through	the	8.	
financial	mechanism	to	be	operational-
ized	under	the	authority	of	the	COP.	
In	order	to	ensure	that	NAMAs	contrib-9.	
ute	to	the	achievement	of	the	objective	
of	the	Convention,	they	should	not	be	
financed	through	the	carbon	market,	
nor	used	as	carbon	offsets	for	developed	
countries.
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abstract
Many developing countries are already 
implementing climate change mitigation actions. 
In Bali, developing countries indicated their 
willingness to undertake additional measurable, 
reportable and verifiable mitigation actions, 
provided they receive the promised measurable, 
reportable and verifiable support from 
industrialized countries. The possible types of 
NAMAs under debate include voluntary and 
unilateral, supported and carbon credit NAMAs. 
Most southern African countries feel that NAMAs 
need to contribute to developing countries’ 
sustainable development goals and boost their 
economic growth. The scope and scale of NAMAs 
has not yet been defined by the negotiations, 
but judging from Parties’ proposals, they could 
include anything from voluntary renewable energy 
targets to boosting energy efficiency standards to 
deforestation projects, provided that international 
support is available and the additional mitigation 
benefit can be measured, reported and verified. 
Climate	 change	 is	 one	 of	 the	 biggest	 threats	
facing	mankind	today.	Science	has	clearly	demon-
strated	the	extreme	urgency	of	taking	real	action	
to	avoid	irreversible	damages	to	our	planet.	The	
Fourth	 Assessment	 Report	 (4AR)	 of	 the	 Inter-
governmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	 states	
that	Africa	will	suffer	the	most	from	the	impacts	
of	climate	change.	
The	 priority	 for	 most	 developing	 countries	 is	
adaptation,	but	mitigation	 is	 also	 viewed	as	ex-
tremely	 important	 in	 order	 to	 safeguard	 future	
generations	 from	 the	 diverse	 and	 complex	 im-
pacts	of	climate	change.	A	certain	amount	of	ad-
aptation	will	be	necessary,	no	matter	what	we	do.	
The	fear	is	that	there	will	come	a	time	where	it	
will	not	be	possible	to	adapt	our	way	out	of	the	
problem.
According	to	the	Convention,	developing	coun-
tries	can	voluntarily	implement	nationally	appro-
priate	mitigation	actions	(NAMAs)	in	the	context	
of	sustainable	development,	as	well	as	following	
a	clean	development	path	now,	up	to	and	beyond	
NatiONally aPPrOPriate MitigatiON actiONs FOr develOPiNg cOUNtries:
A Perspective from Southern Africa
W.	Zhakata
Climate Change Office  
in Zimbabwe
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2012	to	allow	them	to	reduce	their	rate	of	emis-
sions	growth		by	comparison	with	1990	levels.
Mitigation	has	been	at	the	heart	of	the	climate	
negotiations	from	the	outset.	As	the	next	round	
of	 negotiations	 will	 focus	 on	 what	 developing	
countries	might	do	on	mitigation,	 the	topic	re-
mains	 highly	 relevant.	Movement	 on	 this	 topic	
started	 in	 Bali,	 where	 attempts	 were	 made	 to	
retain	the	Annex	I/non-Annex	I	balance	of	miti-
gation	 commitments,	 as	well	 as	 to	 increase	 the	
sense	of	urgency	on	both	sides.	The	balance	was	
outlined	in	paragraph	1:	
(b) ‘Enhanced national/international action on 
mitigation of climate change, including, inter 
alia, consideration of: 
(i) Measurable, reportable and verifiable 
nationally appropriate mitigation  com-
mitments or actions, including quantified 
emission limitation and reduction objectives 
(QELROs), established under the Kyoto 
Protocol, by all developed country Parties, 
while ensuring the comparability of efforts 
among them, taking into account differ-
ences in their national circumstances; 
(ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation ac-
tions by developing country Parties in the 
context of sustainable development, sup-
ported and enabled by technology, financ-
ing and capacity-building, in a measurable, 
reportable and verifiable manner’.
One	 priority	 for	 southern	 Africa	 countries	 in	
Bali	was	that	all	developed	countries,	 including	
the	 United	 States	 (US),	 adopt	 the	 Quantified	
Emission	 Limitation	 and	 Reduction	 Objectives	
(QELROs)	established	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	
Of	concern	was	that	this	was	included	only	as	an	
option	in	the	final	text.
There	 are	 various	 proposals	 for	 new	 sectoral	
market	 mechanisms	 for	 developing	 countries	
under	 consideration	 in	 the	 Ad	 hoc	 Working	
Group	 on	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 (AWG-KP),	 and	
some	 of	 these	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	 parallel	
in	the	Ad	hoc	Working	Group	on	Long-term	Co-
operative	 Acton	 (AWG-LCA).	 These	 essentially	
seek	to	leverage	the	power	of	the	carbon	market	
to	 support	 developing	 countries’	 NAMAs.	Most	
southern	African	countries	were	not	opposed	to	
the	financial	windows	that	were	proposed.
However,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 feeling	 regarding	
southern	 African	 countries	 in	 particular	 that	
mitigation	measures	in	agriculture	and	reducing	
emissions	from	deforestation	can	make	a	signifi-
cant	 mitigation	 contribution.	 Concurrently,	 in	
both	forestry	and	agriculture,	there	are	synergies	
between	mitigation,	adaptation,	sustainable	de-
velopment,	food	security	and	poverty	alleviation.	
Many	mitigation	 options	 can	 result	 in	 win-win	
situations,	 such	 as	 increasing	 food	 security	 or	
enhancing	climate	change	resilience.	
Countries	 in	 Southern	 Africa,	 like	 many	 other	
developing	 countries,	 is	 already	 implementing	
climate	 change	 mitigation	 actions,	 but	 only	 a	
few	have	climate	change	strategies	in	place.	The	
sub-region	generally	concurs	with	other	nations	
on	the	idea	of	developing	countries	introducing	
NAMAs	with	international	support.	
It	 is	 argued	 that,	 with	 support	 in	 the	 form	 of	
clean	 technologies	 and	 finance,	 NAMAs	 could	
contribute	to	creating	real	competitive	economic	
advantages	for	Africa.	Southern	Africa	feels	that,	
in	order	to	harness	this	opportunity,	the	region	
needs	 to	 define	 additional	mitigation	 activities	
that	 could	 function	 as	NAMAs.	 There	 is	 also	 a	
need	for	clarity	on	how	financial	and	technologi-
cal	support	would	be	directed.	
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However,	 there	 is	 a	 fear	 among	 southern	 Afri-
can	countries	that	public	funding	is	unlikely	to	
provide	sufficient	support	to	meet	the	full	needs	
of	both	mitigation	and	adaptation.	The	carbon	
market	is	one	viable	option.	A	question	arises	as	
to	whether	investing	in	the	NAMAs	of	developing	
countries	would	count	towards	meeting	targets	in	
industrialized	countries.	The	region	feels	that	it	
is	critical	that	the	negotiations	clarify	the	gener-
ating	mechanisms.	Regarding	policy	approaches	
and	policy	incentives	on	issues	relating	to	reduc-
ing	 emissions	 in	 developing	 countries,	 market	
mechanisms	have	 enormous	potential	 to	 act	 as	
an	effective	means	to	promote	the	large-scale	in-
vestment	required	to	reduce	emissions.	For	this	
reason,	it	would	be	prudent	to	use	market-based	
mechanisms	 that	 create	 carbon	 credits	 that	
are	 fully	 fungible	 with	 Assigned	 Amount	 Units	
(AAUs),	 Certified	 Emission	 Reduction	 (CERs)	
units,	Emission	Reduction	Units	 (ERUs),	etc.	 to	
the	greatest	extent	possible.	
It	 is	 a	 feeling	 not	 only	 in	 southern	 Africa	 but	
in	Africa	as	a	whole	 that,	 in	order	 to	develop	a	
market	capable	of	generating	long-term	private-
sector	investment,	the	required	legal	and	regula-
tory	 infrastructure	must	 be	 established	 in	 host	
countries.	The	developed	country	parties	could	
make	funds	available	to	developing	countries	in	
the	period	up	to	2013	to	facilitate	the	diffusion	
of	such	infrastructure,	examine	the	specific	local	
and	regional	barriers,	and	establish	the	systems	
and	resources	to	enable	developing	countries	to	
participate	in	and	benefit	fully	from	the	carbon	
market	 and	 to	 attract	private-sector	 investment	
in	forestry	and	sustainable	land	use.
This	paper	tries	to	provide	more	information	on	
the	above	issues,	starting	with	the	introduction,	
which	briefly	sketches	the	history	of	the	NAMAs,	
and	 ending	 by	 highlighting	 some	 concerns	 of	
southern	 African	 countries	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
financing	of	mitigation	actions.	The	paper	then	
turns	 to	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	basis	 for	mitiga-
tion.	Section	2	introduces	the	issues	relating	to	
the	potential	 for	NAMA	 implementation.	 These	
include	 the	 possible	 types	 of	 NAMAs,	 sectoral	
approaches	and	 support	 for	NAMAs	 implemen-
tation.	This	discussion	then	leads	into	section	3,	
which	deals	with	one	of	the	contentious	issues,	
the	 ‘hot’	 topic	 of	 how	 mitigation	 actions	 can	
be	made	 ‘measurable,	 reportable	and	verifiable’	
(MRV).	 Before	 the	 conclusions,	 a	 discussion	 of	
the	 carbon	 financing	 prospects	 for	 NAMAs	 is	
presented.
Potential for NaMa implementation
Opinions	of	 some	countries	 frame	 the	 concern	
about	 equity	 in	 terms	 of	 per	 capita	 emissions,	
others	argue	that	consideration	of	historical	re-
sponsibility	is	a	basis	for	a	fair	deal,	while	for	yet	
others	the	dimension	of	equity	relates	to	devel-
opment.	This	approach	draws	on	Article	2	of	the	
Convention,	in	particular	that	climate	protection	
should	occur	 in	a	manner	 that	 ‘enables[s]	eco-
nomic	development	to	proceed	in	a	sustainable	
manner’.	More	broadly,	it	argues	that	sustainable	
development	in	developing	countries,	including	
its	 ecological	 and	 social	 dimensions,	 is	 indis-
pensable	 for	 an	 equitable	 solution,	 given	 that	
developed	countries	went	through	their	process	
of	 industrialization	without	carbon	constraints.	
In	earlier	debates	under	the	Convention,	the	Re-
public	of	South	Africa	(RSA)	put	forward	the	ap-
A Perspective from Southern Africa
There is a strong feeling regarding southern 
African countries in particular that mitigation 
measures in agriculture and reducing 
emissions from deforestation can make 
a significant mitigation contribution.
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proach	of	sustainable	development	policies	and	
measures	(RSA	2006b).
Sustainable	development	policies	and	measures	
suggest	 that	 developing	 countries	 themselves	
identify	 more	 sustainable	 development	 paths	
and	 commit	 to	 implementing	 these	with	 finan-
cial	support	(RSA	2006a;	Winkler	et	al.	2002a).
Southern	Africa	feels	that	these	sustainable	de-
velopment	 policies	 and	 measures	 (SD-PAMs)	
may	 aim	 to	 encompass	 large-scale	 policies	 and	
measures,	not	only	projects	as	in	the	CDM.	Many	
southern	 African	 countries	 have	 weak	 policies	
with	regard	to	climate	change,	and	emissions	of	
greenhouse	gases	 in	particular.	However,	under	
this	 approach	 (SD-PAMs),	 each	 country	 may	
define	 what	 it	 means	 by	 making	 development	
more	 sustainable.	 Funding	 for	 SD-PAMs	 could	
build	 on	 existing	 commitments	 in	 Convention	
Article	4.1(b)	and	Kyoto	Protocol	Article	10,	but	
since	they	are	development-oriented,	they	could	
also	mobilize	domestic	and	international	devel-
opment	 finance.	 Both	 climate	 and	 non-climate	
funding	 can	 be	 mobilized	 to	 implement	 SD-
PAMs.
Progress	in	achieving	both	the	local	sustainable	
development	 benefits	 and	 climate	 co-benefits	
might	 be	 monitored	 through	 national	 institu-
tions,	but	could	also	be	reviewed	internationally.	
Recent	work	has	 identified	 four	broad	method-
ologies	for	quantifying	the	effect	of	SD-PAMs	on	
development	and	emissions	(Winkler	et	al.	2008):	
(1)	case	studies;	 (2)	national	energy	modelling;	
(3)	 analysis	 of	 sectoral	 data;	 and	 (4)	 inclusion	
of	policies	in	global	emission	allocation	models.	
The	first	two	of	these	methods	focus	on	the	na-
tional	or	subnational	levels	in	quantifying	results.	
Case	studies,	by	their	nature,	focus	on	a	specific	
context,	 while	 energy	 modelling	 quantifies	 re-
sults	 (for	energy	and	often	also	emissions)	as	a	
partial	analysis	of	a	national	economy.	Method	4	
has	a	more	global	focus,	being	designed	for	the	
purpose	 of	 comparing	 international	 emission	
allocation	 schemes.	 Method	 3	 bridges	 the	 na-
tional/global	divide	by	collecting	fairly	detailed	
data	 from	 countries	 (for	 selected	 sectors),	 but	
allowing	 international	 projections.	 A	 potential	
weakness	of	SD-PAMs	is	that	the	environmental	
outcome	is	uncertain:	it	depends	entirely	on	the	
number	and	extent	of	policies	implemented.
Possible types of NaMas
The	 first	 possible	 NAMAs	 could	 be	 associated	
with	 actions	 that	 developing	 countries	 would	
take	voluntarily	and	unilaterally	without	support	
from	 developed	 countries.	 The	 least	 developed	
countries	(LDCs)	are	engaged	in	drawing	up	Na-
tional	 Adaptation	 Plans	 of	 Action	 (NAPAs)	 for	
climate	change.	The	other	developing	countries	
have	done	the	technology	transfer	needs	assess-
ments	 for	 climate	 change.	 All	 these	 efforts	 are	
aimed	at	addressing	both	mitigation	and	adapta-
tion.	These	and	other	studies	can	form	the	basis	
for	 the	 formulation	of	 sustainable	development	
policies	and	measures.	These	actions	should	also	
be	recognized	as	international	actions	for	com-
bating	climate	change	once	 they	are	 registered	
on	 the	 Registry.	 They	 should	 be	 interpreted	 as	
unilateral	 contributions	 from	developing	 coun-
tries	to	global	commons	(See	Table	1).
Secondly,	there	are	actions	that	require	support	
from	developed	countries.	These	are	the	actions	
that	developing	countries	are	willing	to	take	with	
the	 support	 of	 financing	 and	 technology	 from	
developed	countries.	Developing	countries	could	
specify	the	details	of	the	support	they	needed,	in	
cases	of	a	lack	of	capacity,	they	could	simply	list	
the	need	for	capacity	building	as	well.
37
CD4CDM
Last	 but	 not	 least	 among	 possible	 NAMAs	 are	
those	 that	 can	 be	 associated	 with	 actions	 that	
developing	countries	are	willing	 to	 take	 for	 the	
purpose	 of	 obtaining	 carbon	 credit	 as	 an	 out-
come	 of	 implementing	 such	 actions.	 Reducing	
Emissions	 from	 Deforestation	 and	 Degrada-
tion	(REDD)	as	well	as	Agriculture,	Forestry	and	
Other	Land-Uses	(AFOLU),	would	be	good	exam-
ples	of	such	actions.	Carbon	credit	could	provide	
market	incentives	for	investment	in	such	actions.	
Most	southern	African	countries	support	types	2	
and	3,	where	support	is	generally	provided.
sectoral approaches
The	Bali	Action	Plan	 includes	as	one	option	 in	
the	 mitigation	 building	 block	 cooperative	 sec-
toral	 approaches	 and	 sector-specific	 actions,	 in	
order	 to	 enhance	 implementation	 of	 Article	 4,	
paragraph	1(c),	of	the	Convention.	
In	 terms	of	 the	Bali	 Action	Plan,	 domestic	 sec-
toral	 efforts	 would	 be	 closer	 to	 nationally	 ap-
propriate	mitigation	actions,	while	transnational	
sectoral	agreements	probably	amount	to	mitiga-
tion	commitments,	at	 least	 for	 the	sectors	con-
cerned.	Whatever	one’s	interpretation,	it	is	clear	
that	 sectoral	 approaches	 are	 closely	 related	 to	
technology	in	the	Bali	Action	Plan.
Developing	 countries	 have	 expressed	 concerns	
about	 transnational	 sectoral	agreements,	which	
they	 see	 as	 introducing	 commitments	 without	
recognizing	the	principles	of	equity	and	common	
but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	respective	
capabilities.	For	Annex	I	countries,	policies	and	
measures	(many	of	which	are	implemented	at	the	
sectoral	level)	are	intended	by	the	Kyoto	Protocol	
to	 achieve	 national	 caps	 or	 QELROs.	 However,	
there	appears	to	be	more	agreement	that,	what-
ever	the	multi-lateral	agreement,	sectoral	efforts	
are	important	in	implementation	at	the	national	
level.	Framed	appropriately,	sectoral	approaches	
may	be	helpful	as	one	tool	for	mitigation.
A	recent	version	of	particular	 interest	 to	devel-
oping	countries	may	be	sectoral	crediting	base-
lines	(Ward	et	al.	2008).	This	particular	variant	
would	be	implemented	domestically	in	develop-
Table 1: Types of NAMAs
Type of NAMA Description
Voluntary and unilateral1. NAMA associated with actions that developing coun-
tries would take voluntarily and unilaterally without 
support from developed countries
Supported2. Actions that require support from developed 
countries
Carbon Credit NAMAs3. NAMAs associated with actions that developing coun-
tries are willing to take for the purpose of obtaining 
carbon credit as an outcome of implementing such 
actions
A Perspective from Southern Africa
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ing	countries,	with	the	‘no	lose’	meaning	that	ex-
ceeding	a	specified	benchmark	entitles	a	country	
to	trade	surplus	emission	reductions.	There	is	no	
penalty	for	not	achieving	any	sectoral	standard,	
but	 there	 is	 an	 incentive	 to	 exceed	 the	bench-
mark.	Beyond	the	advantage	of	‘no	lose’,	this	vari-
ant	may	be	attractive	due	to	its	focus	on	incen-
tives	and	being	voluntary.
support for NaMas
Financing
Designing	 a	 well-functioning	 mechanism	 to	
transfer	 financial	 resources	 and	 technology	 to	
developing	countries	 to	 support	 their	NAMA	 is	
another	 important	 element.	 The	 current	 situa-
tion	 is	 not	 clear	 on	 support	 for	mitigation	 ac-
tions.	 The	 current	 financial	 flows	 are	 not	 pre-
dictable	and	dependable.	No	clear	commitments	
have	 been	 made	 by	 the	 Annex	 I	 countries	 to	
support	any	mitigation	actions.	Uneven	regional	
distribution	 of	 Clean	 Development	Mechanism	
(CDM)	projects	has	resulted	in	its	failure	in	most	
African	countries.
However,	 there	 is	 a	 general	 feeling	 within	 the	
southern	African	countries	that	with	the	restruc-
turing	 of	 the	 current	 CDM,	 and	 learning	 from	
past	 experiences,	 a	 new	 financial	 mechanism	
could	 be	 agreed	 that	 would	 be	 more	 efficient	
in	 addressing	 especially	 the	 issues	 of	 regional	
distribution.
One	 of	 the	 crucial	 factors	 in	 scaling	 up	 finan-
cial	 flows	 to	 mitigation	 actions	 in	 developing	
countries	 is	 improving	 the	commercial	 viability	
of	 investments.	 Under	 the	 current	 CDM,	 some	
projects	are	too	small	to	attract	investment	from	
large-scale	enterprises.	For	example,	power	gen-
eration	is	limited	to	15	MW	for	small-scale	proj-
ects.	 Large-scale	mitigation	 projects	 are	 gener-
ally	considered	developmental	and	in	some	cases	
are	 not	 acceptable	 as	 additional	 under	 CDM.	
What	is	lacking	is	not	money	and	technology,	but	
a	climate	regime	which	could	improve	the	com-
mercial	 viability	 of	 investments	 for	 mitigation.	
Once	this	is	addressed,	then	the	market	will	drive	
finance	and	technology	to	flow	to	mitigation	ac-
tions	in	developing	countries.	
As	NAMAs	are	 incentive-based,	 southern	Africa	
feels	that	international	financial	and	technology	
support	for	NAMAs	should	come	from	a	range	of	
sources	mobilized	by	Financial	and	Technology	
Mechanism(s).	The	support	provided	would	then	
be	measured	by	developed	countries,	indicating	
an	allocation	and	transfer	of	finance	 for	means	
of	implementation	over	and	above	Official	Devel-
opment	Assistance	 (ODA)	 in	units	of	an	agreed	
common	currency.
technology transfer
On	 the	 stimulation	 of	 technology	 development,	
diffusion	and	transfer,	one	of	 the	most	effective	
moves	that	Parties	and	countries	could	make	is	to	
establish	a	global	price	for	carbon	emissions	and	
allow	unhindered	access	to	offsets	for	up-capped	
sectors.	This	would	promote	and	enhance	invest-
ments	in	clean	technology	development	and	diffu-
sion	in	developed	and	developing	countries	alike.	
There	is	a	need	for	CDM	implementation	reforms	
in	order	for	technology	transfer	to	succeed.	Once	
this	 is	done,	 the	ability	of	market-based	mecha-
nisms	to	facilitate	the	transfer	of	clean	technol-
ogy	will	be	enhanced.	In	principle,	the	future	of	
market-based	mechanisms	looks	bright.
Any	 new	 market-based	 mechanisms,	 such	 as	
no-lose	 targets	 with	 crediting,	 would	 certainly	
scale	up	such	 transfers	 to	developing	countries	
dramatically	as	 long	as	 they	ensured	 incentives	
for	 developed-	 and	developing-country	private-
sector	 actors	 to	 take	 part.	 The	 expansion	 and	
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improvement	 of	 programmatic	CDM	or	 a	move	
towards	the	use	of	standardized	baselines	and/or	
positive	lists	for	the	determination	of	additional-
ity	in	‘regular’	CDM	would	have	a	similarly	posi-
tive	effect	on	technology	transfer	and	diffusion,	
albeit	on	a	smaller	scale.
However,	 there	 are	 some	 technologies	 that	 re-
quire	 more	 than	 the	 carbon	market	 pricing	 to	
bridge	the	gap	to	economic	competitiveness.	For	
these	technologies,	the	development	of	a	market	
needs	to	be	accompanied	by	other	policies,	mea-
sures	and	instruments.	In	that	case	governments	
could	consider	innovative	funding	arrangements	
for	such	technologies,	such	as	the	use	of	domes-
tic	auction	revenues	to	support	the	demonstra-
tion	of	critical	technologies	like	Carbon	Capture	
and	Sequestration	(CCS).	Of	course,	CCS	is	still	
contentious.
There	might	also	be	a	need	to	explore	the	possi-
bility	of	creating	an	international	mechanism	for	
technology	 development	 or	 transfer	 to	 provide	
credits	 for	 participation.	 Developed	 countries	
could	measure	 the	 technology	 transfer,	 includ-
ing	 development,	 application	 and	 diffusion,	 in	
units	 established	according	 to	 indicators	being	
developed	under	the	auspices	of	the	Subsidiary	
Body	 for	 Implementation	 (SBI)	 and	 Subsidiary	
Body	 for	 Scientific	 and	 Technological	 Advice	
(SBSTA).	 The	 agreed	 full	 incremental	 costs	 for	
technology	 transferred	 to	 developing	 countries	
would	 then	 be	 reported	 in	 units	 of	 an	 agreed	
common	currency.
capacity development 
Effective	 and	 efficient	 governance	 and	 institu-
tional	arrangements	are	critical	to	ensuring	that	
the	 objectives	 of	 the	 NAMAS	 are	 fulfilled	 in	 a	
transparent,	 efficient,	 timely	 and	 accountable	
fashion.	Every	effort	should	be	made	to	increase	
administrative	 simplicity	 and	minimize	 transac-
tion	costs.	Governance	arrangements	will	need	to	
be	developed	for	new	flexibility	mechanisms,	such	
as	sectoral	crediting.	 In	doing	so,	Parties	 should	
be	 careful	 not	 to	 duplicate	 roles,	 functions	 and	
processes,	but	also	be	prepared	to	learn	from	ex-
periences	in	the	first	commitment	period.	
There	is	a	good	case	to	be	made	for	re-examining	
the	 structure	and	operation	of	 the	CDM	and	 its	
project	approvals	system	in	order	to	 facilitate	an	
increased	 flow	 of	 crediting	 proposals	 post-2012.	
There	is	a	need	to	strengthen	the	Designated	Na-
tional	Authorities	 (DNAs).	The	capacity-building	
required	 applies	 to	 the	 individual,	 institutional	
and	 systemic	 levels.	Most	of	 the	 individuals	who	
constitute	the	DNAs	do	not	participate	in	climate	
change	activities	in	their	day-to-day	work	and	thus	
need	awareness	and	in	some	cases	short	courses	
on	climate	change	mitigation.	In	order	for	institu-
tions	to	support	the	activities	of	the	DNAs,	there	
is	a	need	for	awareness	as	well	as	equipping	these	
institutions	with	the	required	hardware	and	soft-
ware.	With	regard	to	the	systemic	levels,	there	is	a	
need	 for	 awareness	by	policy-makers	 and	conse-
quently	for	policy	reviews.	The	current	policies	in	
various	southern	Africa	countries	do	not	accom-
modate	even	CDM	itself.	DNAs	in	most	southern	
African	countries	have	never	approved	any	CDM	
projects.	The	focal	points	need	capacity-building	
in	 order	 for	 them	 to	 have	 a	 better	 appreciation	
of	the	NAMAs	and	their	roles	 in	climate	change.	
Some	focal	points	in	some	southern	African	coun-
tries	are	not	active	participants	 in	 the	UNFCCC	
process.	 No	 new	 institutions	 may	 be	 needed	 to	
handle	the	NAMAs.
A Perspective from Southern Africa
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have been made by the Annex I countries 
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Developed	countries	can	be	free	to	measure	the	
support	for	capacity-building	according	to	indi-
cators	and	in	units	to	be	established	in	the	review	
of	the	capacity-building	framework.
NaMas registration
The	issuing	of	a	register	 is	one	of	the	core	ele-
ments	 in	 any	 negotiating	 text	 addressing	 para-
graph	1(b)	(ii)	of	the	Bali	Action	Plan.	The	register	
is	a	mechanism	to	enhance	the	implementation	
of	the	relevant	provisions	of	Article	4,	paragraph	
1	of	the	Convention,	which	deals	with	mitigation	
action	to	be	taken	by	developing	countries	in	the	
context	 of	 their	 overriding	 poverty	 alleviation	
and	sustainable	development	priorities	and	in	ac-
cordance	with	the	principles	specified	in	Article	
3	of	the	Convention,	particularly	their	common	
but	 differentiated	 responsibilities	 and	 respec-
tive	capabilities.	The	extent	to	which	developing	
country	 Parties	will	 effectively	 implement	 their	
commitments	under	the	convention	will	depend	
on	 the	 effective	 implementation	 by	 developed	
country	Parties	of	their	commitments	under	the	
convention	 related	 to	 their	 financial	 resources	
and	transfers	of	technology	(Article	4,	paragraph	
7	of	the	Convention).	The	register	enhances	the	
implementation	of	Article	4,	paragraphs	3	and	5	
of	the	Convention	by	facilitating	the	identifica-
tion,	mobilization	and	matching	of	the	financial,	
technology,	capacity	and	other	support	required	
to	 implement	nationally	 appropriate	mitigation	
actions	(NAMAs)	which	are	submitted	by	devel-
oping	countries	in	terms	of	Article	12,	paragraph	
4	of	the	Convention.
As	such,	the	register	provides	a	practical	mecha-
nism	to	enable	the	international	recognition	of	
developing	country	mitigation	action	and	to	en-
hance	its	communication	in	terms	of	the	relevant	
provisions	of	Article	12	of	the	Convention.	
Southern	African	countries,	like	most	developing	
countries,	feel	that	NAMA	registration	should	be	
voluntary.	Each	Party	may	register	the	content	of	
NAMAs	as	well	as	the	kind	of	support	they	need	
to	implement	them.	It	could	also	specify,	if	pos-
sible,	the	expected	quantity	of	mitigation	result-
ing	from	its	NAMAs.	Implementation	plans,	such	
as	timeframes,	could	also	be	registered:	the	sub-
region	has	no	objection	to	this.
There	is	a	feeling	in	the	region	that	the	UNFCCC	
Secretariat	should	open	and	maintain	the	regis-
ter	of	NAMAs,	which	should	include	the	actions	
that	 developing	 countries	 want	 to	 submit,	 the	
identified	 support	 required,	 and	 the	 emissions	
that	would	be	avoided,	relative	to	baseline.	This	
emanates	 from	 the	 convention,	which	does	not	
discuss	 binding	 emission	 reduction	 require-
ments	by	developing	country	parties,	only	volun-
tary	mitigation	actions.
Others	feel	that	NAMAs	may	comprise	individual	
mitigation	actions,	sets	of	actions	or	programmes.	
Developing	countries	may	choose	from	a	variety	
of	forms	of	action,	including	REDD,	programmat-
ic	CDM	modified	to	fit	into	NAMAs,	no-lose	sec-
toral	crediting	baselines	and	others.	The	register	
should	initially	contain	a	list	of	indicative mitiga-
tion	actions	proposed	and	the	support	needed	to	
implement	them,	as	well	as	information	related	to	
the	assumptions	and	methodology	underpinning	
the	 proposed	 action,	 the	 emissions	 that	 would	
be	avoided	relative	to	baseline	and	the	required	
support	for	the	indicative	mitigation	actions.
A	number	of	developing	countries	propose	that	
the	assumptions	and	methodology	underpinning	
the	 proposed	 action	 and	 the	 required	 support	
for	 the	 indicative	mitigation	 actions	 should	be	
assessed	by	a	Technical	Panel	established	under	
the	 Convention.	 Once	 the	 Technical	 Panel	 re-
ports	that	the	action	and	support	have	been	es-
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tablished	using	good	practice,	 a	 request	 to	 the	
Financial	 and	 Technology	Mechanism(s)	 of	 the	
Convention	is	triggered.
On	an	annual	basis,	the	register	should	be	updat-
ed	to	reflect	the	status	of	implementation	of	an	
action	and	 its	 support.	Following	 the	first	MRV	
report,	 the	 NAMA	 should	 be	 considered	 regis-
tered (and	no	longer	indicative).
Measurable, reportable and verifiable  
Another	contentious	issue	in	the	current	negoti-
ations	pertains	to	concerns	by	some	Parties	and	
organizations	 on	 what	 needs	 to	 be	 measured,	
reported	 and	 verified.	 Some	 organizations,	 like	
the	International	Emissions	Trading	Association	
(IETA),	believe	 that	 all	 commitments	under	 the	
convention	and	associated	actions,	by	both	de-
veloped	and	developing	country	Parties,	should	
entail	measurement,	 reporting	 and	 verification.	
As	developing	country	Parties,	 the	countries	of	
the	southern	Africa	sub-region	strongly	feel	that	
such	monitoring	should	be	based	upon	the	2006	
Intergovernmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	
(IPCC)	Guidelines,	which	must	be	accompanied	
by	 guidance	 to	 enable	 detailed	 and	 consistent	
MRV	 at	 the	 appropriate	 sector	 level.	 However,	
the	 region	 feels	 that	 the	 emission	 reductions	
relative	 to	baseline	 should	be	measured	by	 the	
Party	implementing	the	mitigation	action	in	tons	
of	carbon	dioxide	equivalent,	according	to	multi-
laterally	agreed	guidelines	and	methodologies.
Most	 southern	 African	 countries	 feel	 that	 it	 is	
important	for	developing	countries	to	take	action	
to	 reduce	 their	 own	 emission	 trajectories,	 but	
with	the	assistance	of	developed	country	Parties.	
They	should	also	do	so	in	line	with	their	cumula-
tive	 emissions,	mitigation	 potential	 and	 oppor-
tunities,	bearing	in	mind	national	circumstances	
and	 the	 principle	 of	 common	 but	 differenti-
ated	responsibilities	and	respective	capabilities.	
Countries	 should	now	be	prepared	 to	pursue	a	
clean	development	path	up	to	and	beyond	2012	
through	measurable	 and	 verifiable	 actions	 that	
result	 in	 significant	 deviations	 in	 emissions	
growth	from	business-as-usual	scenarios.
Renewable	energy	and	energy	efficiency	policies	
and	measures	should	form	the	central	pillars	of	
future	 climate	 mitigation	 strategies	 involving	
NAMAs.	 Expanding	 access	 to	 renewable	 energy	
and	energy-efficient	technologies	should	be	the	
key	 strategy	 for	 engaging	 developing	 countries	
in	mitigation	efforts.
Technologies	 that	 increase	 dependence	 on	 car-
bon-intensive	 fuel	 sources	 should	 be	 discour-
aged.	 Technologies	 that	 generate	 additional	 or	
new	 environmental	 and	 health	 risk	 challenges	
for	the	international	community,	such	as	nuclear	
power,	should	not	be	included	in	the	energy	mix.
On	 what	 needs	 to	 be	 measured,	 reported	 and	
verified	 in	 relation	 to	 actions,	 the	 sub-region	
feels	 that	 energy	 efficiency	 targets	 and	 renew-
able	 energy	 targets	 can	 form	 a	 useful	 mecha-
nism	for	assessing	progress.	National	renewable	
energy	 targets,	 accompanied	 by	 concessionary	
financing	 from	 the	 international	 community	 to	
assist	 in	 achieving	 them,	 can	 be	 helpful	 in	 ad-
dressing	 both	 climate	 change	 and	 sustainable	
development.
The current carbon markets have proved 
to be ineffective in developing countries, 
particularly in Africa, where very little 
has been done in terms of CDM
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On	the	issue	of	reporting,	there	is	a	strong	feel-
ing	 amongst	 developing	 countries	 that	 mitiga-
tion	 actions	 implemented	 by	 developing	 coun-
tries	with	their	own	resources	should	be	report-
ed	in	national	communications,	thus	enhancing	
implementation	 of	 Article	 12.1	 of	 the	Conven-
tion.	In	addition,	developing	countries	may	vol-
untarily	 choose	 to	 register	 actions	 undertaken	
with	their	own	resources,	but	for	which	they	are	
not	 seeking	multi-lateral	 support.	 Such	 actions	
are	registered	for	recognition	purposes	only.
Mitigation	actions	 receiving	support	 should	be	
reported	to	the	registry.	Reporting	on	the	status	
of	 implementation	 to	 the	 registry	 should	 be	
annual,	with	an	update	based	on	measured	out-
comes	every	two	to	three	years,	alternating	with	
reporting	on	GHG	inventories.
It	is	the	suggestion	of	the	Africa	group	as	whole	
that	developed	countries	need	to	report	on	the	
measurement	of	support	they	may	be	providing	
to	developing	Parties	in	their	national	communi-
cations	under	Article	12.3.
In	 terms	 of	 verification,	 the	 proposal	 by	 South	
Africa	and	supported	by	many	other	countries	in	
the	sub-region	on	NAMAs	has	been	fairly	accept-
ed.	According	to	this	proposal,	NAMAs	support-
ed	with	public	funding	from	developed	countries	
and	not	resulting	in	the	transfer	of	carbon	cred-
its	should	be	verified,	together	with	the	support	
as	 measured	 and	 reported,	 through	 modalities	
and	 procedures	 to	 be	 established	 under	 Con-
Developing countries could be the driver 
of the global carbon market if they 
could generate carbon credits from 
their NAMAs in a MRV manner.
vention	and	according	 to	multi-laterally	agreed	
guidelines.
However,	 NAMAs	 financed	 through	 the	 carbon	
market	 and	 market	 finance	 should	 be	 verified	
together	with	 the	 support	 as	measured	and	 re-
ported,	 by	 institutions	 accredited	 by	 the	 COP	
and	according	to	the	same	multilaterally	agreed	
guidelines.	Independent	third-party	verification	
may	 be	 used,	 but	 must	 result	 in	 a	 verification	
report	considered	by	a	body	under	the	authority	
and	guidance	of	the	COP	and	in	accordance	with	
multi-laterally	agreed	guidelines.
NAMAs	undertaken	with	a	country’s	own	resourc-
es	may	be	verified	by	national	entities	working	to	
multi-laterally	agreed	guidelines	and	reported	in	
National	Communications.
For	 supported	 actions,	 developed	 country	 Par-
ties,	including	those	in	Annex	II,	should	provide	
new	and	additional	financial	 resources	 to	meet	
the	agreed	 full	 costs	of	 verification	undertaken	
by	developing	countries.
carbon Financing Prospects for NaMas 
current carbon markets 
The	 current	 carbon	markets	 have	 proved	 to	 be	
ineffective	 in	developing	countries,	particularly	
in	Africa,	where	very	little	has	been	done	in	terms	
of	CDM.	This	 implies	 that	 it	will	be	difficult	 to	
convince	some	of	the	developing	country	groups	
of	any	mechanism	without	concrete	guarantees	
that	it	will	not	be	yet	another	CDM.	Under	CDM,	
little	 if	 any	 new	 technology	 was	 transferred	 to	
southern	Africa,	and	only	small	amounts	of	capi-
tal	have	been	mobilized	for	climate	change	miti-
gation	as	we	approach	the	end	of	the	first	com-
mitment	period.
43
CD4CDM
Irrespective	of	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	current	
market	mechanism	for	southern	Africa,	 there	 is	
still	hope	that,	with	proper	planning	and	commit-
ment,	the	market	still	remains	critical	for	mobiliz-
ing	capital	and	technology	transfer	on	the	scale	
needed	to	achieve	the	ultimate	objective	of	the	
convention.	There	is	a	need	for	genuine	commit-
ment	to	meeting	the	challenge	of	climate	change	
and	to	come	to	agreement	in	Copenhagen.
Regarding	 the	 extension,	 scaling-up,	 reviewing	
and	 improvement	 of	 the	 current	 market-based	
mechanisms,	 some	 international	 organizations	
feel	strongly	that,	regardless	of	any	moves	to	dif-
ferentiate	among	developing	country	Parties	 in	
the	post-2012	period,	the	operation	of	the	exist-
ing	flexible	mechanisms	should	continue.	Indeed,	
reform	and	expansion	of	the	flexible	mechanisms	
are	crucial	for	an	effective	post-2012	framework.	
If	 the	 reforms	 are	 acceptable,	 then	 southern	
Africa	is	ready	to	support	this.
Southern	Africa	also	strongly	believes	that	prob-
lems	 with	 existing	 mechanisms	 should	 be	 ad-
dressed	within	the	UNFCCC	negotiation	process	
rather	than	uni-	or	bi-laterally	by	major	country	
buyers.	 Adding	 uni-	 or	 bi-lateral	 qualitative	 or	
quantitative	restrictions	to	the	CDM	only	intro-
duces	uncertainty	and	confusion	into	the	market.	
CDM	 requires	 reform	 so	 that	 activities	 can	 be	
scaled	 up,	 geographical	 distribution	 enhanced,	
and	 environmental	 integrity	 assured	 beyond	
doubt.	 The	 sub-region	 also	 is	 of	 the	 opinion	
that	the	necessary	reform	will	require	significant	
changes	to	the	CDM’s	governance	and	manage-
ment	system.	
Future carbon markets 
Many	new	market-based	mechanisms	have	been	
proposed	by	the	Parties	as	a	method	of	incentiv-
izing	mitigation	action	in	developing	countries.	
Examples	 include	 the	 establishment	 of	 sectoral	
or	 economy-wide	 ‘no-lose’	 targets,	 where	 cred-
its	would	be	 issued	for	over-achievement	of	 the	
target,	or	crediting	on	the	basis	of	nationally	ap-
propriate	mitigation	actions.
The	cost	of	one	ton	of	CO
2
	emission	reduction	
is	 from	 only	 a	 few	 dollars	 for	many	 developing	
countries	to	around	20	USD,	while	for	developed	
countries	it	ranges	from	153	USD	to	234	USD.	It	
would	be	appreciable	and	acceptable	if	we	could	
design	a	climate	regime	which	allows	developing	
countries	 to	 sell	 carbon	 credit	 generated	 from	
their	NAMA	done	in	a	MRV	manner,	so	that	the	
revenue	from	the	sales	of	these	credits	can	scale	
up	finance	and	 technology	flows	 to	 the	mitiga-
tion	 projects	 in	 developing	 countries.	 At	 the	
same	time,	it	will	reduce	the	total	cost	of	global	
mitigation.	According	to	one	particular	model,	a	
global	 trading	 system	 that	 includes	 developing	
countries	 could	 reduce	 global	mitigation	 costs	
by	70%	(Submission	of	Republic	of	Korea	to	the	
UNFCCC	Negotiation	process).
In	 order	 to	make	 such	 a	 global	 carbon-trading	
scheme	function,	there	have	to	be	demands	for	
carbon	 credits	 from	 the	 NAMAs	 of	 developing	
countries.	Annex	1	countries	have	already	agreed	
to	support	the	mitigation	actions	of	developing	
countries	by	transferring	finance	and	technolo-
gies.	 Thus	 buying	 carbon	 credit	 does	 not	 rep-
resent	 a	 new	 or	 additional	 burden	 for	 Annex	
1.	Buying	carbon	credit	more	cheaply	 than	the	
cost	of	domestic	mitigation	within	Annex	1	will	
be	 beneficial	 for	 Annex	 1	 credit	 buyers.	 Many	
developed	 countries	have	 announced	 that	 they	
are	going	to	offer	varying	sizes	of	climate	funds	
to	 support	 developing	 countries.	 Accepting	 a	
deeper	 target	 to	 buy	 credit	 from	 developing	
countries	will	not	be	much	different	than	offer-
ing	funds.
A Perspective from Southern Africa
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Since	 the	 Emissions	 Trading	 System	 (ETS),	 a	
carbon	trading	scheme	for	the	European	Union	
(EU),	 is	 reported	 as	 functioning	 efficiently	 in	
minimizing	 the	 costs	 of	 mitigation	 among	 Eu-
ropean	 countries,	 why	 not	 expand	 the	 Global	
Carbon	Market	to	embrace	developing	countries	
as	the	main	players?	Developing	countries	could	
be	the	driver	of	the	global	carbon	market	if	they	
could	generate	carbon	credits	from	their	NAMAs	
in	a	MRV	manner.
Whilst	current	CDM	is	already	functioning	as	a	
carbon	credit	mechanism	for	developing	country	
projects,	the	CDM	in	its	current	project-specific	
form	 is	not	able	 to	generate	 the	financial	flows	
needed	under	a	‘global	deal.’	It	is	estimated	that	
climate	 stabilization	 will	 require	 20-75	 billion	
USD	by	2020	and	up	to	100	billion	USD	by	2030	
(Submission	of	Republic	of	Korea	to	the	UNFCCC	
Negotiation	 process).	 The	 capacity	 of	 current	
CDM	 is	about	400	projects	 registered	per	year	
and	 6	 billion	 USD	 at	 current	 carbon	 prices.	
Awarding	carbon	credit	for	NAMAs	will	be	a	con-
crete	 idea	 to	 scale	 up	 current	 CDM	 in	 a	more	
enhanced	manner.	CDM	 is	 already	 known,	 and	
its	potential	benefits	have	been	assessed.	Once	
scaled	up	with	regional	distribution	in	mind,	the	
new	hybrid	mechanism	would	be	an	appropriate	
incentive	for	climate	change	mitigation	in	devel-
oping	countries.
Programmatic	 and	 sectoral	CDM	based	on	effi-
ciency	 standards	 could	 be	 an	 option	 to	 opera-
tionalize	 the	 idea	 of	 credit	 for	NAMAs	 using	 a	
wholesale	approach.	In	balancing	the	quality	of	
credit	 from	NAMA	 and	 project-based	CDM,	 we	
can	differentiate	the	price	of	credits	depending	
on	quality.
As	NAMAs	 will	 be	 taken	 in	 the	 context	 of	 sus-
tainable	development	by	developing	countries,	a	
carbon	market	based	on	NAMA	carbon	credit	will	
be	more	conducive	to	sustainable	development.
There	is	a	great	deal	of	interest	in	the	use	of	mar-
kets	to	enhance	the	cost-effectiveness	of,	and	to	
promote,	mitigation	actions.
NaMas and redd
REDD	 and	 AFOLU	 are	 issues	 that	 have	 gained	
momentum	in	the	climate	change	negotiations.	
REDD	 is	 at	 an	 advanced	 stage	 of	 negotiations,	
while	AFOLU	has	been	recommended	by	Africa	
for	 further	 discussions.	 Regarding	 policy	 ap-
proaches	 and	 policy	 incentives	 for	 reducing	
emissions	from	deforestation	and	degradation	in	
developing	 countries	 and	 the	 role	 of	 conserva-
tion,	the	sustainable	management	of	forests	and	
the	enhancement	of	 forest	 carbon	 stocks,	most	
developing	countries	believe	that	market	mecha-
nisms	have	enormous	potential	to	act	as	an	effec-
tive	means	to	promote	the	large-scale	investment	
required	to	reduce	emissions	from	deforestation,	
forest	degradation	and	land-use	change.	For	this	
reason,	the	use	of	market-based	mechanisms	may	
create	carbon	credits	that	are	fully	fungible	with	
AAUs,	 CERs,	 ERUs,	 etc.	 to	 the	 greatest	 extent	
possible.
However,	it	is	apparent	that	the	sustainable	man-
agement	of	forests	and	the	enhancement	of	forest	
carbon	stocks	require	long-term	investments	and	
the	application	of	modern	techniques	and	man-
agement	skills.	In	order	to	develop	a	market	that	
is	capable	of	generating	such	long-term	private-
If the concept becomes acceptable, 
NAMAs should be integrated into national 
mitigation strategies in the form of national 
low-emission development strategies.
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sector	 investment,	 the	 required	 legal	 and	 regu-
latory	 infrastructure	must	be	established	in	de-
veloping	 countries,	 particularly	 regarding	 land	
ownership	and	the	enforcement	of	forest	conser-
vation	deeds.	
conclusions
If	 the	 concept	 becomes	 acceptable,	 NAMAs	
should	 be	 integrated	 into	 national	 mitigation	
strategies	 in	 the	 form	 of	 national	 low-emission	
development	 strategies.	 Drawing	 up	 plans	 for	
NAMAs	for	all	sectors	would	be	the	initial	step.	
Such	 plans	 should	 build	 on	 existing	 plans	 and	
implemented	 actions	 that	 many	 developing	
countries	 are	 already	 undertaking.	 This	 should	
include,	as	a	priority,	the	establishment	and	de-
velopment	of	 the	necessary	 institutional	 frame-
works	 for	 systematic	 national	 inventories	 for	
emissions	and	removals.
If	 NAMAs	 could	 include	 anything	 from	 renew-
able	energy	projects	to	reducing	emissions	from	
deforestation	 projects,	 to	mitigation	 actions	 in	
agriculture,	 provided	 the	 additional	 mitigation	
benefit	can	be	measurable,	reportable	and	verifi-
able,	they	would	be	of	huge	potential	benefit	for	
African	countries.	For	example,	renewable	energy	
projects	that	are	supported	through	a	Copenha-
gen	 deal	 could	 contribute	 to	 providing	 access	
to	 energy	 for	 many	 Africans.	 This	 would	 drive	
economic	growth	and	contribute	to	the	creation	
of	a	clean,	sustainable	and	independent	energy	
future.
Most	of	the	issues	covered	above	represent	a	real	
challenge	for	the	AWG-LCA	and	for	the	negotia-
tions.	The	discussion	above	is	necessarily	general,	
but	there	is	an	urgent	need	now	to	become	spe-
cific,	and	to	deal	with	real-world	examples	rather	
than	 high-flown	 principles.	 Each	 of	 the	 issues	
needs	to	be	examined	from	the	perspective	of	the	
financial	sector	if	there	is	to	be	any	chance	of	the	
substantial	private-sector	investment	and	contri-
bution	that	the	Parties,	the	UNFCCC	Secretariat	
and	other	stakeholders	are	all	looking	for.	
It	will	be	important	to	award	carbon	credit	in	a	
scaled-up	 and	wholesale	manner	 for	 the	 verifi-
able	mitigations	from	the	NAMAs	of	developing	
countries	 to	 take	 effect.	 If	 Annex	 1	 countries	
adopt	 deeper	 targets	 to	 generate	 demand	 for	
these	credits,	this	has	the	potential	to	expand	the	
global	 carbon	market	 so	 that	developing	coun-
tries	 could	play	 a	more	active	 role.	Once	 these	
measures	 have	 been	 achieved,	 the	 commercial	
viability	of	 investment	 for	mitigation	actions	 in	
developing	 countries	 will	 be	 improved,	 and	 fi-
nancial	 flows	 for	 the	 mitigation	 of	 developing	
countries	 in	 the	 form	of	NAMAs	will	 be	 scaled	
up.
Copenhagen	 is	 an	 opportunity	 for	 Africa	 to	
secure	benefits	from	stepped	up	climate	change	
action	that	will	contribute	to	both	poverty	eradi-
cation	and	sustainable	development.	
Washington Zhakata is the National Coordinator for Cli-
mate Change in Zimbabwe and a member of the Task Force 
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aN Observer’s PersPective*
The Trust Building Role of NAMAs 
 
abstract:
Trust leads to empowerment and teamwork, which 
are needed to have a chance against climate 
change. Trust has been lost in the climate change 
negotiations and must be restored if an ambitious 
agreement is to be achieved. In this trust-building 
process, NAMAs can play a central role. The article 
unfolds this role from three perspectives: 1) global 
mitigation and the ongoing negotiations; 2) the 
achievement of sustainable development at the 
national level; and 3) synergies between mitigation 
and adaptation. NAMAs can be instruments for 
mitigation, building political will, matching all 
actions in all developing countries with appropriate 
support, capacity-building and even adaptation. 
Trust	 is	 a	 vital	 concept.	Only	 trust	 can	 lead	 to	
empowerment	and	effective	teamwork,	and	these	
are	key	capabilities	that	must	be	developed	and	
strengthened	at	the	international	level	if	we	wish	
to	have	a	chance	against	global	climate	change.	
In	the	search	for	solutions,	we	need,	as	nations,	
to	 trust	ourselves	and	our	ability	 to	contribute,	
but	we	also	need	to	trust	each	other	if	collective-
ly	we	are	to	combat	a	global	problem	that	needs	
a	global	solution.	
It	 does	 not	 take	 an	 expert	 to	 conclude	 that	 in	
the	climate	change	negotiations	trust	has	been	
lost	after	seventeen	years	of	constructive	but	not	
necessarily	 fruitful	discussions.	Furthermore,	 in	
this	 context	 of	 distrust,	 science	 now	 shows	 us	
that	efforts	have	failed	by	a	long	way	to	achieve	a	
stabilization	of	the	greenhouse	gases	(GHG)	that	
cause	climate	change,	while	recent	impacts	show	
us	 that,	 although	adaptation	 to	climate	change	
is	vital,	 it	 is	not	really	happening	in	developing	
countries.	
	
Pía	Zevallos
Libélula Comunicación, 
Ambiente y Desarrollo
*  This article does not reflect on Peru’s position on the climate change negotiation process under the UNFCCC, nor on the position of Latin 
American countries or the G77.
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Nationally	 Appropriate	 Mitigation	 Actions	 by	
developing	 countries	 (NAMAs)	 have	 become	 a	
thorny	issue	in	the	climate	change	negotiations.	
The	 term	was	first	 introduced	back	 in	2007	 as	
part	of	the	Bali	Action	Plan	(BAP),	but	its	exact	
definition	is	still	subject	to	intense	discussion.	In	
the	context	of	NAMAs,	there	is	a	main	difference	
between	asking	for	support	first	 in	order	to	act	
later,	and	offering	to	act	first	and	asking	for	sup-
port	later:	the	difference	lies	in	trust.	Trust	must	
definitely	be	restored	between	Annex	I	and	Non	
Annex	I	Parties.
Trust	must	 also	 be	 built	 between	Non	 Annex	 I	
Parties.	Developing	countries	need	to	trust	them-
selves	 and	 each	 other	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 uni-
fied	and	contribute	to	global	mitigation	efforts.	
We	must	 also	 remember	 that	 developing	 coun-
tries	are	not	responsible	for	the	current	climate	
change	and	that	adaptation	remains	their	main	
priority	and	concern;	therefore,	as	they	start	be-
coming	involved	in	mitigation	efforts,	they	need	
to	consider	adaptation	so	that	they	can	be	sure	
that	 mitigation	 will	 not	 make	 things	 worse	 for	
their	ecosystems	and	populations. 
This	article	argues	that,	in	order	even	to	begin	to	
conceive	an	ambitious	agreement	that	will	effec-
tively	tackle	climate	change,	an	environment	 in	
which	trust	can	be	restored	must	be	put	in	place.	
It	also	argues	that	NAMAs	can	and	must	play	an	
essential	role	in	this	‘trust-building’	process.	The	
existing	 lack	 of	 a	 definition	 for	NAMAs	 can	 be	
an	opportunity	to	give	them	a	central	role	under	
the	climate	change	negotiation:	a	trust-building	
role.
In	 order	 to	 understand	 NAMAs	 and	 their	 po-
tential	fully,	the	article	presents	facts	and	back-
ground	 relating	NAMAs	 in	 two	 initial	 sections,	
after	 which	 it	 looks	 at	 them	 from	 three	 differ-
ent	perspectives:	 a)	 their	 role	 in	global	 climate	
change	mitigation	 and	 the	 current	negotiation	
process;	b)	their	role	in	the	achievement	of	sus-
tainable	development	at	a	national	level;	and	c)	
their	connection	to	climate	change	adaptation	as	
a	main	priority	for	developing	countries	in	light	
of	the	existence	of	unavoidable	climate	change.
the scientific facts
Climate	 change	 is	 happening,	 it	 is	 a	 result	 of	
human	activity	and	it	is	causing	all	kinds	of	im-
pacts	on	ecosystems,	which	are	in	turn	the	basis	
of	 human	 activities.	 The	 Fourth	 Assessment	
Report	 of	 the	 Intergovernmental	 Panel	 on	 Cli-
mate	Change	(IPCC)	draws	attention	to	the	fact	
that	most	of	the	temperature	rise	in	the	last	fifty	
years	can	be	attributed	to	human	activity.	It	also	
shows	that	human	activity	will	continue	to	influ-
ence	the	composition	of	the	atmosphere,	even	if	
GHG	emissions	dropped	to	a	point	at	which	their	
atmospheric	concentration	would	stabilize.1	It	is	
in	 light	of	 these	 facts	that	measures	to	support	
the	adaptation	of	economies	and	societies	 that	
are	particularly	vulnerable	to	the	adverse	effects	
of	climate	change	must	be	considered	as	essen-
tial	complements	of	any	global	effort	to	stabilize	
GHG	levels	in	the	atmosphere.
Although	 it	 is	 not	 technically	 feasible	 to	deter-
mine	 each	 developed	 country’s	 exact	 historical	
1  IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 2007.
“The existing lack of a definition for 
NAMAs can be an opportunity to give them 
a central role under the climate change 
negotiation: a trust-building role.”
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responsibility	for	climate	change,	it	is	a	fact	that	
current	impacts	are	a	consequence	of	the	GHG	
emissions	 put	 into	 the	 atmosphere	 by	 these	
industrialized	 nations	 in	 the	 past.	 This	 is	 the	
basis	 for	most	of	the	articles	 in	the	United	Na-
tions	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	
(UNFCCC),	 which,	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	
‘common	 but	 differentiated	 responsibilities’,	
stresses	 the	 need	 for	 global	 action	 led	 by	 de-
veloped	countries.	 Furthermore,	Annex	 I	of	 the	
UNFCCC	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	Convention	
and	 lists	 the	group	of	developed	countries	and	
economies	in	transition	that	have	commitments	
under	this	legally	binding	treaty	(these	countries	
are	often	referred	to	as	‘Annex	I’	parties,	whereas	
developing	 countries	 go	 by	 the	 name	 of	 ‘non-
Annex	I’	parties).
It	is	also	a	fact	that	future	climate	change	will	be	
the	result	of	our	actions	today	and	in	the	coming	
decades,	and	that	it	will	no	longer	be	caused	only	
by	 developed	 countries,	 since	 the	 increase	 in	
GHG	emissions	shows	a	direct	relationship	with	
economic	 growth,	 and	 this	 growth	 is	 currently	
taking	place	mainly	in	the	developing	world.	The	
following	table	shows	the	range	of	difference	cal-
culated	by	the	IPCC	between	emissions	in	1990	
and	emission	allowances	in	2020/2050	for	vari-
ous	GHG	concentration	 levels	 for	 Annex	 I	 and	
non-Annex	 I	 countries	 as	 a	 group.	 Clearly,	 sci-
ence	calls	for	a	contribution	from	the	developing	
world	in	order	to	achieve	stabilization.	
a definition for NaMas
NAMAs	were	first	conceived	under	the	Bali	Action	
Plan	(BAP)	or	decision	1/CP.13	of	the	UNFCCC.	
In	 referring	 to	 NAMAs,	 paragraph	 1	 (b)	 (ii)	 is	
generally	quoted:	
	 The	Conference	of	the	Parties	[…]	1.	
Decides	to	launch	a	comprehensive	
process	to	enable	the	full,	effective	and	
sustained	implementation	of	the	Con-
vention	through	long-term	cooperative	
action,	now,	up	to	and	beyond	2012,	in	
order	to	reach	an	agreed	outcome	and	
adopt	a	decision	at	its	fifteenth	session,	by	
addressing,	inter	alia:	[…]	(b)	Enhanced	
national/international	action	on	mitiga-
tion	of	climate	change,	including,	inter	
alia,	consideration	of:	[…]	(ii)	Nationally	
appropriate	mitigation	actions	by	devel-
The Trust Building Role of NAMAs
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Later	in	this	article	we	will	see	how	this	flexibility	
permits	developing	countries	to	enter	a	continu-
ous	process	at	different	stages,	in	which	different	
capacity-building	 activities	 are	 combined	 with	
different	scales	of	emission	reductions.
However,	NAMAs	also	need	to	be	framed	in	the	
context	of	the	UNFCCC	and	the	BAP	as	a	whole.	
The	UNFCCC	gives	overall	guidance	covering	a	
concrete	objective,	guiding	principles	and	a	de-
scription	of	how	the	main	issues	for	tackling	cli-
mate	change	must	be	addressed.	Although	some	
of	these	issues,	such	as	education,	training	and	
outreach,	and	research	and	systematic	observa-
tion,	are	of	the	utmost	importance	in	combating	
climate	change,	 they	have	not	been	specifically	
addressed	by	the	BAP.	
The	BAP’s	preamble	sets	out	the	context	for	1(b)
(ii)	 and	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	 The	 said	
preamble	expresses	a	renewed	sense	of	urgency,	
reaffirms	that	economic	and	social	development	
and	poverty	eradication	are	global	priorities,	and	
recognizes	that	deep	cuts	in	global	emissions	will	
be	 required.	 Paragraphs	 1(b)(iii)	 to	 1(b)(vi)	 of	
the	BAP	are	significant	as	 they	provide	a	menu	
of	 feasible	mitigation	 options,	 including	 policy	
approaches	and	positive	incentives	on	issues	re-
lating	to	reducing	emissions	from	deforestation	
and	forest	degradation,	the	role	of	conservation,	
the	 sustainable	management	of	 forests	 and	 the	
enhancement	of	forest	carbon	stocks	in	develop-
ing	 countries	 (REDD+2),	 and	 cooperative	 sec-
toral	approaches	and	actions.	They	also	propose	
various	approaches,	including	the	use	of	markets	
to	make	mitigation	more	cost-effective,	and	they	
call	on	Parties	to	take	into	account	the	economic	
2  This concept was first introduced in COP 11 as only REDD (Reduc-
ing emissions from deforestation in developing countries), later on in the 
negotiations the second ‘D’ would become ‘desertification’. In the BAP 
the ‘plus’ (+) was added referring to the sentences after the semicolon in 
1b(iii): ‘; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks’.
oping	country	Parties	in	the	context	of	
sustainable	development,	supported	and	
enabled	by	technology,	financing	and	
capacity-building,	in	a	measurable,	report-
able	and	verifiable	manner.
We	can	take	some	important	features	of	NAMAs	
from	this	particular	paragraph:	they	must	be	‘na-
tionally	 appropriate’,	meaning	 that	 they	 should	
respond	 to	 national	 circumstances,	 which	 also	
implies	that	each	country	shall	determine	what	
is	 ‘appropriate’;	they	are	referred	to	only	as	 ‘ac-
tions’,	so	there	is	no	definition	of	scale:	an	action	
can	be	an	activity,	a	measure,	a	project,	program,	
or	even	a	policy;	they	must	be	carried	out	‘in	the	
context	 of	 sustainable	 development’,	 meaning	
that	they	should	be	integrated	into	development	
and	poverty	eradication	efforts;	and	they	must	be	
‘supported	and	enabled	by	technology,	financing	
and	capacity-building’	 in	a	way	 that	 is	 ‘measur-
able,	reportable	and	verifiable’	(MRV).	It	appears,	
then,	 that,	 in	contrast	 to	commitments	and	ac-
tions	by	developed	countries	under	1(b)(i)	which	
must	be	MRVed,	 in	 the	context	of	NAMAs	MRV	
refers	to	their	support	and	enablement.	It	is	im-
portant	to	note,	though,	that,	even	though	not	all	
developing	countries	are	as	yet	able	to	MRV	all	
their	mitigation	actions	and	therefore	to	commit	
themselves	to	it,	MRV	for	NAMAs	is	of	great	sig-
nificance	 for	 environmental	 integrity	 and	must	
be	supported	and	achieved.
It	is	important	to	note	that	issues	such	as	the	vol-
untary	or	mandatory	nature	of	NAMAs,	the	geo-
graphical	or	political	level	at	which	they	should	
be	 implemented	 and	 their	 particular	 source	 of	
support	 (public,	 private,	 national	 or	 interna-
tional)	are	not	specified	in	1(b)(ii).	One	can	then	
presume	 that	 there	 is	 a	 certain	 flexibility	 and	
that	it	is	each	country’s	prerogative	to	decide	on	
the	nature,	scale	and	source	of	support	for	their	
NAMAs	(hence	the	‘nationally	appropriate’	part).	
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and	social	consequences	of	 response	measures,	
including	 impacts	 on	 commerce.	 Finally,	 1(b)
(vii)	addresses	the	catalytic	role	of	the	UNFCCC	
in	engaging	other	 important	 stakeholders	 such	
as	the	private	sector	and	civil	society.	Although	
often	 overlooked,	 this	 paragraph	 is	 definitely	
worth	noting	since	only	global	engagement	will	
solve	the	climate	problem.	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 BAP	 must	 also	 be	 considered,	
given	 that	 mitigation	 by	 developing	 countries	
needs	 to	be	enabled	by	 technical	and	financial	
cooperation,	and	is	strongly	linked	to	adaptation	
(this	 link	will	 be	 further	 discussed	 later	 in	 the	
article).	
NaMas for global mitigation
there is a main difference between asking 
for support first in order to act later, and 
offering to act first and asking for support 
later . the difference lies in trust .
Ambitious	 mitigation	 is	 fundamental:	 not	 only	
will	it	prevent	us	from	irreversible	impacts	in	the	
future,	 it	 will	 also	 send	 a	 clear	message	 to	 the	
international	community,	the	private	sector	and	
civil	society,	thus	building	trust	among	countries	
and	peoples.	NAMAs	have	a	central	role	to	play	
in	 both	 global	 mitigation	 efforts	 and	 the	 cur-
rent	negotiation	process,	 in	which	 some	Annex	
I	countries	are	failing	to	put	forward	ambitious	
mitigation	commitments.	
Nationally	 appropriate	 mitigation	 actions	 by	
developing	 countries	 can	not	 only	provide	 real	
reductions.	If	defined	in	a	flexible	manner,	they	
also	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 generate	 enabling	
environments	 for	non-Annex	 I	 countries	 at	 dif-
ferent	stages	of	development	and	to	participate	
progressively	 in	 global	 mitigation.	 Moreover,	
they	 can	 put	 political	 pressure	 on	 developed	
countries	that	have	not	yet	engaged	fully	in	the	
mitigation	effort.
Of	 course,	 implementing	 NAMAs	 will	 be	 chal-
lenging	for	developing	countries.	However,	they	
are	 necessary	 to	 avoid	 greater	 impacts	 in	 the	
future,	 and,	 with	 the	 right	 amount	 of	 support,	
they	 can	materialize.	 In	most	 developing	 coun-
tries	they	are	already	being	implemented	at	some	
level,	 and	 it	 is	 only	 a	matter	 of	finding	ways	 to	
quantify,	 scale	 up	 and	 integrate	 them	 into	 one	
comprehensive	mitigation	strategy.
Moreover,	 a	 recent	 study	 of	 the	 Latin	 Ameri-
can	 region	 shows	 that,	 taking	 into	account	 the	
regional	 costs	 of	 mitigation	 and	 of	 adaptation	
to	 the	expected	 impacts	of	 climate	 change,	 the	
region	 is	 better	 off	 following	 a	 bold	mitigation	
pathway	within	a	global	effort	resulting	from	an	
ambitious	agreement	than	by	focusing	on	adap-
tation	alone.3	This	is	mainly	because	adaptation	
costs	are	much	higher	than	mitigation	costs	and	
because	 they	 increase	 exponentially	 with	 weak	
mitigation	 efforts.	 Also,	 bold	 mitigation	 by	 all	
countries	 would	 not	 only	 decrease	 adaptation	
costs,	but	also	 increase	 the	size	of	carbon	mar-
kets,	thus	providing	additional	private	funding	to	
cover	mitigation	costs.
Now,	 as	 said	 before,	 trust	 must	 be	 restored.	
Annex	 I	 countries	 must	 show	 their	 willingness	
to	 fulfill	 their	commitments	under	 the	Conven-
tion,	regarding	not	only	mitigation	but	also	the	
provision	of	financial	resources	and	technology	
3  Garibaldi. ‘The Economy of Boldness’, July 2009.
“.. future climate change will be the 
result of our actions today ..”
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neity	and	diversity	among	developing	countries	
call	for	a	flexible	approach	to	address	NAMAs.	As	
previously	stated,	the	characterization	of	NAMAs	
allows	 for	 a	 national	 definition	 of	 the	 nature,	
scale	 and	 form	of	 support	 for	 these	 ‘nationally	
appropriate’	actions.
The	legal	nature	of	NAMAs	will	probably	remain	
voluntary	in	the	short	term,	since	even	develop-
ing	countries	with	the	best	economic	and	social	
indicators	 are	 still	 falling	 far	 behind	 Annex	 I	
countries.	In	time	flexibility	will	allow	countries	
to	take	on	more	ambitious	no-lose	targets,	and,	
once	barriers	have	been	removed	and	sufficient	
capacity	has	been	developed,	to	undertake	legal-
ly	binding	commitments.	An	important	provision	
is	that	increasing	ambition	should	be	accompa-
nied	by	increasing	support.
transfer	 to	developing	countries.	Again,	NAMAs	
can	serve	as	one	of	the	instruments	to	facilitate	
the	fulfilment	of	these	obligations.
NaMas for national sustainable 
development
differentiation does not mean separation: 
developing countries need to trust themselves 
and each other to remain unified .
Developing	countries	still	have	the	same	develop-
ment	and	poverty-alleviation	priorities	 to	bring	
them	together,	but	they	do	not	necessarily	have	
equal	 responsibility	 for	 future	 climate	 change,	
nor	 equal	 capabilities	 to	 address	 it.	 Heteroge-
Figure 1: National mitigation actions at different scales
Source: J. Garibaldi. ‘Strategic Program Approaches’, 2008
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The	 issue	 of	 scale	 must	 also	 be	 considered	 as	
part	 of	 a	 flexible	 approach.	 The	 differences	 in	
national	circumstances	are	evident	from	the	ex-
perience	of	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	
(CDM).	Clearly,	some	countries	have	been	able	to	
participate	actively	 in	mitigation	through	CDM	
project	development	and	must	now	aim	to	scale	
up	their	efforts	with	programmatic	and	even	sec-
toral	 policy	 approaches.	 Others,	 however,	 have	
failed	 to	 do	 so,	 demonstrating	 that	 the	 project	
level	 cannot	 yet	 be	 taken	 as	 the	 smallest	 scale	
possible.	Figure	1	shows	the	range	of	scales	for	
mitigation	action.
These	 different	 circumstances	 and	 the	 differ-
ent	readiness	of	countries	and	of	sectors	within	
countries	 allow	 a	 ‘nested	 approach’4,	 as	well	 as	
South-South	cooperation.	The	nested	approach	
was	first	introduced	as	part	of	the	discussions	on	
REDD,	but	its	overall	concept	and	main	features	
are	perfectly	applicable	to	other	sectors,	as	pre-
sented	in	Garibaldi’s	work	on	Strategic	Program	
Approaches.	It	basically	states	that,	since	not	all	
countries	 are	 ready	 to	 engage	 in	 action	 at	 the	
national	level,	they	could	start	from	single	proj-
ects	 and	aggregate	 them	 to	generate	programs,	
policies,	 sectors	 and	 finally	 national	 targets.	 It	
also	argues	 that,	whereas	 it	 is	essential	 to	 inte-
grate	sub-national	activities	into	broader	public	
programs,	 rewarding	 such	 sub-national	 activi-
ties	could	be	de-linked	from	the	risk	of	broader	
program	failure	in	the	short	term.	Ideally,	in	the	
long	run,	in	order	to	maintain	environmental	in-
tegrity	and	avoid	double	counting,	once	a	sector	
has	 reached	 the	 capacity	 for	 a	 sectoral	 NAMA,	
project	 activities	 for	 that	 sector	 should	 not	 be	
accounted	for.	
4  CATIE, ‘The Nested Approach: A Flexible Mechanism to Reduce 
Emissions from Deforestation’, November 2007.
A	‘nested	approach’	applied	to	mitigation	actions	
in	all	 sectors	could	allow	 for	a	mechanism	that	
awards	emission	reduction	credits	to	participants	
in	mitigation	 activities	 while	 promoting	 action	
on	both	the	national	and	sub-national	levels.	It	
could	also	help	enhance	the	contribution	of	de-
veloping	countries	to	global	emission	reductions	
that	is	consistent	with	the	principle	of	common	
but	differentiated	responsibilities.	
Finally,	 there	 is	also	 some	flexibility	 involved	 in	
deciding	 the	best	ways	 to	 provide	NAMAs	with	
the	 appropriate	 financial,	 technical	 and	 capac-
ity-building	 support.	 In	 the	 past,	 there	 have	
been	 two	 main	 sources	 of	 support	 for	 mitiga-
tion	actions	by	developing	countries	 inside	the	
UNFCCC:	the	carbon	market	through	CDM,	and	
the	Financial	Mechanism	of	the	Convention	(en-
trusted	 to	 the	Global	Environmental	 Facility	or	
GEF).	As	already	noted	here,	not	all	developing	
countries	have	been	able	to	participate	in	CDM,	
and	even	those	who	have,	have	experienced	that	
CDM	 is	 not	 an	 adequate	 source	 of	 funding	 or	
technology	 transfer	 because	 of	 the	 high	 trans-
action	costs	and	 the	barriers	 that	have	allowed	
only	 a	 few	 countries	 to	 participate	 effectively.	
The	GEF,	on	the	other	hand,	has	suffered	from	a	
continuous	lack	of	funds,	and	its	allocation	crite-
ria	have	favoured	big	emitters	under	the	concept	
of	‘global	environmental	benefits’.	
A	new	financial	architecture	under	the	UNFCCC	
needs	 to	 be	 built,	 financial	 resources	 must	 be	
dramatically	increased	and	CDM	needs	to	be	re-
formed.	Within	this	new	financial	structure	there	
should	be	certain	flexibility	for	each	country	to	
decide	how	to	support	their	NAMAs.	Support	for	
NAMAs	 could	 consist	 of	 a	mix	 of	 international	
public	 support	 (for	 capacity-building	 at	 every	
level	and	sector	and	policy	NAMAs),	carbon	off-
sets	 (at	 the	 project,	 program	 and	 policy	 levels)	
and	 national	 finance	 (for	 win-win	 solutions,	
The Trust Building Role of NAMAs
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NAMAs	 that	 are	 cost-effective	 and	 have	 impor-
tant	co-benefits).	Cost-benefit	assessments	could	
be	carried	out	to	determine	the	mix.
Capacity-building	plays	a	drastic	role	for	NAMAs,	
but	it	has	to	be	tailored	to	address	the	different	
needs	of	different	developing	countries.	For	least	
developed	countries	(LDCs),	there	is	a	need	for	
even	more	flexibility:	 small-scale	activities	must	
be	promoted	and	additionality	assessments	sim-
plified,	 or	 even	 removed,	 in	 order	 to	 follow	 a	
more	 ‘learning	 by	 doing’	 approach.	 An	 impor-
tant	 capacity-building	 need	 for	 all	 non-Annex	
I	countries	is	the	strengthening	of	GHG	inven-
tory	systems	(still	being	improved	even	in	Annex	I	
countries)	in	order	to	quantify	developing	coun-
tries’	efforts	more	effectively.	In	general	and	for	
all	scales,	different	stages	or	phases	of	readiness	
and	 engagement	 should	 be	 defined,	 but	 with	
flexibility	depending	on	the	country	and	even	on	
the	sector	of	the	country’s	economy.	
The	question	of	readiness	also	calls	 for	flexibil-
ity,	and	here	a	proposal	made	 in	the	context	of	
REDD	 negotiations	 could	 be	 applicable.	 The	
Parties	have	made	many	suggestions	that	an	op-
erational	framework	for	REDD+	action	should	be	
developed	 to	 deliver	 effective	 means	 of	 imple-
mentation	 and	finance	 by	 phases.	 It	 is	 argued5	
that	 such	 an	 approach	 would	 be	 useful	 for	
building	 confidence,	 enabling	 early	 action	 and	
considering	 how	 different	 sources	 of	 funding	
might	 be	 combined.	 The	 three	 phases	 defined	
for	REDD+	action	that	might	also	be	applicable	
5  IUCN, ‘Operational Framework for REDD action with specific refer-
ence to means of implementation and finance’, October 2009.
to	 all	mitigation	 actions	 are:	1)	Preparation and 
Readiness:	involves	the	development	of	strategies	
and	 capacity-building,	 and	 could	 be	 supported	
through	public	and	private,	multilateral	and	bi-
lateral	 grant	 schemes;	 2)	 Intermediate:	 involves	
the	 establishment	 or	 strengthening	 of	 policies	
and	measures	to	allow	implementation.	Options	
for	 funding	 could	 include	 voluntary	 contribu-
tions	from	governments,	levies,	multilateral	con-
cessional	financing	sources,	bilateral	and	private	
funding,	and	early	market	payments;	3)	Final:	in-
volves	verification	of	emission	reductions	or	re-
movals	by	sinks.	Mechanisms	such	as	the	carbon	
market	 and	 fund-based	 mechanisms	 could	 de-
liver	performance-based	payments.	Entry	into	all	
phases	would	be	different	for	each	country.
All	 NAMAs,	 no	 matter	 what	 their	 nature,	 scale	
or	 source	of	 funding,	 should	be	quantified	and	
registered.	 The	 first	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 environ-
mental	 integrity.	 Furthermore,	 there	 are	 many	
developing	 countries	 that	 are	 implementing	
NAMAs	using	their	own	resources	and	that	need	
appropriate	 ways	 to	 quantify	 them	 in	 order	 to	
put	them	forward	 later	as	their	contribution	or	
even	subtract	these	reductions	from	future	miti-
gation	 targets.	 Also,	 appropriate	 and	 enhanced	
MRV	promoted	at	the	national	level	would	lower	
transaction	 costs	 and	 increase	 the	 prices	 of	
carbon	credits.	 For	all	 countries,	but	especially	
the	 least	 developed	 countries,	 innovative	 ap-
proaches	 need	 to	 be	 developed,	 and	 flexibility	
can	also	contribute	to	this.	These	innovative	ap-
proaches	could	include	NAMAs	with	a	large	com-
ponent	of	education	and	outreach	that	reduce,	
and	even	more	‘avoid’	emissions	(e.g.	educating	a	
new	generation	of	conscious	citizens),	and	have	
the	potential	to	change	not	only	production	but	
also	consumption	patterns	that	contribute	to	cli-
mate	change.	There	 is	a	need	to	develop	a	new	
set	of	indicators	to	measure	these	contributions	
in	order	to	implement	them	effectively.
“Of course, implementing NAMAs will be 
challenging for developing countries.”
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For	 each	 developing	 country,	 NAMAs	 should	
aim	 to	 support	 sustainable	 development	 and	
economic	 growth.	 For	 this	 to	 be	 implemented,	
countries	must	 integrate	 their	NAMAs	 into	 de-
velopment	and	poverty	reduction	strategies	and	
plans.	Countries	that	account	for	larger	percent-
ages	of	global	GHG	emissions	must	focus	first	on	
the	actions	that	can	result	on	the	 largest	GHG	
reductions,	 while	 other	 countries	 should	 focus	
on	 those	 actions	 that	 are	 low	 cost,	 have	 high	
return	 rates,	 are	 no	 lose	 and	 bring	 co-benefits	
such	as	air	quality	improvement	and	adaptation.	
The	following	text	box	illustrates	this	concept	of	
‘flexibility’	further	by	means	of	the	example	of	a	
specific	country	(Peru).
synergies between NaMas and adaptation
Never before has the saying ‘the best 
defence is a good offense’ made 
more sense, and we need to trust that 
mitigation will not make things worse . 
One	 may	 try	 to	 ease	 the	 symptoms	 or	 conse-
quences	of	any	illness	or	problem,	and	one	may	
even	temporary	succeed	in	this	attempt.	Howev-
er,	if	the	source	is	not	identified	and	dealt	with,	
the	chances	are	the	 illness	will	come	back,	and	
more	strongly	every	time.	Such	is	the	case	with	
climate	change:	one	may	try	to	adapt	to	 its	ad-
verse	 effects,	 but	 only	 the	 mitigation	 of	 GHG	
emissions	can	prevent	these	effects	from	growing	
incrementally	worse.
	It	is	true	that	the	best	adaptation	is	mitigation,	
not	 only	 because	mitigation	 will	 prevent	more	
acute	impacts	from	occurring	in	the	future,	but	
also	 because	 strong	 links	 between	 mitigation	
and	adaptation	become	apparent	when	they	are	
both	 considered	 in	 the	 context	 of	 sustainable	
development.	
Chapter	 18	 of	 the	 IPCC	 Fourth	 Assessment	
Report	 on	 mitigation	 addresses	 the	 inter-rela-
tionships	 between	 adaptation	 and	 mitigation,	
showing	how	this	issue	has	recently	captured	the	
interest	 of	 the	 scientific	 community.	 Moreover,	
this	 issue	 definitely	 deserves	more	 attention	 in	
the	future,	as	it	is	highly	relevant	to	many	devel-
oping	 countries	 that	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 im-
pacts	of	 climate	 change	yet	paradoxically	make	
a	 low	 contribution	 to	 global	 GHG	 emissions.	
Figure	2	shows	how	adaptation	and	mitigation	to	
climate	change	interact	in	the	earth	and	human	
systems.	
Look	closely	at	the	figure.	Let	us	start	at	the	far	
right,	with	climate	process	drivers	in	the	human	
system:	GHG	and	aerosols,	which	are	a	result	of	a	
form	of	socio-economic	development	that	cause	
climate	change	in	earth	systems.	It	is	now	known	
that	this	relationship	is	no	longer	a	linear	cause-
and-effect	 one,	 since	 climate	 change	 can	 alter	
GHG	concentrations	(this	is	represented	in	the	
graphic	by	two-way	arrows).	At	the	next	level	are	
the	impacts,	which	interact	with	both	natural	and	
human	 systems:	 this	 second	 set	 of	 interactions	
has	been	prioritized,	but	the	impact	on	ecosys-
tems	is	still	uncertain	and	has	the	ability	to	ag-
gravate	 climate	 change	 deeply.	 Both	mitigation	
and	 adaptation	 interact	 with	 socio-economic	
development:	here	it	is	in	the	human	system	that	
both	the	cause	and	the	consequence	of	climate	
change	lay.	To	manage	climate	change	properly,	
one	 must	 understand	 this	 interaction	 between	
drivers,	impacts	and	responses.
The Trust Building Role of NAMAs
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Context	 and	 data:	Peru’s	 contribution	 to	 global	
GHG	emissions	is	less	than	0.5%,	and	its	contribu-
tion	to	the	emissions	already	put	in	the	atmosphere	
in	even	smaller.	47%	of	these	2000	emissions	come	
from	the	Land	Use,	Land	Use	Change	and	Forestry	
(LULUCF)	sector.1	During	COP	14,	Peru’s	Ministry	
of	 the	Environment	offered	 to	 stabilize	emissions	
derived	from	deforestation	by	2017.	Peru	has	been	
consistently	 ranked	 among	 the	 most	 vulnerable	
countries	 to	 climate	 change	 and	has	most	of	 the	
vulnerability	conditions	listed	in	the	UNFCCC	(e.g.	
costal	zones,	mountainous	ecosystems,	forests,	air	
pollution	and	poverty,	among	others).	
A	possible	 strategy	under	 a	flexible	 approach:	
Clearly	 Peru	 is	 not	 a	 large	 contributor	 to	 GHG	
emissions,	 yet	 its	 vulnerability	 determines	 its	 cli-
mate	change	priorities:	adaptation	and	ambitious	
global	mitigation.	Peru	 thus	can	 and	must	engage	
in	developing	NAMAs,	not	only	because,	as	a	Party	
to	the	UNFCCC,	it	has	a	responsibility	to	combat	
climate	change,	but	also	because	this	provides	an	
opportunity	 for	 national	 actions	 that	 are	 low	 or	
zero	cost	and	no	lose,	and	that	can	bring	important	
co-benefits	to	society.	These	opportunities	exist	in	
many	sectors,	 such	as	energy,	waste	management,	
transport	and	even	construction.	These	sectors	are	
different	 in	 nature	 and	 are	 at	 different	 stages	 of	
readiness	 for	 engaging	 in	mitigation	 actions.	We	
will	give	some	clear	examples	of	how	a	flexible	ap-
proach	could	work	in	two	of	these	sectors:	LULUCF	
and	waste	management.
1  Peru’s National Inventory, base year 2000.
1)	 LULUCF:	 The	 offer	 referred	 to	 above	 could	
easily	 be	 the	 main	 component	 of	 Peru’s	 mitiga-
tion	 strategy	and	would	constitute,	by	definition,	
a	 NAMA.	 Clearly	 the	 scale	 is	 national,	 the	 legal	
nature	 is	 voluntary	 and	 finance	 could	 come	 pri-
marily	from	Annex	I	financial	commitments	under	
the	 Convention	 (international	 public	 finance)	
since	there	needs	to	be	a	large	component	of	ca-
pacity-building	for	MRV,	among	others.	Certainly,	
as	part	of	 a	National	 Forestry	Strategy,	 there	will	
also	be	an	allocation	of	national	public	funds.	Also,	
if	a	financial	mechanism	is	put	in	place	for	REDD	
or	REDD+	which	includes	a	combination	of	public	
and	private	finance,	then	these	would	also	be	sup-
plementary	sources	of	finance.	Forestry	CDM	could	
also	be	included	while	capacity	is	built	to	scale	up	
projects	to	the	sub-national	and	national	levels.	A	
large	 component	 of	 education,	 training	 and	 out-
reach	must	be	put	in	place	as	a	crucial	part	of	the	
NAMA.
2)	 Waste	 management:	 The	 situation	 in	 this	
sector	 is	 different:	 it	 does	 not	 represent	 a	major	
part	of	the	country’s	emissions,	and	its	legal	situ-
ation	 would	 probably	 prevent	 it	 from	 engaging	
in	 a	national	NAMA	 in	 the	near	 future.	However,	
CDM	projects	 in	 this	 sector	 have	 proved	 to	 have	
the	potential	 to	develop	successfully,	and	to	have	
important	co-benefits	for	public	health.	Therefore	
supplementary	NAMAs	in	this	sector	could	initially	
be	implemented	and	financed	by	private	sources	as	
project	or	programme	activities	under	the	CDM.	
a flexible approach to NaMas: the case of Peru
59
CD4CDM
Furthermore,	 even	 if	 developing	 countries	 de-
cided	 to	 engage	 actively	 in	mitigation,	 adapta-
tion	would	still	 remain	their	first	priority,	since	
this	 threatens	 to	undermine	 their	 development	
and	 efforts	 to	 alleviate	 poverty.	 Therefore	 ad-
aptation	 must	 be	 considered	 when planning	 for	
mitigation.	 NAMAs	 can	 and	 should	 contribute	
to	effective	adaptation	 in	developing	countries,	
which	is	where	the	concept	of	‘climate	screening’	
comes	in.	Climate	screening	refers	to	the	consid-
eration	of	climate	change	(both	mitigation	and	
adaptation)	 during	 the	 planning	 phase	 of	 an	
activity	or	investment,	or	the	inclusion	of	these	
considerations	in	an	ongoing	process	or	existing	
institution.	
The	 Peruvian	 energy	 sector	 is	 a	 clear	 example	
of	 how	 taking	 climatic	 impacts	 and	 adaptation	
to	these	impacts	into	account	can	influence	the	
decision	to	implement	NAMAs.	Focusing	only	on	
mitigation	would	probably	result	in	a	decision	to	
expand	hydro	 power	 generation,	 since	 hydro	 is	
a	 renewable	energy	source	with	zero	emissions.	
Nevertheless,	if	studies	of	vulnerability	are	con-
sulted,	one	finds	that	most	water	for	hydro	power	
generation	(and	many	other	uses)	in	Peru	comes	
Figure 2: Inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation
Source: IPCC. ‘Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report’, 2007
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from	mountain	 glaciers,	 and	 these	 are	 melting	
away	because	of	climate	change.	The	expansion	
of	hydro	power	generation	could	then	put	at	risk	
the	supply	of	water	for	agriculture	(food	security)	
and	human	consumption	(health).	
conclusion
Countries	 have	 a	 big	 task	 and	 responsibility	
ahead	 of	 them	on	 their	way	 to	Copenhagen.	 It	
is	important,	though,	to	be	practical	and	realize	
that	 this	 task	should	 focus	on	 two	main	duties.	
First,	countries	must	consider	what	it	is	that	must	
be	agreed	in	December	2009,	and	what	can	be	
left	 for	 further	 discussion.	 Secondly	 and	 most	
importantly,	 each	country	must	play	 its	part	 in	
order	to	build	trust	between	them.
Science	shows	us	that	developed	countries	must	
take	the	lead,	but	also	that	developing	countries	
must	follow.	The	role	of	developing	countries	is	
to	push	for	a	fair	agreement	and	to	set	clear	na-
tional	priorities	to	push	the	developed	world	to	
stronger	commitment.	NAMAs	will	be	the	instru-
ment	by	which	these	priorities	can	be	set.	A	bal-
ance	is	needed	between	flexibility	that	allows	all	
the	national	circumstances	of	developing	coun-
tries	to	be	taken	into	account,	and	deep	MRVed	
GHG	cuts	that	produce	environmental	integrity.
If	 they	 are	 allowed	 to	 develop	 under	 a	 flexible	
approach	 that	 takes	 adaptation	 into	 account,	
NAMAs	can	help	ease	the	way	by	restoring	trust.	
NAMAs	can	be	used	as	 instruments	 for	climate	
change	mitigation,	building	political	will,	match-
ing	all	actions	in	developing	countries	with	the	
appropriate	support,	effective	capacity-building	
in	developing	countries,	and	even	adaptation.	
Let	us	remember	that	only	trust	can	lead	to	em-
powerment	 and	 effective	 teamwork,	 and	 that	
these	are	key	capabilities	that	must	be	developed	
and	strengthened	if	we	want	to	have	a	chance	of	
tackling	global	climate	change.	
Are	we	ready	to	start	trusting?
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exPlOriNg a sectOr NO-lOse target iN tHe traNsPOrt sectOr:
Urban transport in Beijing, China
The	 negotiations	 over	 a	 follow-up	 agreement	
to	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 have	 entered	 their	 final	
phase.	Nationally	appropriate	mitigation	actions	
(NAMAs)	 for	 developing	 countries	 have	 been	 a	
central	topic	in	the	debate.	A	multitude	of	policy-
makers	and	stakeholders	have	responded	to	this	
challenge	and	have	started	putting	forward	sug-
gestions	for	a	general	NAMA	framework,	as	well	
as	 individual	 policy	 instruments	 that	 could	 be	
put	forward	by	developing	countries	as	a	NAMA.
Sector	no-lose	targets	(SNLTs)	belong	to	the	class	
of	 sector-crediting	 approaches	 that	 are	 being	
discussed	 as	 a	NAMA	option.	 They	 are	 seen	 as	
one	 way	 of	 scaling	 up	 mitigation	 efforts	 and	
one	possible	path	of	evolution	from	the	current	
CDM.	 Sector	 no-lose	 targets	 are	 one	 possible	
mechanism	 that	 can	 be	 applied	 at	 the	 sectoral	
level,	at	 least	for	some	sectors	and	some	(large)	
developing	countries.	They	can	be	formulated	in	
such	a	way	that	they	can	be	assessed	as	NAMAs	
and	 facilitate	matching	with	 corresponding	 in-
ternational	support.	
 
abstract
Based on a case study of urban transport in 
Beijing, road-testing a Sectoral Proposal Template 
for sector no-lose targets, this paper concludes 
that this approach would work as a national 
appropriate mitigation action (NAMA) in China. 
As such, the paper presents a clear argument for 
the feasibility of sector no-lose targets for the 
transport sector. Even more, analysis suggests 
that this approach may be the best suitable 
approach for the sector. Experiences also show 
that sub-sectors, like urban transport, may be 
promising starting points for national action. 
*  This case study has been made possible through the UK FCO Stra-
tegic Program Fund. With contributions by Marion Vieweg, Niklas Höhne, 
Padraig Oliver and Xingyu Li, Ecofys
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Geographically,	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 has	 been	 fo-
cussed	on	NAMAs	in	China.	This	is	not	surprising	
given	the	importance	of	the	country’s	contribu-
tion	to	future	emission	reduction	efforts.	China	
has	been	 the	major	 recipient	 of	Annex	 I	 coun-
try	 financing	 through	 the	 Clean	 Development	
Mechanism,	but	huge	opportunities	to	scale	up	
mitigation	 still	 exist.	 The	 transport	 sector	 has	
so	 far	 not	 been	 able	 to	 attract	 much	 interna-
tional	 support	 for	mitigation	 efforts	 under	 the	
Kyoto	Protocol,	but	new	approaches	that	can	be	
implemented	 and	 supported	 as	NAMAs	may	be	
an	appropriate	solution	to	this	problem.	Sector	
no-lose	targets	may	be	a	more	promising	option	
to	direct	international	funding	to	the	transport	
sector	 in	China	 than	other	approaches	 such	as	
Policy-CDM	or	Sustainable	Development	Policies	
and	Measures	 (SD-PAMs)	 and	 are	 therefore	 ex-
plored	further.
Ecofys	and	GTripleC	developed	‘Sectoral	Propos-
al	Templates’	that	aim	at	facilitating	this	concept	
in	 the	proposal	 stage	of	 a	NAMA	 (Höhne	et	 al.	
2009).	 They	 combine	qualitative	 and	quantita-
tive	 information	 on	 the	 sector	 in	 a	 structured	
manner.	In	this	way,	the	developing	country	can	
provide	a	description	of	its	circumstances	at	the	
level	of	transparency	needed	to	negotiate	a	sec-
toral	target,	negotiate	appropriate	international	
support	and	scale	up	its	mitigation	actions	to	the	
sectoral	level.
After	a	first	stage	 in	Mexico,	we	have	chosen	to	
test	 this	 set	 of	 Sectoral	 Proposal	 Templates	 in	
China.	The	issues	and	challenges	encountered	in	
this	road-testing	exercise	are	set	out	below,	and	
we	discuss	the	findings	of	a	case	study	of	the	Bei-
jing	urban	transport	sector.	This	is	done	with	a	
view	to	giving	negotiators	a	sense	of	the	viabil-
ity	of	the	policy	instrument	of	SNLTs	as	a	NAMA	
and	its	requirements	at	the	domestic	(developing	
country)	and	international	(UNFCCC)	levels.
This	 paper	 starts	 with	 an	 introduction	 to	 the	
Chinese	transport	sector,	 the	challenges	 that	 it	
presents	 and	how	 the	Chinese	 government	 has	
been	 aiming	 to	 manage	 its	 sustainable	 devel-
opment.	We	then	discuss	 the	concept	of	sector	
no-lose	 targets,	 explore	how	 they	fit	within	 the	
current	discussion	on	NAMAs,	how	they	address	
the	 challenges	 encountered	 in	 the	 transport	
sector	 and	 what	 tools	 will	 be	 needed	 to	 make	
them	work.	Finally,	urban	transport	in	Beijing	is	
examined	as	a	case	study	to	illuminate	how	this	
concept	could	actually	work	in	practice.	We	close	
with	some	general	lessons	and	conclusions	that	
have	emerged	from	Ecofys’	road-testing	exercise	
in	the	transport	sector,	carried	out	 in	coopera-
tion	with	the	Chinese	Energy	Research	Institute.
Managed growth in the 
chinese transport sector
The	Chinese	transport	sector	has	grown	tremen-
dously	 in	the	past	three	decades.	Following	the	
opening	up	of	China’s	economy,	the	transport	of	
goods	has	exploded.	Car	ownership	and	air	travel	
have	 become	 affordable	 to	 tens	 of	 millions	 of	
people	in	developed	urban	areas,	and	they	sym-
bolize	economic	success	and	a	new	freedom	for	
CDM has been successful in many sectors 
of the Chinese economy to reduce the 
domestic emissions of GHGs and improve 
energy efficiency. Of the roughly 600 
projects registered in China, however not 
a single one is in the transport sector.
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hundreds	of	millions	more.	1,200	cars	are	being	
added	each	day	 to	 the	 streets	of	Beijing	 alone,	
and	 the	 number	 of	 passengers	 on	 commercial	
planes	 grew	 more	 than	 tenfold	 from	 1990	 to	
2007	(China	Statistics	Press	2008).	
China	 has	 followed	 the	 industrialized	 world	 in	
the	use	of	 fossil	 fuel-based	modes	of	 transport.	
With	the	strong	growth	in	the	use	of	combustion	
engines	 come	 rises	 in	 emissions	of	 greenhouse	
gases	 (GHGs),	 most	 importantly	 carbon	 diox-
ide.	China	is	far	behind	the	US	when	it	comes	to	
GHG	emissions	from	the	transport	sector,	but	its	
share	 is	 growing	 quickly.	 Transport	 contributes	
28%	of	total	GHG	emissions	in	the	United	States,	
and	 in	China	5.4%	of	GHG	emissions	were	 al-
ready	being	emitted	by	transport	activities	as	of	
2006,	more	than	triple	the	1990	emissions	(see	
Figure	 1).	 This	 excludes	 the	 indirect	 emissions	
of	 electric-powered	 trains	 and	urban	 transport,	
which	use	 electricity	 generated	mostly	 in	 coal-
fired	power	stations.	
Local	 emissions	 of	 SO
2
	 and	 particulates	 have	
become	 a	 significant	 problem	 for	 urban	 areas.	
Since	 many	 industrial	 installations	 that	 were	
traditionally	located	in	or	near	cities	have	been	
moved	 to	 the	 countryside,	 the	 transport	 sector	
has	 become	 the	 largest	 contributor	 to	 urban	
smog.	The	drastic	measures	that	the	city	of	Bei-
jing	took	to	provide	an	acceptable	environment	
for	 the	 Olympic	 Games	 in	 2008	 demonstrates	
the	adverse	health	effects	of	the	local	pollution,	
which	originates	largely	from	cars,	etc.
The	 Chinese	 government	 has	 adopted	 ambi-
tious	measures	to	improve	energy	efficiency	and	
reduce	local	pollution	from	the	transport	sector.	
Urban transport in Beijing, China
Figure 1.  
Growth in the Chinese transport sector (source: adapted from IEA 2008).
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Measures	 include	 provisions	 to	 expand	 high-
speed	railways	greatly,	as	well	as	public	transport	
in	 urban	 areas.	 Market-based	 mechanisms	 like	
fuel	taxes	are	not	yet	widely	applied,	but	China	
has	adopted	a	strict	timetable	to	phase	in	fuel	ef-
ficiency	standards	for	vehicles	(NDRC	2008).	
The	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM)	has	
been	successful	 in	many	sectors	of	the	Chinese	
economy	 in	 reducing	 the	 domestic	 emissions	
of	 GHGs	 and	 improving	 energy	 efficiency.	 Of	
the	roughly	600	projects	currently	registered	in	
China,	however,	not	a	single	one	is	in	the	trans-
port	 sector.	One	project	under	development	 in	
Chongqing	 focuses	 on	 an	 urban	 rapid-transfer	
bus	system.	Globally,	only	two	projects	have	been	
registered	 in	 the	 transport	sector	so	 far	 (UNEP	
Risoe	Centre	2009).	The	CDM	generally	favours	
large,	single-point	emission	sources,	where	emis-
sions	 can	 be	 clearly	 attributed	 and	 calculated.	
Consequently,	 one	 methodology	 has	 been	 ap-
proved	 for	 the	 transport	 sector	 so	 far.	Whereas	
applying	for	a	CDM	project	is	already	a	tedious	
task,	with	high	 transaction	costs	 in	 the	case	of	
renewable	 energy	 power	 generation	 or	 emis-
sion	 reductions	 in	 industrial	 installations,	 the	
challenges	 become	 close	 to	 insurmountable	 in	
the	 transport	 sector.	 The	 existing	methodology	
so	 far	 only	 covers	 rapid-transport	 bus	 systems,	
and	another	 small-scale	methodology	has	been	
applied	 to	 motorbikes.	 Their	 wider	 application	
for	private	transport,	air	travel	or	the	transport	
or	shipping	of	goods	is	not	proven,	and	few	new	
methodologies	 for	 these	areas	are	under	devel-
opment	(UNFCCC	2009).	
Policy	CDM	could	be	one	alternative	to	the	cur-
rent	CDM	for	these	cases.	In	this	variant,	emis-
sion	reductions	that	result	from	the	introduction	
of	a	new	policy	(e.g.	a	fuel	economy	standard	or	
fuel	 taxes)	 are	 credited	 in	 the	 form	of	 certified	
emission	reductions	(CERs)	to	the	agency	imple-
menting	the	policy.	However,	as	 it	 is	difficult	to	
set	an	appropriate	baseline	and	causally	attribute	
observed	emission	reductions	directly	to	any	one	
explicit	policy,	the	use	of	Policy	CDM	has	so	far	
not	been	permitted	under	the	Kyoto	Protocol.
The	question	is,	then,	how	can	further	advances	
in	 the	 Chinese	 transport	 sector	 be	 recognized	
and	supported	 internationally	as	nationally	ap-
propriate	 mitigation	 actions?	 Administrative	
measures	 have	 already	 moved	 carbon	 dioxide	
emissions	in	the	transport	sector	away	from	what	
would	have	happened	in	their	absence.	And	they	
are	clearly	nationally	appropriate,	as	the	Chinese	
government	has	undertaken	them	in	the	light	of	
domestic	energy	constraints	and	to	reduce	local	
air	pollution.	As	 such,	 they	 could	be	 framed	as	
sustainable	development	policies	 and	measures	
(SD-PAMs),	a	mechanism	proposed	internation-
ally	 to	 acknowledge	 developing	 country	 efforts	
that	have	a	 large	sustainable	development	divi-
dend	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 reducing	 green-
house	 gas	 emissions.	 However,	 in	 light	 of	 the	
pressure	 that	may	be	placed	on	China	to	agree	
to	measurable,	 reportable	 and	 verifiable	 (MRV)	
actions	in	Copenhagen,	the	use	of	SD-PAMs	may	
be	seen	as	too	weak,	as	the	quantification	of	and	
constraints	on	emissions	are	not	major	elements	
of	this	approach.	
Sectoral approaches for emissions reduction 
have received considerable attention in 
recent years ….. They are seen as one way of 
scaling up mitigation efforts and one possible 
path of evolution from the current CDM.
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sectoral no-lose targets as a solution?
Sectoral	approaches	for	emission	reductions	have	
received	considerable	attention	in	recent	years,	
and	they	are	on	the	list	of	issues	that	have	been	
discussed	under	 the	Bali	Action	Plan	agreed	 in	
December	2007.	
Sector	no-lose	targets	are	a	form	of	non-binding	
emission	target	that	encourage	sector-wide	emis-
sion	reductions.	Developing	countries	voluntarily	
propose	a	sector	crediting	baseline	(most	likely	in	
the	form	of	an	emission	intensity	for	the	sector	in	
question)	which	is	negotiated	at	the	internation-
al	 level.	Reductions	below	 the	baseline	generate	
credits	issued	to	the	government,	but	no	penalties	
occur	if	the	target	is	not	met	for	the	whole	sector.	
Sector	crediting	baselines	are	negotiated	and	set	
separately	for	each	major	sector	and	country.
As	depicted	in	Figure	2,	the	sector	crediting	base-
line	 is	an	emission	intensity	 level	 for	the	whole	
sector	that	is	lower	than	the	reference	scenario	
(dark	blue).	The	reference	scenario	is	calculated	
to	include	currently	implemented	national	poli-
cies	 and	 measures,	 as	 well	 as	 current	 external	
support	and	CDM	projects	that	are	already	run-
ning.	 As	 an	 important	 element,	 this	 approach	
also	includes	a	national	contribution	in	the	form	
of	emission	reductions,	making	it	a	real	mitiga-
tion	mechanism	that	goes	beyond	the	offsetting	
of	Annex	I	emissions.	It	may	be	supported	by	new	
international	 finance.	 The	 reductions	 between	
the	sector	crediting	baseline	(dashed	green	line)	
and	the	achieved	emission	intensity	level,	multi-
plied	by	units	of	output,	can	be	sold	as	emission	
credits	on	the	international	carbon	market.	
Currently implemented 
national policies and 
measures
Current external support and 
CDM projects
National contribution* /
new external support
Further reductions for sale 
on the carbon market
Reference  (BAU)
Own ambitious target
Sector crediting baseline 
* E.g. policies adoped 
and implemented after 
31 December 2007
time
G
H
G
 in
te
ns
ity
Historical
Sell certificates
Figure 2.  Concept of sector no-lose targets (Ecofys/GtripleC).
Urban transport in Beijing, China
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The	crediting	baseline	for	a	sector	no-lose	target	
is	 negotiated	 at	 UNFCCC	 level,	 ideally	 at	 the	
same	time	as	developed	country	targets	for	post-
2012	 are	 being	 agreed.	 In	 this	way,	 additional-
ity	 could	 be	 ensured	 up-front	 by	 linking	 the	
demand	 for	 reductions	 from	 developed	 coun-
tries	with	the	supply	in	credits	by	hosts	of	sector	
no-lose	 targets.	 The	 international	 community	
needs	to	create	rules	for	linking	this	option	and	
the	emission	certificates	it	creates	in	developing	
countries	to	the	emissions	trading	systems	in	de-
veloped	countries.	
As	the	income	from	the	sale	of	emission	credits	
accrues	to	the	government,	it	in	turn	has	to	pass	
on	the	incentive	to	the	companies	and/or	emit-
ters	at	the	sector	level,	either	directly	or	through	
its	 own	choice	of	policy.	This	 allows	 for	 an	 ap-
proach	 that	 is	 tailored	 to	 the	 country-specific	
situation,	 and	 in	 particular	 it	 qualifies	 it	 as	 a	
NAMA.	Governments	may	 chose	 to	 employ	 ad-
ministrative	measures,	taxes,	subsidies	or	locally	
limited	 emission	 trading	 schemes	 to	 facilitate	
emission	intensity	reductions.	
To	 return	 to	 the	 Chinese	 transport	 sector,	 we	
identified	 above	 a	 number	 of	 measures	 that	
the	 country	 is	 already	 undertaking	which	 have	
a	 greenhouse	 gas	mitigating	 effect.	 The	 causal	
contribution	of	each	individual	measure	is	hard	
to	 determine,	 and	 the	 reductions	 are	 difficult	
to	measure	 at	 each	 individual	 source	–	 i.e.	 the	
effect	of	individual	measures	on	emissions	is	not	
easily	MRV-able.	But	if	China	voluntarily	commit-
ted	itself	to	a	sector	no-lose	target	in	the	trans-
port	sector,	monitoring,	verification	and	report-
ing	at	the	international	level	could	focus	on	the	
(over-)	achievement	of	the	target	as	a	whole.	The	
individual	effects	of	domestic	actions	that	have	
led	to	the	reduction	of	the	emissions	(intensity)	
compared	to	the	agreed	sector	no-lose	target	are	
then	of	no	concern	to	the	international	commu-
nity.	Applying	a	sector	no-lose	target	enabled	by	
new	additional	finance	and	 linked	 to	 the	 inter-
national	 carbon	market	 could	 be	 considered	 a	
NAMA	in	itself.
For	the	transport	sector,	the	basic	sector	no-lose	
target	 approach	may	 be	most	 viable	 where	 the	
income	accrues	 to	 the	government,	which	then	
incentivises	reductions	in	the	national	transport	
sector.	Another	option	for	this	approach	in	other	
(industry)	sectors	would	be	to	move	the	incentive	
structure	from	the	national	to	the	company	level	
and	let	companies	profit	directly	if	they	beat	the	
intensity	 baseline.	 It	 is,	 however,	 presently	 un-
clear	 how	 this	 option	 could	 be	 integrated	 into	
the	 current	 climate	 change	 regime	 under	 the	
UNFCCC	 (Ward	et	 al.	2008;	Baron	et	 al.	2009;	
Schneider	and	Cames	2009).	
One	 basic	 precondition	 for	 the	 implementa-
tion	 of	 a	 sector	 no-lose	 target	 is	 that	 the	 his-
torical	data	used	are	detailed	and	credible	and	
the	observed	situation	of	the	sector	can	indeed	
be	monitored,	 reported	 and	 verified.	 This	 is	 to	
ensure	firstly	that	the	assumptions	on	which	the	
reference	scenario	and	the	crediting	baseline	are	
set	are	viable.	Secondly,	it	is	to	warrant	the	cor-
rectness	of	 the	emission	reductions	claimed	by	
the	government	during	the	commitment	period.	
Sector no-lose targets are a form of non 
binding emission targets that encourage 
sector-wide emission reductions. Developing 
countries voluntarily propose a sector crediting 
baseline (most likely in the form of an emsission 
intensity of the sector in question) which 
is negotiated at the international level.
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The	validity	of	the	targets	and	the	MRV	process	
is	the	basis	for	the	integrity	of	sector	no-lose	tar-
gets	as	a	NAMA,	and	this	in	turn	depends	a	lot	on	
the	availability	and	quality	of	data	in	the	country	
and	sector	and	their	transparent	presentation.
Starting	this	process	 in	the	first	 instance,	a	key	
issue	 becomes	 how	 developing	 countries	 will	
prepare	 their	 proposals	 for	 sectoral	 crediting	
baselines	so	that	they
can	be	understood	by	the	other	countries	•	
in	the	process;
will	be	seen	as	a	credible	starting	point	•	
with	the	right	ambition	level;	and
provide	a	means	to	negotiate	them	•	
through	analysis	of	specific	underlying	
elements	and	drivers.
Ecofys	 and	 GTripleC	 have	 developed	 ‘Sectoral	
Proposal	 Templates’	 that	 aim	 to	 facilitate	 this	
proposal	stage	(www.sectoral.org).	The	concept	of	
these	templates	is	systematically	to	step	through	
all	the	elements	that	are	necessary	to	understand	
what	a	reasonable	crediting	baseline	might	be	for	
the	sector	in	question.	These	elements	are	obvi-
ously	of	a	technical,	social	and	economic	nature	
and	are	very	sector-	and	country-specific.	More-
over,	given	that	a	crediting	baseline	is	essentially	
a	projection	for	a	future	multi-year	period,	it	will	
be	 important	 to	understand	 the	current	 trends	
in	 emissions	 and	 associated	 dynamic	 ‘metrics’	
for	the	sector	and	drivers	for	these	trends.
By	combining	qualitative	and	quantitative	infor-
mation	 on	 the	 sector	 and	 the	 relevant	 circum-
stances	 in	 the	country	 in	a	 structured	way,	 the	
templates	 provide	 the	 maximum	 level	 of	 trans-
parency	necessary	 for	 the	negotiation	of	a	 sec-
toral	crediting	baseline	at	the	international	level.	
This	kind	of	assessment	is	the	key	to	formulating	
sector	no-lose	targets	as	a	country	NAMA.	
The	templates	have	been	road-tested	 in	Mexico	
and	 more	 recently	 in	 China.	 The	 goal	 of	 this	
road-testing	is	to	improve	the	understanding	of	
the	concept	of	 sectoral	 crediting	baselines	and	
to	 learn	about	data	availability	and	data	collec-
tion	needs.	A	revision	of	the	templates	will	take	
into	account	the	lessons	learned	from	the	road-
testing	 phase.	 So	 far,	 three	 sectors	 have	 been	
covered:	 cement,	 electricity	 and	 transport.	 The	
transport	 template	 in	 particular	 has	 profited	
from	the	experience	in	Mexico	and	has	been	up-
dated	 considerably	 for	 the	 second	 road-testing	
phase	in	China.	
The	yet	 to	be	developed	MRV	process	of	sector	
no-lose	 targets	 and	NAMAs	 in	 general	 is	 likely	
to	benefit	from	the	experience	gained	by	testing	
templates	for	the	proposal	stage	of	sector	no-lose	
targets.	 Similar	 tools	 need	 to	 be	 developed	 for	
the	 later	MRW	stage	 to	present	 information	on	
sectoral	mitigation	achievements	of	a	developing	
country	and	the	adequacy	of	the	funding	it	is	re-
ceiving	from	developed	countries.	The	advantage	
of	the	sector	no-lose	target	concept	with	regard	
to	MRV	is	that	it	is	the	achieved	emission	inten-
sity	of	the	sector	compared	to	the	crediting	base-
line	that	needs	to	be	MRVed,	not	the	individual	
measures	(e.g.	policies,	standards,	internal	trad-
ing,	subsidies	etc.)	that	have	led	to	the	decrease	
in	intensity.	
case study: beijing’s transport sector
The	 expansion	 of	 transport	 activity	 has	 been	
most	pronounced	 in	China’s	urban	 regions,	 re-
sulting	in	a	great	increase	in	personal	mobility,	as	
well	as	negative	environmental	 impacts.	Admin-
istrations	in	all	large	cities	have	made	efforts	to	
Urban transport in Beijing, China
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manage	transport	expansion	in	their	administra-
tive	 regions,	 and	 they	 enjoy	 considerable	 free-
dom	to	steer	development	in	this	sector	in	their	
preferred	direction.	Beijing’s	transport	planning	
has	received	significant	attention	in	the	wake	of	
the	Olympic	Games	and	as	the	capital	and	one	of	
the	largest	Chinese	cities.	Instead	of	going	to	the	
national	 level	 directly	 and	 covering	 the	 trans-
port	sector	of	the	whole	country,	for	which	less	
reliable	detailed	data	are	available,	it	was	there-
fore	a	good	choice	to	 focus	on	the	Beijing	mu-
nicipal	region	to	road-test	the	transport	sectoral	
template.	
This	focus	on	Beijing	implies	a	number	of	choic-
es	regarding	the	boundary,	that	is,	what	we	mean	
when	we	talk	about	the	transport	sector.	Trans-
port	that	goes	beyond	the	geographical	area	of	
Beijing	municipality	 has	 been	 excluded	 on	 the	
grounds	 that	 emissions	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	
attribute.	 This	 refers	 to	 aviation,	 railway	 trans-
port,	transport	on	waterways	and	inter-province/
city	 highway	 transport	 apart	 from	 the	 portion	
that	occurs	in	Beijing	municipality.	In	effect,	we	
chose	 to	 test	 a	 sector	 no-lose	 target	 for	 urban	
transport.	The	adapted	 template	 could	 then	be	
applied	in	any	given	urban	area.
In	 developing	 a	 proposal	 template,	 it	 is	 neces-
sary	to	balance	the	need	for	detail	and	separate	
clearly	 distinguished	 transport	modes	with	 the	
general	goal	of	reducing	complexity	and	provid-
ing	 an	 overview	 that	 is	 easily	 understandable.	
Transport	is	therefore	split	into	
road-based	freight	transport,	•	
private	vehicle	passenger	transport,•	
public	(passenger)	transport	running	•	
on	fossil	fuels,	and	
public	(passenger)	transport	running	•	
on	electricity.	
Boundary	 issues	 still	 persist	 with	 respect	 to	
including	 certain	 new	 transport	 modes	 that	
exist	already	or	that	might	become	an	important	
option	in	the	future.	Electric	bikes	are	becoming	
more	popular	in	China,	and	studies	have	shown	
that	 they	 are	 low	 on	 energy	 consumption	 and	
pollution.	However,	they	are	not	included	in	the	
boundary	because	of	the	complexity	of	collecting	
data	on	the	amount	of	electricity	used	to	charge	
the	batteries.	Similarly,	the	scenario	assumptions	
for	the	future	do	not	yet	consider	electric	cars.	
Eventually,	 these	 new	 modes	 of	 transport	 will	
have	 to	 be	 included	 so	 as	 to	 account	 for	 all	
mitigation	efforts	 in	 the	 transport	 sector	when	
proposing	 a	 no-lose	 target	 for	 the	 sector	 as	 a	
nationally	appropriate	mitigation	action.	
Data	 availability	 in	 Beijing	 can	 be	 considered	
good	overall	compared	to	other	cities	or	provinces	
in	China.	This	is	a	key	prerequisite	to	be	able	to	
MRV	the	given	approach	as	a	NAMA.	Most	of	the	
historical	 data	 can	 be	 taken	 directly	 from	 the	
Beijing	Transport	Development	Annual	Reports,	
Beijing	 Statistical	 Yearbooks	 and	China	Energy	
Statistical	 Yearbooks.	 Additionally,	 previous	
studies,	 projects	 and	 modelling	 exercises	 on	
Beijing’s	 transport	 sector	 have	 proved	 to	 be	
constructive	sources	for	providing	supplementary	
data.	 However,	 data	 exist	 mostly	 in	 aggregate	
One basic precondition for the implementation 
of a sector no lose target is that the 
historical data used is detailed and credible 
and the observed situation can indeed 
by monitored, reported and verified.
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form	only,	 and	 the	 energy	 use	 of	 specific	 large	
consumers,	 such	 as	 the	 departments	 operating	
the	 public	 bus	 system	 or	 taxi	 companies,	 is	
not	 monitored	 comprehensively	 or	 specifically	
identified.	 One	 particular	 further	 problem	 is	
that	gasoline	and	diesel	for	use	in	commercial	or	
government	vehicles	 is	often	purchased	 in	bulk	
and	not	distributed	through	regular	gas	stations.	
These	 are	 just	 a	 few	 of	 the	 issues	 surrounding	
data	availability	and	integrity	that	would	need	to	
be	adequately	addressed	before	a	sectoral	target	
could	be	formulated	capable	of	withstanding	the	
scrutiny	of	an	international	MRV	process.
One	 important	point	 to	note	 is	 that	a	 lot	more	
information	is	needed	to	develop	a	sector	no-lose	
target	proposal	than	merely	information	on	total	
sectoral	emissions.	In	order	for	the	scenarios	to	
be	 transparent,	 they	 are	 based	 on	 assumptions	
regarding	transport	activity,	modal	structure,	the	
efficiency	of	 vehicles	 and	 fuel	 emission	 factors.	
This	allows	for	the	scenarios	to	be	different	based	
on	choices	regarding	these	factors.	For	example,	
the	 reference	 (BAU)	 scenario	 might	 assume	
that	 50%	 of	 all	 passenger	 transport	 (person	
km)	happens	on	public	 transport,	while	a	more	
ambitious	 scenario	 assumes	 that	 70%	 public	
transport	 can	 be	 achieved.	 The	 actual	 target	
that	is	ultimately	set	through	negotiations	at	the	
international	level	can	then	be	easily	compared	
to	future	performance	as	observed	and	expressed	
directly	in	terms	of	GHG	emissions	(intensity).
We	 assessed	 the	 trends	 in	 historical	 energy	
consumption	 and	 distance	 travelled	 for	
passengers	and	 freight	 from	1990	 to	2007.	The	
data	provide	a	basis	for	assumptions	on	travelling	
activity,	 transport	 modal	 structure	 and	 vehicle	
efficiency	 in	 the	 three	 scenarios	 underlying	 a	
sector	no-lose	target.	Figure	3	shows	the	data	that	
have	to	be	taken	into	account,	and	that	therefore	
needs	to	be	provided	as	an	input,	to	develop	an	
understanding	 of	 the	 possible	 developments	 in	
the	sector.	The	data	used	to	calculate	total	activity	
for	example,	include	statistics	per	transport	mode	
on	 average	 travelling	 distance	 per	 passenger,	
total	 annual	 passenger	 numbers,	 average	 load	
per	vehicle	and	so	on.	Data	on	vehicle	efficiency	
are	 not	 available	 from	 direct	 sources	 but	 are	
derived	from	previous	studies	relating	to	Beijing	
municipality.	The	availability	of	such	information	
or	 the	ability	 to	generate	 it	 is	 a	prerequisite	 to	
develop	 a	 transparent,	 MRV-able	 proposal	 for	
sector	no-lose	targets	as	a	NAMA.	
Figure 3. ASIF methodology as implemented in the calculation tool.
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Scenarios	 calculated	 using	 the	 IPAC-AIM/tech-
nology	 model,	 which	 was	 developed	 by	 the	
Energy	 Research	 Institute	 under	 the	 National	
Development	and	Reform	Commission	of	China,	
are	 used	 to	 inform	 the	 assumptions	 needed	 to	
complete	the	proposal	template.	The	IPAC	model	
addresses	 energy	 consumption	 and	 pollution	
under	 the	 conditions	 of	 future	 population	 and	
economic	 development.	 It	 particularly	 focuses	
on	 the	 impact	 of	 transport	 policy	 on	 emission	
mitigating	 actions.	Using	 a	 quantified	method-
ology,	 the	 framework	of	 the	model	 looks	 at	 the	
following	elements:
Future	trends	in	population	and	eco-•	
nomic	development;
Estimated	transport	demand	based	•	
on	Beijing’s	economic	development	
trend;	derived	future	passenger	and	
freight	travelling	distances	and	vehicle	
numbers;
Factors	that	influence	scenario	settings	•	
under	different	policy	conditions:	ef-
ficiency	changes	in	vehicles	through	
technological	advances,	market	share	
by	type	of	vehicles	and	change	in	fuel	
mix;
Quantified	analysis	of	future	energy	•	
demand	and	CO
2
	emissions	in	Beijing;
Policy	advice	based	on	model	analysis.•	
An	 important	 issue	 in	 the	 scenario	 setting	 is	
which	policies	 should	be	 included	 in	 the	 refer-
ence	 scenario	 and	 which	 go	 beyond.	 The	 year	
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2007	was	chosen	as	the	policy	base	year,	mean-
ing	 that	 policies	 and	 measures	 that	 came	 into	
effect	before	the	end	of	2007	would	be	included	
in	the	business-as-usual	scenario,	while	new	pol-
icies	and	measures	introduced	after	2007	influ-
ence	the	scenario	used	as	crediting	baseline	(see	
Figure	2).
This	 means	 that	 the	 following	 activities	 that	
the	Chinese	government	has	undertaken	in	the	
transport	sector	nationally	and	in	Beijing	before	
2007	fall	under	the	business-as-usual	scenario:
Fuel	economy	standards	for	small	passen-•	
ger	vehicles;
Energy	development	and	conservation	•	
planning	for	Beijing	in	the	11th	Five-Year	
Plan	(FYP);
Beijing	transport	development	framework;•	
Beijing	infrastructure	development	for	•	
the	11th	FYP;
Limitation	on	inefficient	small	passenger	•	
vehicles;
Future	planning	for	rail	transit	in	Beijing.•	
No	external	support	in	the	form	of	CDM	has	been	
received	in	the	transport	sector.
New	policies	and	measures	after	2007,	which	can	
be	considered	China’s	national	contribution	and	
which	 should	 be	 supported	 with	 new	 external	
support,	include:
New	vehicle	emission	standard;•	
Wholesale	oil	price	reform;•	
Traffic	restrictions	indexed	by	weekday/•	
licence	plate	numbers;
Adjustment	on	car	sales	tax;•	
Subsidy	on	efficient	and	new	energy	cars;•	
Revitalisation	plan	for	the	automotive	•	
industry.
The	question	of	what	metric	 to	use	 in	 the	 sce-
narios	has	come	up	during	the	road	testing	and	
in	the	consultations	with	stakeholders.	In	gener-
al,	the	idea	of	the	no-lose	target	has	been	to	use	
a	 calculation	based	on	 intensities,	 for	 example,	
CO
2
eq.	 per	 ton	 of	 cement	 or	 kilowatt	 hour.	 As	
the	road	testing	in	Mexico	showed,	a	metric	like	
GHG	emissions	per	person	kilometre	or	similar	
is	not	viable	because	verifiable	data	in	kilometres	
travelled	is	not	available.	So	the	Beijing	exercise	
started	out	by	exploring	emission	intensity	from	
transport	per	capita	and	per	GDP	of	Beijing	mu-
nicipality.	Both	options	appear	viable,	but	even	
an	absolute	no-lose	target	could	be	acceptable.	
This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 ambitious	 planning	 for	 sus-
tainable	 transport	 in	 Beijing,	 and	 more	 gener-
ally	because	space	constraints	naturally	limit	the	
expansion	 of	 fossil	 fuel-based	private	 transport	
in	the	urban	region.	Unlike	other	industries	like	
cement	and	iron	and	steel,	there	is	less	concern	
that	an	absolute	 target	will	 limit	 the	expansion	
of	the	sector.
In	the	end,	the	exact	absolute	or	 intensity	 level	
at	 which	 to	 set	 the	 target,	 that	 is,	 the	 sectoral	
crediting	baseline,	is	always	a	political	decision.	
It	needs	to	take	into	account	how	stringent	and	
ambitious	existing	policies	are,	how	much	financ-
ing	can	be	provided	to	implement	them,	what	the	
maximum	mitigation	potential	is,	etc.	If	sectoral	
analyses	 regarding	 marginal	 abatement	 costs	
(MAC)	exist,	they	may	be	used	to	inform	this	pro-
Urban transport in Beijing, China
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cess.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	an	argument	can	be	made	
for	 the	sectoral	crediting	baseline	 to	be	placed	
at	some	point	in	between	a	‘no	regret’	cost	line,	
covering	measures	that	have	no	or	negative	costs	
to	implement,	and	a	‘co-benefit’	level,	including	
measures	 which	 entail	 substantial	 other	 posi-
tive	environmental	or	development	benefits	(see	
Figure	4).	For	the	Beijing	transport	template	road	
testing,	an	in-depth	analysis	based	on	a	sectoral	
MAC	curve	has	not	been	undertaken	due	to	a	lack	
of	data.	Using	MAC	curve	information	can	be	the	
key	to	presenting	a	convincing	case	for	a	specific	
sectoral	target.	In	the	transport	sector	this	may	
nevertheless	be	difficult	because	a	large	part	of	
the	cost	might	be	borne	by	individuals,	and	ben-
efits	are	 largely	available	 to	all	of	 the	public	 in	
the	form	of	positive	environmental	externalities.	
To	present	persuasive	scenarios	for	the	transport	
sector,	stakeholders	must	be	adequately	involved	
and	given	the	opportunity	to	provide	input.	At	the	
current	stage,	the	road	testing	has	been	carried	
out	 as	 a	 research	project,	with	 the	 information	
used	coming	mostly	 from	a	central	government	
research	 organisation.	 Local	 government	 agen-
cies	have	been	consulted	and	have	been	involved	
in	 the	collection	of	data	as	well	 as	 in	planning	
the	general	direction	of	future	scenarios.	
City	 planners	 in	 Beijing	 have	 extensive	 experi-
ence	of	mapping	out	and	implementing	sustain-
able	strategies	for	city	transport.	In	the	past	this	
has	been	realized	mostly	with	a	view	to	solving	the	
problems	of	congestion	and	localized	pollution.	
Low	carbon	development	has	become	a	hot	topic	
among	 politicians	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 government	
in	China,	but	it	is	still	a	relatively	new	idea	and	
has	not	been	an	independent	goal	for	the	urban	
transport	strategy	of	Beijing.	Taking	up	a	sector	
no-lose	target	in	Beijing’s	transport	sector	would	
mean	 that	 sustainable	 transport	 strategies	 that	
are	being	implemented	or	planned	today	(expan-
sion	of	mass	public	transport,	vehicle	efficiency	
standards,	 fuel	 taxes,	 etc.)	 can	 continue	 to	 be	
used	and	made	more	stringent.	In	addition,	each	
policy	would	be	mainstreamed	to	concentrate	on	
the	most	effective	ways	to	mitigate	carbon	diox-
ide	 emissions	 and	 new	measures	 be	 devised	 to	
further	this	overarching	goal.	To	assess	the	suc-
cess	of	the	NAMA	in	the	transport	sector,	it	will	
then	not	be	necessary	 to	 look	at	each	measure	
individually,	but	at	the	overall	deviation	of	trans-
port	emissions	from	the	sectoral	crediting	target	
that	has	been	agreed	a priori.	
Following	this	logic,	the	choice	of	an	implement-
ing	and	supervising	organisation	that	promotes	
mainstreaming	 of	 the	 GHG	 mitigation	 goal	 in	
the	 transport	 sector	 becomes	 vital.	 Beijing	 city	
will	need	the	capacity	to
present	a	compelling	case	for	a	cred-•	
iting	baseline	using	the	proposal	
template;
implement	ambitious	policies	and	mea-•	
sures	that	go	beyond	the	status	quo	
and	have	a	GHG	mitigation	objective	at	
their	heart;	
ensure	that	the	crediting	baseline	is	•	
actually	crossed	to	generate	income	
from	the	sale	of	emission	credits	on	the	
international	carbon	market;
ensure	that	data	quality	and	presenta-•	
tion	meet	the	requirements	of	the	in-
ternational	MRV	process;	and
use	the	projected	income	stream	and	•	
other	available	international	finance	
to	incentivize	mitigation	measures	
adequately.
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As	becomes	obvious	from	this	list,	the	challenges	
for	the	actual	realization	of	a	no-lose	target	in	the	
Beijing	transport	sector	are	considerable.	Achiev-
ing	the	target	will	require	the	coordinated	efforts	
of	the	Beijing	Development	and	Reform	Commis-
sion,	 the	 Statistical	 Bureau,	 the	 transport	 and	
urban	 planning	 agencies,	 research	 institutions,	
the	 National	 Development	 and	 Reform	 Com-
mission,	the	Ministry	of	Transport	and	probably	
a	number	of	other	entities.	 It	 should	be	noted,	
however,	 that	 the	 challenges	 mostly	 concern	
the	presentation	and	harmonization	of	 sectoral	
efforts	 –	 the	 actual	 policies	 and	measures	 that	
are	needed	can	continue	along	the	lines	already	
practiced	today,	as	only	the	sector	no-lose	target	
would	 be	 presented	 and	 evaluated	 internation-
ally	as	a	NAMA.	
conclusions
The	 road-testing	 of	 the	 proposal	 template	 for	
a	 sector	no-lose	 target	 in	 the	Beijing	 transport	
sector	has	shown	that	it	would	actually	be	pos-
sible	 to	 implement	such	an	approach	 in	China,	
at	 least	 within	 the	 boundaries	 chosen	 for	 this	
particular	 case	 study.	 It	 has	 become	 clear	 that	
the	 capacity	 to	provide	 and	present	 the	neces-
sary	data	 still	needs	 to	be	 further	enhanced	 to	
a	level	that	can	withstand	the	scrutiny	of	an	in-
ternational	 MRV	 process.	 Issues	 surrounding	
the	 coordination	of	 efforts	 to	 reach	 the	 target,	
as	well	 as	 the	 use	 of	 the	 possible	 income	 from	
the	carbon	market	to	incentivise	emission	reduc-
tions,	deserve	much	more	attention	and	should	
be	the	focus	of	future	research	efforts,	for	exam-
ple,	through	a	pilot	study.	
While	in	other	sectors	there	have	been	doubts	as	
to	whether	an	approach	is	feasible	that	allocates	
income	from	the	carbon	market	to	a	government	
(not	private)	actor,	this	research	clearly	demon-
strates	that	this	is	the	preferred	and	probably	only	
option	in	the	transport	sector.	The	large	number	
of	dispersed	emission	sources	is	just	what	makes	
other	 approaches	 like	 the	CDM,	 which	 rely	 on	
the	incentivisation	of	reductions	at	each	individ-
ual	 source,	 impractical.	 Furthermore,	 nearly	 all	
present	reduction	efforts	in	the	transport	sector	
in	China	 today	rely	on	administrative	measures	
like	the	setting	of	standards	and	the	expansion	of	
mass	public	transport,	etc.,	which	can	be	further	
enhanced	with	additional	financing.
What,	then,	does	the	case	of	urban	transport	in	
Beijing	 tell	 us	 about	 the	 applicability	 of	 sector	
no-lose	 targets	 for	 the	 transport	 sector	 in	gen-
eral	 in	 other	 big	 (Chinese)	 cities,	 and	 do	 they	
have	a	wider	application	beyond	the	metropoli-
tan	regions?	Data	on	the	transport	sector	in	big	
Chinese	cities	exist	in	differing	qualities.	The	ar-
gument	has	been	made	above	that	data	availabil-
ity	and	quality	and	 the	capacity	 to	analyse	and	
present	them	are	indispensable	for	proposing	a	
sector	no-lose	target.	If	the	approach	should	be	
applied	more	widely,	preparing	cities’	 ability	 to	
cope	with	these	challenges	should	therefore	be	
one	of	 the	primary	 concerns	of	 capacity-build-
ing	 efforts.	 Through	 the	 Chinese	 governance	
system,	and	provided	sufficient	funding	is	avail-
able,	it	should	be	possible	to	spread	experience	
gained	in	pilot	projects	and	more	advanced	cities	
to	others,	replicating	institutions	and	incentive	
structures.	
To	present	sectoral	targets	as	a	NAMA,	it	may	be	
reasonable	 to	 consider	 transport	 by	dividing	 it	
into	 distinguishable	 sub-sectors.	 Urban	 trans-
port	and	the	policies	and	measures	for	reducing	
GHG	emissions	are	considerably	different	 from	
the	questions	that	arise	when	one	thinks	of	inter-
city	transport,	including	not	only	road	transport,	
but	 also	 aviation	 and	 water-based	 transport	 of	
both	passengers	and	freight.	
Urban transport in Beijing, China
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One	sub-sector	could	therefore	be	urban	trans-
port,	for	example,	covering	all	the	cities	in	China	
above	a	certain	size,	applying	the	transport	mode	
boundary	used	 in	our	case	study.	Although	the	
sector	no-lose	target	would	in	this	case	exist	 in	
cities	 spread	 out	 across	 China,	 concerns	 over	
leakage	are	unlikely	to	arise	because	urban	trans-
port	cannot	be	replaced	by	inter-city	transport.	
Policies	in	large	cities	with	a	target	that	supports	
the	development	of	mass	public	transport	are	also	
unlikely	 to	 cause	 inhabitants	 to	move	 to	 other,	
smaller	cities	that	do	not	need	such	a	target.	Ve-
hicle	efficiency	standards	put	into	place	to	reach	
targets	in	the	cities	effectively	also	extend	to	in-
ter-city	road	transport,	as	manufacturers	will	not	
offer	separate	models.	The	Chinese	government	
could	take	up	an	absolute	or	intensity	target	for	
transport	 in	 all	 cities	 above	 a	 certain	 size,	 and	
one	could	even	imagine	the	setting	of	a	bench-
mark	expressed	in	terms	of	per	capita	emissions	
in	the	transport	sector,	which	makes	the	achieve-
ments	of	cities	comparable	and	helps	in	reaching	
the	overall	national	target.	
The	case	study	presented	here	allows	few	conclu-
sions	for	the	sub-sector	of	either	inter-city	(here	
especially	freight)	or	rural	transport.	The	discus-
sions	surrounding	the	former	might,	however,	be	
partially	informed	by	the	debate	surrounding	in-
ternational	aviation	and	maritime	emissions.	
The	transport	sector	as	analysed	here	is	quite	dis-
tinct	from	other	sectors	such	as	cement,	iron	and	
steel	 production	 and	 power	 generation,	 where	
other	case	studies	have	been	or	will	be	carried	
out.	However,	one	other	sector	with	a	major	share	
in	global	emissions	that	may	be	able	to	apply	the	
lessons	learned	through	the	transport	case	study	
is	 the	 building	 sector.	 This	 shares	 important	
characteristics	with	 the	 transport	 sector:	 it	has	
a	 large	 number	 of	 dispersed	 emission	 sources	
where	individual	emission	reductions	are	impos-
sible	to	incentivise	directly,	leakage	and	compet-
itive	 concerns	 are	minimal,	 and	 there	 is	 a	 reli-
ance	on	administrative	measures	 like	 standards	
and	public	spending	to	realize	energy	efficiency	
gains.	 Further	 research	could	 therefore	 also	be	
directed	at	developing	a	 sectoral	proposal	 tem-
plate	for	the	building	sector	and	analysing	more	
generally	questions	of	the	domestic	implementa-
tion	of	sector	no-lose	targets	as	a	NAMA	in	both	
these	sectors.	
Experience	from	the	road	testing	exercise	under-
lines	 once	more	 that	data	 analysis	 can	only	be	
a	starting	point	in	formulating	a	sector	no-lose	
target	as	a	NAMA.	Data	availability,	information	
on	cost,	etc.	are	certainly	 important	issues,	but	
in	the	end	the	setting	of	the	no-lose	target,	the	
sector	crediting	baseline,	remains	a	political	de-
cision.	It	has	to	be	taken	with	a	view	to	the	specif-
ic	circumstances	of	the	country	and	sector,	and	
by	matching	the	level	of	ambition	of	the	NAMA	
with	the	level	of	international	support	provided.	
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abstract
A new approach for a Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMA) framework is presented 
to unlock the enormous potential for low-cost 
greenhouse gas emission reductions in the 
dispersed energy end-use sectors in developing 
countries. The framework is designed to fulfill 
the demand for public policies and public sector 
investment in developing countries and thereby 
boost private sector investment through project/
program based market mechanisms, such as 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
and Joint Implementation (JI). The new NAMAs 
framework is a need-based mechanism which 
more effectively considers the conditions of each 
developing country. The building sector is used as 
an example to demonstrate how NAMA measures 
can be registered based on the circumstances 
that exist in each country. The capacity building, 
financial, and technology transfer/development1 
support from developed countries are financed 
as NAMA programs to assist the design and 
implementation of their registered NAMA package. 
1  Technology transfer and technology development are used inter-
changeably in this paper. It includes technological assistance for research, 
development, adoption, and dissemination of climate friendly technolo-
gies, whether the technology is developed locally or internationally.
NaMas FOr disPersed eNergy eNd-Use sectOrs: 
Using the Building Sector as an Example
 
Chia-Chin	Cheng
	Xianli	Zhu	
UNEP Risø Centre 
In	 the	 series	of	negotiation	 sessions	 leading	 to	
COP15	 in	Copenhagen,	NAMAs	 are	 one	 of	 the	
main	 focuses	 of	 the	 negotiations	 and	 have	 the	
potential	 to	 become	 a	 new	mechanism	 to	 sup-
port	mitigation	efforts	 in	developing	countries.	
As	outlined	below,	a	new	NAMA	framework	devel-
oped	and	presented	in	this	paper	would	be	ap-
propriate	 and	 operational	 for	 dispersed	 energy	
end-use	sectors	in	developing	countries,	in	par-
ticular,	 the	 building	 sector	 and	 the	 industrial	
sector.	 These	 two	 sectors	 make	 up	 the	 largest	
portions	 of	 energy	 consumption	 in	 developing	
countries	 and	 are	 characteristically	 dominated	
by	enormous	dispersed	energy	end-use	activities	
in	 developing	 countries.	 Because	 of	 their	 dis-
persed	nature	and	various	barriers,	 the	current	
Kyoto	Flexible	Mechanisms	are	under-utilized	in	
the	two	dispersed	end-use	sectors.	In	developing	
countries,	 the	 building	 and	 industrial	 sectors	
are	 typically	 the	most	 difficult	 sectors	 for	 gov-
ernment	policies	to	tackle	and	are	in	great	need	
of	 capacity-building,	 as	 well	 as	 technological	
and	financial	 support	 in	 the	 post-2012	 regime.	
If	 designed	 appropriately,	NAMAs	 implemented	
in	these	two	sectors	could	make	the	widest	and	
strongest	impacts	in	the	transformation	to	a	low-
carbon	society	in	developing	countries.
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The	 approach	 presented	 here	 builds	 on	 the	
Sector	No	Loose	Target	idea	(Ward,	2008).	How-
ever,	NAMA	activities	are	not intended	to	be	fi-
nanced	based	 on	 carbon	 credits.	 In	 the	NAMA	
framework	illustrated	in	this	paper,	benchmarks	
to	determine	NAMAs	 and	 carbon	financing	 are	
entirely	 energy	 performance-based	 (see	 Figure	
1).	The	upper	part	of	Figure	1	shows	energy	per-
formance	improvement	and	consumption	reduc-
tion	due	to	various	NAMA	policy	support	activi-
ties,	which	is	supported	by	a	separate	financing	
mechanism	 that	 will	 be	 described	 later	 in	 this	
paper.	The	lower	part	of	Figure	1	shows	further	
improvements	 beyond	 minimum	 performance	
standards	which	could	continue	to	be	supported	
by	 the	 CDM	 or	 an	 improved	 project/program-
based	mechanism	of	the	sort	that	are	under	dis-
cussion	through	the	United	Nations	Framework	
Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (UNFCCC).	 In	
other	words,	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	reduction	in	
a	sector	starts	with	a	sector-wide	NAMA-support-
ing	mechanism.	If	and	when	the	project	develop-
ers	decide	to	construct	their	buildings	(or	design	
their	manufacturing	units)	beyond	the	mandatory	
minimum	performance	standards,	the	additional	
reduction	could	create	carbon	credits	and	receive	
carbon	finance	 from	the	CDM.	In	addition,	pre-
mium	carbon	credits	are	awarded	above	a	certain	
benchmark	to	reward	entities	who	are	taking	fur-
ther	steps	to	achieve	state-of-the-art	technologies,	
where	 mitigation	 costs	 are	 often	 much	 higher.	
The	same	framework	also	applies	to	the	industrial	
Figure 1. A NAMA financing framework developed to interface non-carbon credit-based NAMAs and carbon 
credit based-financing for the building sector (as well as the industrial end-use sector)
Note: * Several baselines and benchmarks may be established for use in building sub-sectors. The baselines and benchmarks 
could be determined by building end-use types, climate zones and energy types, etc.
     ** Minimum performance standards and crediting benchmarks are tightened over time, could be negotiation-based or 
voluntarily determined by countries, or a combination of the two.*** For the industrial framework, energy performance could be 
measured with kWhe/output or GJ/output). The baselines and benchmarks could be determined by process systems, technology 
types, production size (output levels), etc.
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sector:	 only	 the	 energy	 performance	 could	 be	
measured	with	kWhe/output	(or	MJ/output).
The	 paper	 first	 provides	 a	 brief	 analysis	 of	 the	
characteristics	of	dispersed	energy	end-use	sec-
tors.	 Secondly,	 the	 paper	 explains	 the	multiple	
barriers	and	market	failures	that	hamper	invest-
ment	 in	 dispersed	 energy	 end-use	 sectors	 fol-
lowed	by	 a	brief	discussion	and	an	overview	of	
policy	instruments	that	could	be	used	to	elimi-
nate	 these	barriers.	Next,	 it	 is	pointed	out	 that	
these	policies	 and	measures,	which	are	 the	key	
to	 overcoming	 barriers,	 should	 be	 designed	 as	
NAMAs	 and	 implemented	 in	 developing	 coun-
tries	with	financial,	capacity-building	and	tech-
nological	 support	 from	 developed	 countries.	
Some	examples	are	provided	for	such	NAMAs	in	
the	 context	 of	 the	 building	 sector,	 it	 being	 ex-
plained	that	success	indicators,	not	greenhouse	
gas	emission	reductions,	 should	be	used	as	 the	
basis	 for	 the	MRV	of	NAMAs.	Finally,	 the	paper	
comes	to	the	conclusion	that	a	NAMA	framework	
of	this	kind	can	provide	the	urgently	needed	so-
lution	to	global	climate-change	negotiations.	
characteristics of dispersed 
energy end-use sectors 
The	dispersed	energy	end-use	sectors	discussed	
in	 this	paper	mainly	 include	 the building sector,	
which	 is	 the	 largest	energy	end-use	sector,	and	
the	 industrial sector,	 which	 consists	 primarily	 of	
SMEs	in	developing	countries.	The	two	end-use	
sectors	 contribute	 the	 largest	 shares	 of	 energy	
end-use	in	today’s	economy.		
The	 energy	 saving	 and	 emission	 reduction	 po-
tentials	 from	 these	 two	 sectors	 are	 substantial.	
According	 to	 the	 Intergovernmental	 Panel	 of	
Using the Building Sector as an Example
Figure 2: Potential emission reductions in different sectors in 2030 as a function of the 
cost assigned to reduction measures (US$/tonne of CO
2
 equivalent) 
 
 
Source: IPCC 2007, Mitigation - Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, p 10
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Climate	 Change	 (IPCC),	 the	 building	 sector	
has	 the	 largest	 potential	 for	 achieving	 low-cost	
emission	 reduction	 (<	20USD/tCO2e)	 in	devel-
oping	countries	in	the	years	to	2030	(see	Figure	
2).	Of	 all	 sectors,	 the	 industrial	 end-use	 sector	
in	developing	countries	has	a	larger	GHG	of	all	
sectors	 emission	 reduction	 potential	 than	 that	
of	 the	energy	supply	sector.	 	After	 the	building	
sector,	 the	 industrial	 sector	 potential	 is	 only	
smaller	than	that	of	the	agricultural	sector	where	
methane	is	the	primary	GHG	-which	is	a	much	
more	potent	GHG	compared	 to	carbon	dioxide	
(CO
2
).	Therefore,	in	terms	of	reducing	CO
2
	emis-
sions	and	its	associated	fossil	fuel	consumption,	
the	building	 and	 industrial	 sectors	 present	 the	
largest	 opportunities.	 In	 developing	 countries,	
the	 building	 sector	 and	 industrial	 energy	 end-
use	sectors	are	intimately	related	to	sustainable	
development	because	 they	are	closely	 linked	to	
the	lifestyles	of	the	people	and	the	development	
progress	of	the	country.	However,	emissions	from	
the	building	and	industrial	energy	end-use	sec-
tors	are	difficult	and	costly	to	tap.	Thus,	the	huge	
potential	in	the	two	sectors	is	relatively	difficult	
to	realize	due	to	a	variety	of	barriers.		
A	 large	 share	 of	 human	 activity	 takes	 place	 in	
buildings.	Based	on	their	uses,	buildings	can	be	
classified	into	residential,	commercial	and	public	
buildings.	Energy	is	used	in	buildings	to	satisfy	
a	wide	 variety	of	 functions	–	 to	 keep	 the	 room	
temperature	at	a	comfortable	level,	 for	lighting,	
cooking,	water	heating,	and	to	provide	electric-
ity	to	power	various	electrical	appliances.	Com-
mercial	 buildings	 and	 public	 buildings	 can	 be	
further	 categorized	 into	 subtypes	 like	 schools,	
hospitals,	departments,	hotels	and	office	build-
ings.	 Depending	 on	 its	 purposes	 and	 location,	
the	energy	consumption	pattern	of	each	build-
ing	type	is	different.	The	climate	zone	in	which	
a	building	is	located	determines	the	cooling	and	
heating	needs	of	the	building.		
The	dispersed	nature	of	buildings	and	SME	indus-
tries	has	been	recognized	and	described	by	some	
energy	 end-use	 CDM	 researchers	 as	 ‘long-tail’	
Figure 3.  Large aggregated savings and emission reduction potential from large numbers 
of end-use units in the long-tail section of the building and industrial sectors. 
Source: Cheng, et al. (2008)
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characteristics	(Hinostroza,	et	al.	2007,	Figueres	
and	Philips,	 2007,	Cheng,	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 Energy	
end-use	 in	buildings	and	 industrial	SMEs	pres-
ent	distinct	characteristics	of	dispersed	end-use	
patterns	in	terms	of	location,	adopted	technolo-
gies,	size,	stakeholder’s	knowledge	and	technical	
capacity,	 end-use	 conditions,	 and	 stakeholder	
and	end-user’s	decisions.	Since	a	 large	number	
of	activities	occur	at	the	tail-end,	the	aggregated	
energy	 consumption,	 and	 therefore	 the	 energy	
saving	 potential,	 often	 outweigh	 the	 potential	
from	large-scale	projects	(Hinostroza,	et	al.	2007,	
Cheng,	 2008).	Moreover,	 the	measures	 needed	
to	spur	actions	from	the	building	and	industrial	
sectors	require	the	involvement	of	a	substantial	
number	of	stakeholders	and	actors	across	all	sec-
tions	of	the	country’s	economy.	
energy efficiency in dispersed sectors 
is out of reach of existing cdM
Despite	 the	 enormous	 potential	 for	 low-cost	
emission	 reduction	 in	 the	 building	 sector,	 the	
CDM	has	so	far	failed	to	channel	large	amounts	
of	private	investments	into	this	area.	Among	the	
4673	CDM	projects	that	have	been	registered	or	
were	still	in	validation	as	of	the	end	of	Septem-
ber	2009,	there	were	only	21	projects	for	energy	
efficiency	 improvement	 among	households	 and	
another	 17	 for	 energy	 efficiency	 improvement	
of	the	service	sector	(UNEP	Risoe	CDM	Pipeline	
dated	1	Oct	2009).	Together,	 these	38	projects	
accounted	for	less	than	one	per	cent	of	the	exist-
ing	CDM	projects.	In	industries,	only	249	small-
scale	 projects	 qualified	 for	 energy	 end-use	 im-
provement,	compared	to	474	projects	from	large	
manufacturers	(UNEP	Risoe	CDM	Pipeline	dated	
1	Oct	2009).
Some	 recent	 developments	 in	 CDM	 could	 par-
tially	 address	 these	 barriers	 through	 the	 intro-
duction	 of	 programmatic	 CDM,	 under	 which	 a	
coordinating/managing	 entity	 from	 the	 public	
or	 private	 sector	 can	 set	 up	 a	 program	 (called	
PoA)	 to	 coordinate	 the	 participation	 of	 many	
actors	in	emission	reduction.	Once	the	PoA	is	es-
tablished,	activities	can	be	included	in	the	PoA	
and	be	registered	on	a	fast	track.	Programmatic	
CDM	is	designed	to	stimulate	mitigation	actions	
among	dispersed	energy	end-users	such	as	using	
Compact	 Fluorescent	 Lamps	 (CFLs)	 to	 replace	
inefficient	 incandescent	 lamps.	 Since	 the	CDM	
Executive	Board	(EB)	established	the	rules	about	
programmatic	 CDM	 in	 mid-2007,	 fifteen	 pro-
grams	have	been	submitted	worldwide,	and	one	
of	them	has	been	registered.	It	can	be	expected	
that	 once	 the	 greatest	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 post-
2012	carbon	credit-based	mechanism	has	been	
solved,	more	PoAs	will	be	submitted	from	the	de-
veloping	countries.	
However,	 there	 is	 limitation	 to	 how	much	 pro-
grammatic	 CDM	 could	 spur	 sectoral-wide	 ac-
tions	in	long	tail	sectors.	Due	to	strong	barriers	
occurred	in	the	dispersed	end-use	sectors,	which	
will	be	discussed	later,	programmatic	CDM	alone	
cannot	overcome	all	barriers	and	stimulate	a	sys-
tematic	uptake	of	emission	reduction	activities.	
A	recent	UNEP	report	on	CDM	and	the	building	
sector	(Cheng,	et	al,	2008)	also	concluded	that	
project-based	 or	 program-based	 mechanisms	
are	 not	 sufficient	 to	 scale-up	 action	 in	 devel-
oping	countries:	government	policy	is	the	main	
mechanism	to	foster	transformation	in	the	build-
ing	sector.	However,	project	and	program-based	
mechanisms	 are	 good	 bottom-up	 private-sector	
Using the Building Sector as an Example
The NAMA framework is a need-based 
mechanism which effectively considers the 
conditions of each developing country.
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mechanisms	 to	 support	 top-down	 policy	 imple-
mentation	in	fragmented	sectors.	
barriers for the implementation of 
mitigation actions in energy end-use sectors
Due	to	the	dispersed	nature	of	the	energy	end-
use	 sectors,	 stakeholders	 do	 not	 adopt	 energy	
efficiency	 (EE)	 technologies	 and	practices	well.	
Policy	interventions	are	particularly	weak	in	de-
veloping	countries,	especially	in	dispersed	end-
use	energy	sectors.	Even	if	a	government	imple-
ments	 policies,	 stakeholders	 in	 these	 sectors	
typically	do	not	respond	well.	From	the	business/
end-user	 point	 of	 view,	 most	 SME	 and	 build-
ing	 owners	 and	 investors	 are	 unable	 to	 change	
their	practices	 and	update	 technologies	due	 to	
many	barriers,	as	follows	(Hinostroza,	et	al.	2007,	
WBCSD,	2007):
1 . High upfront costs for energy 
efficiency investments .
The	upfront	costs	associated	with	investment	for	
EE	technology	installation	or	upgrade	is	typically	
regarded	as	a	hurdle	for	investment.	The	life-cy-
cle	saving	of	EE	and	Energy	Efficient	Buildings	
(EEB)	projects	are	often	under-estimated	and	not	
properly	 accounted	 for	 in	 the	 investment	deci-
sion	process.	Energy	expenses	are	often	regard-
ed	as	part	of	business	operation	expenses	or	of	
building	operation	costs.	
2 . High transaction costs for 
technology deployment .
Due	 to	 the	 dispersed	 nature	 of	 the	 technolo-
gies	and	inadequate	access	to	technologies	and	
knowledge,	the	transaction	costs	for	technology	
adoption/diffusion	are	exceptionally	high	in	de-
veloping	 countries.	 Transaction	 costs	 are	 often	
NOT	taken	into	account	in	 lifecycle-based	eco-
nomic	analyses.	This	often	results	in	perceptions	
among	policy-makers	that	the	economic	benefits	
of	EE	projects	are	high	and	that	business	owners	
will	take	up	projects	on	their	own.
3 . insufficient financing mechanisms 
for ee investment .
Financiers	 and	 investors	 of	 manufacturing	 and	
real	estate	projects	often	do	not	have	sufficient	
information	or	the	appropriate	tools	to	evaluate	
the	risk	and	returns	from	EEB	and	EE	investment.	
Industrial	 project	 implementers	 and	 potential	
EEB	investors	therefore	have	difficulties	access-
ing	 the	 funding	 through	 conventional	 financ-
ing	mechanisms,	which	are	largely	based	on	risk	
analyses	of	investment	projects.	Risk	assessment	
methods	for	EE	investment	and	securitizing	rev-
enues	generated	through	life-cycle	energy	saving	
have	yet	to	be	established.
4 . lack of awareness and inertia toward 
ee among stakeholders at all levels .
One	of	the	commonest	reasons	for	the	existence	
of	barriers	is	that	stakeholders	at	all	levels	have	
insufficient	 knowledge	 about	 energy	 end-use	
and	about	how	to	save	energy.	Energy	efficiency	
has	not	been	a	main	concern	for	most	businesses	
or	 individuals.	Moreover,	 the	practice	of	 saving	
energy	 often	 interferes	 –	 and	 sometimes	 con-
flicts	 –	 with	 companies’	 and	 individuals’	 daily	
routines	and	tested-and-true	common	practices.	
It	 is	 also	 often	 disconnected	 from	 a	 company’s	
managerial	goals	such	as	increasing	production	
or	expanding	market	share.	This	barrier	creates	
Success indicators, not greenhouse gas emission reductions, 
should be used as the basis for the MRV of NAMAs
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In	 industries,	 minimum	 energy	 performance	
standards	 could	 also	 be	 implemented	 by	 in-
dustrial	 systems,	 such	as	 steam	and	boiler	 sys-
tems,	 pump	 and	 fluid	 transport	 systems	 and	
other	process-specific	systems.	Optimization	of	
industrial	 systems	 is	 often	 more	 cost-effective	
than	optimizing	individual	equipment	(such	as	
a	boiler)	alone.	Implementation	of	performance	
standards	 in	 industry	 also	need	 to	be	 coupled	
with	mandatory	auditing	and	plant-wide	energy	
management	and	accounting	systems	to	achieve	
the	 best	 results.	 Regulatory	 measures	 such	 as	
mandatory	auditing,	the	certification	of	energy	
consumption	 equipment	 and	 energy	 manage-
ment	 systems,	 have	 been	 used	 in	 some	 devel-
oped	countries	and	have	proved	to	be	effective	
tools	to	improve	the	efficiency	of	the	manufac-
turing	sector.		
strong	 inertia	 that	 is	 difficult	 to	 overcome.	 It	
takes	tremendous	effort	for	most	companies	and	
individuals	 to	 change	 their	 attitudes	 and	 prac-
tices.	 This	 ‘inertia’	 is	 evident	 in	 industries,	 de-
signers	and	builders,	as	well	as	among	individual	
energy	users.
Policies and measures to overcome 
barriers for NaMas 
Removing	key	informational,	institutional,	social,	
financial	 and	 market,	 and	 technical	 barriers	 is	
critical	to	paving	the	way	for	private	investment	
for	the	enormous	low-cost	energy-efficiency	im-
provement	and	GHG	emission	mitigation	in	the	
building	sector,	as	well	as	in	SMEs.	
In	buildings,	 as	 indicated	 in	Table	1,	different	
barriers	can	be	tackled	with	different	policy	in-
struments	 and	 measures.	 Regulatory	 normative	
instruments	include	appliance	standards,	build-
ing	codes,	procurement	regulations,	and	efficien-
cy	obligations	and	quotas.	These	are	the	require-
ments	that	have	to	be	met.	Regulatory	informative	
policies	and	measures	are	requirements	on	infor-
mation	provision,	and	detailed	examples	include	
mandatory	energy	auditing,	utility	demand-side	
management	programs,	and	mandatory	labeling	
and	 certification	 programs.	 Every	 policy	 mea-
sure	has	its	own	advantages,	ideal	target	groups	
and	 specific	 operational	 mechanisms.	 None	 of	
them	can	remove	all	the	barriers,	and	they	need	
to	work	 in	packages	 to	be	effective.	To	 improve	
the	 energy	 efficiency	 of	 buildings,	 the	 various	
barriers	need	to	be	addressed	 in	a	holistic	way.	
Building	codes	and	appliance	standards	are	the	
most	important	policies	and	measures	for	energy	
efficiency	 improvement	 in	 buildings,	 but	 their	
success	 depends	 on	 effective	 enforcement	 and	
periodic	updates	(Laustsen,	2008).	
Using the Building Sector as an Example
The dispersed nature of buildings and SME industries 
has been described as ‘long-tail’ characteristics
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Table 1. Policies and measures to overcome the barriers and stimulate efficiency improvement among in building sector
Barrier 
category 
Instrument category Policy instruments as Remedies
Economic 
barriers
Regulatory-normative/ 
regulatory-informative
Appliance standards, building codes, energy efficiency obli-
gations, mandatory labelling, procurement regulations, DSM 
programs
Economic instruments EPC/ESCOs (energy performance contracting/energy ser-
vice companies), cooperative procurement, energy efficiency 
certificates
Fiscal instruments Taxation, public benefit charges, tax exemptions, subsidies/
rebates/grants
Hidden costs/
benefits
Regulatory-normative Appliance standards, building codes
Economic instruments EPC/ ESCOs
Support action Public leadership programs
Market failures Regulatory-normative/ 
regulatory/informative
Appliance standards, building codes, energy efficiency obli-
gations, mandatory labelling, procurement regulations, DSM 
(demand side management) programs
Economic instruments EPC/ESCOs, cooperative procurement, energy efficiency 
certificates, Kyoto Flexibility mechanisms
Fiscal instruments Taxation, public benefit charges, tax exemptions, subsidies/
rebates/grants
Support, information, vol-
untary action
Voluntary labelling, voluntary agreement, public leadership 
programs, awareness raising, detailed billing
Cultural/ 
behavioral 
barriers
Support, information, vol-
untary action
Voluntary labelling, voluntary agreement, public leadership 
programs, awareness raising, detailed billing
Information 
barriers
Support, information, vol-
untary action
Voluntary labelling, voluntary agreement, public leadership 
programs, awareness raising, detailed billing
Regulatory/informative mandatory labelling, procurement regulations, DSM pro-
grams, mandatory audits
Structural/ 
political
Public leadership programs
Source:	adapted	based	on	Koeppel and Ürge-Vorsatz,	(2007)
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Need-based NaMas mechanisms 
with sectoral options 
Policy	 measures	 to	 overcome	 the	 barriers	 to	
energy	 efficiency	 could	 be	 registered	 under	 an	
integrated	 NAMA	 framework.	 To	 support	 miti-
gation	 efforts	 in	 developing	 countries,	 NAMAs	
could	be	formulated	as	a	mechanism	to	support	
the	creation	of	an	overall	framework	for	enabling	
policies	and	the	environment	to	overcome	barri-
ers	and	scale	up	mitigation	actions	 in	develop-
ing	countries.	The	mechanism	developed	in	this	
paper	is	a	need-based	mechanism,	to	be	proposed	
or	 registered	 by	 developing	 countries	 and	 to	
follow	preset	 rules	and	certain	preferred	policy	
options.	The	country	proposals	and	registration	
of	NAMAs	are	based	on	national	circumstances	
and	sustainable	development	needs	and	includes	
capacity-building,	 technology/knowledge	 trans-
fer	 and	 financing	 in	 a	 measurable,	 reportable	
and	verifiable	(MRV)	manner.	Depending	on	the	
circumstances	and	needs	of	a	specific	developing	
nation,	a	NAMA	should	in	part	address	overarch-
ing	national	climate	change	 issues,	 such	as	 the	
establishment	 of	 national	 institutional	 capac-
ity	 and	a	national	policy	 framework	 for	 climate	
change.	Examples	of	such	NAMAs,	depending	on	
national	 circumstances,	 could	 include	 the	 es-
tablishment	of	a	national	institution	for	climate	
change	mitigation,	the	setting	up	of	an	enabling	
policy	 framework	 and	 mechanisms	 to	 scale	 up	
mitigation	actions,	 the	 reduction	of	barriers	 to	
trade	and	investment,	the	setting	up	of	a	carbon	
market	or	energy	tax	scheme,	etc.		
NaMas with sectoral options
NAMAs	should	also	go	down	to	the	sectoral	level	
to	target	unique	opportunities	in	each	economic	
sector.	In	other	words,	policy	options	in	critical	
sectors	for	GHG	mitigation	need	to	be	reviewed	
and	considered	within	the	framework	of	NAMAs.	
This	is	particularly	important	in	energy	end-use	
sectors	where	emission	reduction	opportunities	
are	 sector-specific,	 technological	 options	 are	
based	 on	 sectoral	 needs,	 socio-economic	 cir-
cumstances	in	each	sector	are	unique,	and	stake-
holder	interests	and	capacities	differ.	Therefore,	
the	requirements	for	capacity-building,	technol-
ogy	transfer	and	financial	incentives	could	spe-
cifically	address	the	circumstances	of	the	specific	
energy	 end-use	 sector.	Moreover,	 because	 each	
sector’s	mitigation	options	and	required	interna-
tional	support	differ,	it	is	most	effective	to	define	
sector-specific	MRV	methods	accordingly.
Within	 sectors,	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 set	 of	
carefully	 designed	 policy	 measures	 or	 a	 policy	
package	 is	often	 the	most	effective	way	 to	 spur	
mitigation	actions	and	create	enabling	environ-
ments	 for	 scaling-up	 actions.	 A	 sectoral	 NAMA	
approach	is	especially	important	and	could	po-
tentially	create	the	strongest	impact	in	dispersed	
energy	end-use	sectors,	including	buildings	and	
industrial	SME	sectors.	
In	these	two	sectors,	the	implementation	of	mini-
mum	performance	standards	in	conjunction	with	
other	 complementary	policy	 instruments	 and	 a	
market	mechanism	for	carbon	emission	used	for	
additional	reduction	could	potentially	create	an	
integrated	NAMA	framework	and	effectively	spur	
mitigation	actions	in	the	dispersed	energy	end-
use	sectors.
The	 capacity-building	 and	 technology-transfer	
needs	 of	 each	 registered	 NAMA	 could	 be	 pro-
posed	 by	 a	 country	 as	 capacity-building	 and	
technology-transfer	‘programs’	under	the	specific	
NAMA.	 In	 terms	 of	 sectoral	 NAMA,	 such	 pro-
grams	can	be	 sector-wide,	or	 targeted	at	 a	 spe-
cific	action,	sub-sector	or	region	in	a	country.	
Monitoring, reporting and verification (Mrv)
The	MRV	of	 these	 programs	 is	 an	 integral	 part	
Using the Building Sector as an Example
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of	the	NAMA	mechanism	and	is	strongly	 linked	
to	their	financing.	The	Kyoto	Protocol	uses	one	
and	only	one	indicator	as	the	measure	of	tonnes	
of	GHG	emission	reduction.	This	indicator	may	
not	be	suitable	for	NAMAs.	The	direct	emission	
reduction	effects	of	enabling	policies	and	mea-
sures	are	difficult	to	evaluate	because	a	desired	
mitigation	action	taken	by	a	private	sector	actor	
often	does	not	happen	only	because	of	a	specific	
policy	 or	 intervention.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	
impact	of	a	specific	policy	or	intervention	does	
not	necessarily	result	in	emission	reduction	but	
is	 essential	 to	 create	 an	 enabling	 environment	
for	 businesses	 and	 individuals	 to	 take	 up	miti-
gation	 activities.	 The	 attribution	 of	 causes	 has	
always	been	difficult	when	determining	the	addi-
tionality	of	a	CDM	project	and	has	proved	impos-
sible	 in	many	 cases.	NAMAs	will	 run	 into	more	
difficulties	if	emission	reduction	again	becomes	
the	 only	 measure	 of	 success,	 and	 MRV	 is	 en-
tirely	based	on	one	indicator.	Trying	to	attribute	
emission	reductions	for	many	mitigation	activi-
ties	 taken	by	millions	of	 ‘long	 tail’	 entities	 to	a	
specific	NAMA	 intervention	 and	MRV	 for	 them	
will	 pose	 exceptional	difficulties	 for	developing	
countries.	Moreover,	some	policies	are	easier	to	
attribute	emission	reduction	to	than	others.	If	we	
only	focus	on	measures	for	which	it	is	easy	to	at-
tribute	 emission	 reductions,	many	 policies	 and	
measures	that	have	a	profound	impact	and	create	
extensive	co-benefits	may	not	be	considered	and	
implemented	 in	 developing	 countries,	 such	 as	
energy	 audits,	 training,	 awareness-raising	 and	
research	and	development	(R&D)	programs.	
Fortunately,	many	indicators	of	success	can	also	
be	 measured	 in	 a	 quantitative	 manner	 and	 be	
used	to	monitor,	report	and	verify	the	outcomes	
of	each	NAMA.	The	indicators	of	success	and	the	
MRV	could	be	specific	to	each	NAMA	and	each	
sector.	The	MRV	methods	and	 indicators	 could	
be	determined	for	each	NAMA,	and	the	method-
ologies	need	 to	be	conducive	 to	measuring	 the	
success	 of	 policy	 implementation,	 technology	
transfer	 and	 capacity-building	 programs.	 How-
ever,	the	indicators	of	a	specific	NAMA	should	be	
determined	at	the	UNFCCC	level	to	enable	com-
parison	across	countries	using	a	common	base.	
The	MRV	methodologies	for	each	type	of	capaci-
ty-building	and	technology	program	could	be	es-
tablished	following	the	bottom-up	and	semi-top-
down	process	similar	to	the	development	of	CDM	
methodologies.	The	methodologies	could	there-
fore	 be	 adopted	 in	 common	 by	 all	 developing	
countries.	The	types	of	indicator	and	a	possible	
mechanism	 to	 determine	 the	 level	 of	 financing	
for	NAMA	programs	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	
paper	using	the	building	sector	as	an	example.
Current	carbon	inventory	and	reporting	mecha-
nisms	based	on	carbon	emissions	are	insufficient	
to	 indicate	 the	 success	 of	 NAMAs	 and	 NAMA	
programs	(including	capacity-building	and	tech-
nology	 transfer).	 Measurement	 and	 reporting	
needs	should	facilitate	and	reflect	the	outcome	
of	policy	implementation,	capacity-building	and	
technology	development	and	transfer.	Readiness	
to	implement	a	registered	NAMA	needs	to	be	as-
sessed	and	capacity-building	on	MRV	(e.g.,	data	
collecting,	management,	reporting,	auditing,	and	
use	 of	 tools	 and	 methodologies	 for	 MRV,	 etc.)	
should	 be	 carried	 out	 when	 necessary.	 Assess-
ment	 and	 capacity-building	 should	 be	 subject	
to	financial	and	capacity-building	support	from	
developed	countries.	In	addition,	in	some	coun-
tries,	 capacity-building	 for	 policy	 assessment	
and	 the	 formulation	 and	 registration	 of	NAMA	
also	need	assistance	and	financing.	
Current carbon inventory and reporting 
mechanisms based on carbon emissions alone are 
insufficient to indicate the success of NAMAs
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Using NaMas to leverage Private sector 
investment for Mitigation actions
The	illustrated	NAMA	concept	is	designed	for	a	
public-sector	effort	which	can	stimulate	and	fa-
cilitate	 additional	 mitigation	 actions	 from	 the	
private	 sector;	 it	 is	 essential	 that	 a	majority	 of	
financing	 sources,	 at	 least	 initially,	 come	 from	
the	 public	 sector.	 The	 source	 of	 international	
funding	to	support	developing	countries’	NAMA	
activities	could	also	be	best	served	by	the	public	
sector.	Depending	on	the	country’s	public-sector	
financial	conditions,	some	countries	may	be	able	
to	provide	partial	funding	from	internal	sources,	
while	 other	 countries’	 NAMA	 activities	 might	
rely	entirely	on	the	international	mechanisms.	In	
essence,	 the	 public-sector	 funding	 mechanism	
allocated	 for	NAMAs	 could	 create	 a	 strong	 en-
abling	 environment	 to	 stimulate	 private-sector	
investment	 through	 CDM	 or	 future	 improved	
market-based	 mechanisms	 in	 developing	 coun-
tries.	 This	 mechanism	 is	 also	 a	 realization	 of	
developed	countries’	goals	to	leverage	public	fi-
nancing	for	private-sector	investment.
Using NaMas in the building 
sector as an example
This	section	uses	the	building	sector	as	an	exam-
ple	 to	demonstrate	 the	 feasibility	of	 the	NAMA	
scheme	described	in	the	previous	section	in	the	
post-2012	 regime.	 Certainly,	many	 details	 need	
to	be	determined	at	the	UNFCCC	level;	however,	
the	principles	and	the	framework	design	features	
are	provided	to	demonstrate	how	such	a	mecha-
nism	may	work	and	how	it	may	interface	with	the	
existing	climate	change	mechanisms	for	mitiga-
tion	in	developing	countries.
the NaMa registry
A	NAMA	registry	in	the	building	sector	may	in-
clude	a	policy	package	and	various	supplementa-
ry	programs	that	are	essential	for	the	implemen-
tation	for	the	policies:
Mandatory	minimum	performance	based	1.	
standards
Mandatory/voluntary	building	rating	and	2.	
certification	programs
Loan,	subsidies,	incentives	and	tax	breaks3.	
Building	auditing	programs	for	4.	
compliance	and	certification
Building	survey	and	monitoring	programs	5.	
for	MRV	purposes
Minimum	performance	standards	for	6.	
appliances	and	equipment
Building	professional	(including	7.	
auditors’)	certification	and	education	
programs
Technology	need	assessment,	8.	
demonstration	and	model	house	
programs
Public-sector	building	improvement	and	9.	
high-performance	building	deployment	
programs
Research	and	development	programs	for	10.	
new	building	materials,	technology	and	
practices
Awareness-raising	and	informational	11.	
campaign	programs
	
A	policy	package	in	a	developing	country	could	
be	 registered	 under	 the	 NAMA	 registry	 as	 a	
building	sector	NAMA.	Some	essential	items	are	
‘required’	 in	order	to	receive	financing	support	
from	 international	 funding,	 such	 as	mandatory	
minimum	performance	 standards,	 building	 cer-
tification	and	rating,	and	loan	and	subsidy	pro-
grams.	These	policies	are	essential	to	transform	
the	market	of	the	building	sector	and	need	to	be	
adopted	as	part	of	a	building	sector	NAMA	pack-
age.	 Countries	 could	 design	 their	 own	 capac-
ity-building	 and	 technology-related	 programs	
needed	to	implement	the	registered	NAMAs.	De-
pending	on	needs,	some	countries	may	also	re-
ceive	funding	to	start	loan	and	subsidy	programs.	
Such	financial	assistance	could	also	be	a	NAMA	
Using the Building Sector as an Example
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‘program’	 under	 the	 registered	 building	 sector	
NAMA.	
Implementation	 of	 minimum	 energy	 perfor-
mance	 standards	 for	 buildings	 is	 an	 integral	
part	 of	 the	 NAMA	 package.	 However,	 where	 to	
set	the	minimum	performance	standards	largely	
depends	on	 the	current	 technical	 capacity	 and	
socio-economic	conditions	of	the	country.		The	
standards	could	be	set	at	an	achievable	level	to	
start	with	and	should	be	tightened	 in	stages	to	
strengthen	emission	reduction	efforts	when	the	
compliance	 rate	 reaches	 a	 satisfactory	 level.	 To	
determine	 appropriate	 levels	 of	 minimum	 per-
formance	standards	and	the	step-wise	regulatory	
goals	in	various	building	types	and	climate	zones,	
a	comprehensive	investigation	program	needs	to	
be	 carried	 out	 to	 derive	 a	 clear	 picture	 of	 the	
current	 state	of	 the	building	 sector.	The	estab-
lishment	of	current	status	common	baselines	for	
MRV	indicators,	against	which	all	NAMA	activi-
ties	could	compare	progress,	forms	the	ground-
work	for	 future	MRV	and	for	the	determination	
of	 future	 levels	 of	 standards.	 Some	 developing	
countries	also	require	assistance	on	this	front.	
capacity-building, technology 
transfer and financing
Once	the	minimum	performance	standards	have	
been	adopted	as	part	of	a	building	sector	NAMA,	
effective	 implementation,	 the	 supplementary	
capacity-building,	 technology	assistance	and	fi-
nancing	programs	included	in	the	package	need	
to	 be	 supported	 and	 financed	 under	 NAMAs.	
Because	of	the	dispersed	nature	of	the	building	
sector,	the	costs	for	capacity-building	and	tech-
nology	assistance	are	expected	to	be	high	and	to	
require	financial	assistance.	
Some	developing	countries	are	capable	of	paying	
partial	 costs	 for	 implementation	 of	 the	 policy	
package,	whereas	others	will	depend	on	the	in-
ternational	community	to	help	pay	for	the	trans-
formations	of	their	building	sector.	The	propor-
tion	of	national	funding	could	be	negotiated	at	
the	UNFCCC	level	as	part	of	the	NAMA	registry	
and	could	be	adjusted	over	time	based	on	the	fi-
nancial	capacity	of	 the	public	 sector.	This	 is	 in	
line	with	the	UNFCCC	principle	that	each	coun-
try’s	 contribution	 to	 climate	 change	mitigation	
should	 be	 based	 on	 its	 capability	 and	 national	
circumstances.	
interfacing with Kyoto Protocol’s 
project-based mechanism
The	 implementation	 of	 mandatory	 minimum	
performance	standards	could	interface	well	with	
current	CDM	and	J	and	follow	their	principles	for	
eligibility	of	carbon	credits.	The	UNEP’s	 report	
on	CDM	and	buildings	(Cheng,	et	al.,	2008)	sug-
gested	 that	 using	 overall	 building	 performance	
as	 a	main	measure	 of	 success	 and	 establishing	
performance-based	baselines	as	crediting	bench-
marks	could	substantially	reduce	the	burden	of	
project	developers	and	effectively	scale	up	CDM	
project	 activities	 in	 the	 building	 sector.	 Previ-
ous	 sections	 of	 this	 paper	 also	highlighted	 the	
fact	that	the	implementation	of	minimum	energy	
performance	standards	is	an	effective	regulatory	
tool	to	phase	out	low-performance	buildings	sys-
tematically	and	to	gradually	improve	the	energy	
performance	 of	 the	 entire	 building	 stock.	 The	
performance-based	 approach	 for	 policies	 and	
carbon	 crediting	 enables	 NAMAs	 to	 interface	
with	project-based	carbon-crediting	mechanisms	
such	as	CDM,	programmatic	CDM	and	JI	in	the	
building	 sector.	 This	 approach	 also,	 by	 design,	
eliminates	double	counting	and	gives	a	definite	
and	 clear	 policy	 baseline	 for	 carbon	 crediting	
and	the	determination	of	additionality	for	CDM	
projects.	 The	 minimum	 performance	 standards	
could	automatically	become	the	benchmark	for	
additionality	and	a	baseline	for	carbon	crediting	
(see	the	illustration	in	Figure	1).	In	other	words,	
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buildings	designed	 to	 go	beyond	 the	minimum	
performance	standards	will	be	eligible	for	carbon	
crediting.	 The	 additional	 energy	 saving,	 com-
pared	 to	 the	 minimum	 performance	 standards	
as	the	baseline,	could	be	translated	into	carbon	
emission	reductions	and	apply	for	CDM	financ-
ing	 in	 a	 PoA	 or	 as	 a	 stand-alone	 project.	 This	
framework	also	aligns	well	with	CDM’s	addition-
ality	principle	for	policy	compliance	projects.	
The	 performance-based	 building-sector	 NAMA	
framework	presented	in	Figure	1	includes	mini-
mum	 performance	 standards	 and	 two	 bench-
marks	(crediting	baselines)	as	a	basis	for	carbon	
crediting.	 The	 higher	 performance	 building	
benchmarks	 (first	 line	below	 the	minimum	per-
formance	 standards)	 could	 be	 integrated	 with	
benchmarks	for	building	rating	and	certification	
program	in	practice	and	apply	to	carbon	credits.	
State-of-the-art	 buildings	 (such	 as	 zero-emis-
sion	buildings	 and	passive	 buildings)	 require	 a	
completely	 different	 set	 of	 expertise	 and	 tech-
nologies,	and	usually	incur	much	higher	costs	in	
developing	countries.	The	adoption	of	the	most	
innovative	 building	 technologies	 and	 practices	
which	exceed	the	benchmarks	for	BEE	rating	sys-
tems	should	be	rewarded	with	premium	carbon	
credits.	
For	each	line	or	benchmarks	presented	in	Figure	
1,	several	subsector	lines	or	benchmarks	need	to	
be	 established	 to	 represent	 different	 subsector	
conditions,	 such	as	 commercial	 and	 residential	
buildings,	 rural	 and	 urban	 households,	 apart-
ments	 and	 single	 family	 housing,	 and	 different	
climate	 zones.	 All	 benchmarks	 could	 be	 tight-
ened	over	time	to	reflect	improvements	in	energy	
performance	in	building	stock	and	strengthened	
commitment	(as	seen	in	Figure	1,	all	benchmarks	
decline	over	time,	which	could	also	be	in	stages).	
The	levels	of	crediting	benchmarks	of	each	coun-
try	could	be	negotiated	at	the	UNFCCC	level	to	
find	a	balance	between	a	country’s	ambition	to	
take	responsibility	and	the	overall	global	goal	for	
emission	reduction.
CDM	 as	 a	 project/program-based	 mechanism	
is	 effective	 in	 leveraging	 or	 attracting	 private-
sector	funding	and	as	a	mechanism	to	motivate	
private-sector	emission-reduction	activities	and	
regulate	 them.	UNEP’s	 report	on	 the	CDM	and	
buildings	 (Cheng,	 et	 al.,	 2008)	 also	 concluded	
that	project/program-based	CDM	is	an	effective	
mechanism	to	support	government	policies	and	
coordinate	dispersed	end-use	activities	from	the	
bottom	up,	with	the	presence	of	effective	policy	
intervention.	Retaining	a	project/program-based	
mechanism	(and	future	improvements	to	it)	is	es-
pecially	important	in	a	fragmented	sector	and	in	
sectors	with	scattered	and	small	emission-reduc-
tion	activities,	as	well	as	in	countries	where	most	
economic	activities	are	long-tail	types.
Without	going	into	detail,	industrial	energy	end-
use	sector	NAMA	could	also	be	set	up	in	a	similar	
manner	to	NAMAs	in	the	building	sector.	The	fi-
nancing	framework	of	the	industrial	energy	end-
use	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 building	 sector	 framework	
shown	in	Figure	1.
NaMa Programs and their Mrv 
in the building sector
As	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 capacity-
building,	technology	assistance	and	fiscal	incen-
tive	programs	are	carried	out	in	NAMAs	as	‘pro-
grams’.	Indicators	for	MRV	in	the	building	sector	
NAMA	 should	 be	 able	 to	 demonstrate	 changes	
in	the	building	sector	and	the	effects	of	various	
NAMA	 programs.	 The	 indicators	 should	 be	 re-
Using the Building Sector as an Example
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ported	on	a	regular	basis	and	could	be	used	as	
baselines	and	a	common	denominator	to	evalu-
ate	the	success	of	NAMA	programs	in	the	build-
ing	sector.	Additional	indicators	of	success	that	
could	not	be	presented	by	global	indicators	and	
are	critical	to	specific	programs	should	be	estab-
lished	at	the	program	methodology	level.	
Examples	of	global	indicators2	may	include:
1.	 Representative	oraverage	energy	per-
formances	of	buildings	by	pre-defined	
categories	(according	to	building	types	
and	climate	zones)	and	their	estimated	
number/floor	area	(this	shows	the	status	
quo	of	the	building	stock).
2.	 Percentage	of	new	buildings	built	ac-
cording	to	minimum	energy-performance	
standards.
3.	 Percentage	of	existing	building	retrofitted	
according	to	minimum	energy-perfor-
mance	standards	for	building	retrofitting.
4.	 Percentage	(number)	of	buildings	certi-
fied	or	rated	according	to	predetermined	
benchmarks.
1.	 Number	(percentage)	of	state-of-the-art	
building	built	(zero-emission	buildings	
and	passive	buildings).
2.	 Total	amount	of	loans,	subsidies	or	tax	
breaks	issued.
3.	 Number	of	auditors	on	job,	number	of	
new	auditors	trained.
4.	 Number	of	building	professionals	and	the	
percentage	trained	and	on	job
Global	 indicators	 to	 present	 the	 status	 and	
changes	 of	 the	building	 sector,	 as	 listed	 above,	
2  The Sustainable Building and Construction Initiative of the United 
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP-SBCI) is working on a set of 
global indexes for building monitoring and reporting to facilitate policy 
development and analysis, carbon trading, and progress reporting on 
mitigation actions in the building sector. The published index and meth-
odology may be used as a prototype to develop MRV for NAMAs. See 
http://www.unepsbci.org/
could	 be	 determined	 at	 the	 NAMA	 building	
sector	registry	level.	These	indicators	should	be	
reported	 regularly.	 The	 data	 collection	 and	 re-
porting	 preferably	 follow	 a	 bottom-up	 process	
or	a	semi-bottom-up	process	using	sampling	and	
statistical	 principles.	 Methodologies	 for	 data	
collection,	 measurement	 and	 reporting	 for	 the	
global	 indicators	 should	 be	 established	 at	 the	
UNFCCC	level.	Methodologies	for	their	verifica-
tion	should	also	be	established.	
The	 methodologies	 for	 building	 sector	 NAMA	
programs	could	be	established	 following	a	pro-
cess	similar	to	CDM	methodologies	but	approved	
at	 the	 UNFCCC	 level.	 The	 implementation	 ap-
proaches,	activities	and	MRV	methods	should	be	
included.	The	global	 indicators	 should	be	used	
as	 measures	 of	 success	 whenever	 possible	 and	
defined	 in	 NAMA	 program	 methodologies.	 Ad-
ditional	indicators	could	also	be	included	based	
on	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 programs.	 Building	 per-
formance-related	indicators,	such	as	items	1,	2,	
3,	4,	5	above,	should	always	be	used	for	MRV	in	
programs.	
Financing	 for	 a	 particular	 NAMA	 option	 (i.e.	
building	sector	NAMA)	could	be	awarded	at	the	
NAMA	‘program’	level.	The	program	methodolo-
gies	should	include	criteria	and	evaluation	meth-
ods	for	financing.	 It	 is	also	important	that	pro-
grams	need	to	have	long-term	perspectives,	plans	
and	goals.	However,	they	could	be	implemented	
in	stages	to	evaluate	the	results	of	 implementa-
tion	and	adjust	the	approaches.	Financing	could	
be	partly	ex ante	to	support	the	implementation	
of	the	program	activities	and	partly	ex post based	
on	 the	 improvement	 of	 indicators.	 The	 imple-
mentation	 results	 of	 the	 earlier	 stage	 could	 be	
used	as	criteria	to	determine	the	financing	of	the	
next	stage.
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There	 have	 been	 concerns	 about	 trade	 secrets	
and	 the	 disclosure	 of	 privacy	 information	 for	
bottom-up	reporting.	The	problem	can	be	solved	
by	defining	 the	 level	of	 reporting.	Only	data	at	
aggregated	 levels	 are	 reported.	 Because	 the	
methodology	 to	 derive	 required	 reporting	 in-
formation	is	transparent,	the	data	quality	could	
be	maintained	somehow.	Individual	data	are	re-
tained	at	the	national	or	 local	 level	but	not	re-
quired	 to	be	disclosed.	Verification	of	 reported	
data	could	follow	its	own	independent	sampling	
and	verification	methodology,	so	that	the	accu-
racy	 of	 measurement	 and	 reporting	 is	 double-
checked.	
conclusion
In	summary,	the	benefits	of	the	NAMA	framework	
illustrated	in	this	paper	include	the	following:
1.	 Because	GHG	reductions	are	not	the	
measure	of	success,	it	avoids	the	double	
counting	problem	with	the	existing	
mechanisms.	This	eases	some	concerns	
leveled	at	proposals	currently	on	the	
table.
2.	 For	developed	countries,	the	NAMA	
framework	goes	beyond	offsetting	
mechanisms	and	focuses	on	supporting	
an	enabling	environment	for	mitigation	
actions	in	developing	countries.
3.	 An	MRV	mechanism	is	embedded.	Indica-
tors	are	defined	to	measure	desirable	
changes	in	the	sector	or	to	a	specific	
NAMA	measure	(if	not	a	sectoral	NAMA).	
All	activities	or	programs	under	the	
NAMA	registry	are	‘MRVable’	and	are	
supported	by	international	financing	
mechanisms	under	NAMAs.	This	ap-
proach	could	fulfill	developed	coun-
tries’	expectation	for	MRV	and	ease	the	
concerns	of	developing	countries	about	
adopting	NAMA	options	that	are	difficult	
to	measure	by	emission	reduction	credits.
4.	 All	essential	elements	in	the	BAP	1b(ii)	
are	addressed	and	include	mechanisms	to	
support	activities	for	capacity-building,	
technology,	financing	and	MRV.			
5.	 Sectoral	NAMA	options	to	create	en-
abling	environments	in	sectors	with	
dispersed	GHG	mitigation	potentials	are	
included.
6.	 Funding	from	developed	countries	for	de-
velopment	aids	for	capacity-building	and	
technology	transfer	in	the	climate	change	
sector	are	integrated	and	implemented	
more	systematically.	
7.	 Public	policy	and	funding	to	foster	
and	mobilize	private-sector	investment	
through	the	CDM	and	the	future	project/
program-based	mechanism	in	GHG	miti-
gation	are	utilized.	
NAMAs	are	viewed	as	a	powerful	solution	for	cli-
mate	 change	mitigation	beyond	what	has	been	
achieved	 under	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol.	 To	 achieve	
the	 global	 climate	 target	 of	 controlling	 climate	
change	of	no	more	than	two	degrees	centigrade	
above	 the	pre-industrial	 level,	 developed	 coun-
tries	need	to	make	deep	cuts	in	their	emissions,	
while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 developing	 countries’	
emissions	have	to	be	significantly	reduced	below	
their	business-as-usual	levels.	Although	CDM	has	
stimulated	tens	of	billions	of	dollars	of	investment	
from	the	private	sector	toward	mitigation	in	de-
veloping	countries,	 the	project	mechanism	fails	
to	stimulate	the	much	needed	private	investment	
Using the Building Sector as an Example
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toward	 energy	 efficiency	 in	 dispersed	 end-use	
sectors.	A	well-designed	new	NAMA	mechanism	
could	provide	an	enabling	policy	framework	that	
facilitates	private-sector	mitigation	 activities	 in	
developing	 countries	 and	 boosts	 private-sector	
investment	 in	 GHG	 mitigation	 in	 sectors	 and	
countries	 that	 are	 lagging	behind	 in	 the	Kyoto	
Protocol	regime.
Several	immediate	issues	surrounding	the	NAMA	
discussions	need	to	be	solved	before	NAMAs	can	
be	 inserted	 as	 a	 new	 supporting	 and	 funding	
mechanism	for	developing	countries.	The	issues	
include	taking	into	account	elements	of	the	Bali	
Action	Plan,	avoiding	double	counting,	interfac-
ing	with	Kyoto	Protocol	mechanisms	and	leverag-
ing	sufficient	private	funding	through	public-sec-
tor	investment.	The	NAMA	framework	illustrated	
in	this	paper	offers	feasible	solutions	to	all	these	
issues	 and	 has	 sketched	 out	 a	 comprehensive	
NAMA	 framework	 to	 create	 enabling	 regulatory	
environments	in	developing	countries.	
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abstract
Sectoral approaches have emerged as one of the 
new approaches that are being considered as part 
of a potential Copenhagen package to address 
climate change. While they initially emerged from 
industry, they are still controversial in many parts 
of the business community and are interpreted in 
different ways by business, governments and civil 
society. One of the uses suggested for a sectoral 
approach is as part of the emerging carbon market. 
In examining sectoral crediting and sectoral trading 
from a business participation point of view, sectoral 
trading rapidly emerges as the preferred alternative. 
sectOral aPPrOacHes iN greeNHOUse gas MarKets:
A viable proposition?
The	year	2005	was	an	important	moment	for	the	
emergence	of	sectoral	approaches	as	a	potential	
policy	 tool	 to	 address	 global	warming.	 In	2005	
an	OECD	round	table	was	held	on	trans-national	
sectoral	 agreements	 for	 climate	 change	 policy,	
and	the	G8	Gleneagles	Plan	of	Action	discussed	
the	 concept.	 Since	 then,	 sectoral	 approaches	
have	 risen	 in	 prominence,	 with	 discussions	 in	
the	Major	Economies	Forum	and	the	Asia	Pacific	
Partnership.	 They	 became	 an	 integral	 part	 of	
the	post-2012	negotiations,	with	their	inclusion	
in	the	Bali	Action	Plan	(BAP)	in	2007	as	one	of	
the	enhanced	mitigation	actions	put	forward	for	
consideration.	Sectoral	approaches	will	be	an	el-
ement	in	the	negotiations	at	the	United	Nations	
Climate	 Change	 Conference	 in	 Copenhagen	
(COP	15),	where	it	is	anticipated	that	the	politi-
cal	and	policy	framework	for	their	future	imple-
mentation	will	be	agreed	in	the	context	of	an	en-
hanced	climate	change	regime.	The	details,	how-
ever,	would	have	to	be	worked	out	after	COP15.		
Andrei	Marcu
Mercuria Energy 
Trading
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The	 concept	 of	 sectoral	 approaches	 is	 still	 not	
clearly	defined,	and	UNFCCC	Parties,	civil	socie-
ty	and	business	take	a	very	different	view	of	what	
they	 are,	 how	 they	 can	 be	 organized	 and	what	
roles	they	can	play.	
The	 emergence	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 Emis-
sions	Trading	System	(EUETS)	and	carbon	pric-
ing	in	Europe	has	raised	serious	concerns	within	
business,	 especially	 in	 energy	 intensive	 indus-
tries,	 about	 potential	 competitive	 distortions.	
Sectoral	approaches,	while	not	well	defined,	were	
seen	as	a	possible	answer	and	became	one	of	the	
important	 topics	 for	 examination.	 The	 Cement	
Sustainability	 Initiative	 of	 the	 World	 Business	
Council	 for	Sustainable	Development	 (WBCSD)	
has	 played	 a	 pioneering	 role	 in	 understand-
ing	 sectoral	 approaches,	 their	 advantages	 and	
limitations.	
For	business,	the	appeal	of	the	sectoral	approach	
was	 its	 ability	 to	 address	 two	critical	 and	 inter-
related	issues:	first	competitiveness	and	the	abil-
ity	of	climate	change	regulation	to	impact	nega-
tively	on	domestic	 industries;	and	secondly	 the	
participation	of	developing	countries	in	climate	
change	solutions.	
The	central	premise	of	the	competitiveness	issue	
is	that,	if	any	one	country	was	to	take	unilateral	
action	 to	 reduce	 greenhouse	 gas	 (GHG)	 emis-
sions,	its	domestic	industries	would	be	placed	at	
a	competitive	disadvantage	relative	to	countries	
which	 abstained	 from	 such	 actions.	 This	 could	
result	 in	 ‘carbon	 leakage’	and	 the	 relocation	of	
emitting	 industries	 to	countries	with	 less	strin-
gent	GHG	regulations.	
The	originally	proposed	transnational	sectors	ap-
proach	presented	a	logical	solution	to	the	com-
petitiveness	issue.	Under	this	approach	sectoral	
agreements	would	embrace	the	key	participants	
within	a	global	industry	and	would	enable	com-
petitiveness	 concerns	 to	 be	 addressed	 directly	
within	 these	 agreements.	 	 However,	 the	 tran-
snational	approach	has	been	rejected	by	devel-
oping	countries	and	is	not	seen	as	a	viable	way	
forward.		
Secondly	the	participation	of	developing	coun-
tries	 in	 the	 climate	 change	 solution	 is	 critical,	
as	 developing	 countries	 now	 account	 for	 45%	
of	global	GHG	emissions.	The	ability	to	engage	
developing	countries	in	GHG	mitigation	efforts	
has	become	important	to	many	in	business	as	the	
world	has	changed	since	Kyoto.	The	distinction	
between	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries	
in	many	 business	 areas	 has	 blurred,	 given	 that	
powerful	multinational	 corporations,	 nominally	
based	 in	 developing	 countries,	 have	 emerged	
since	Kyoto	was	negotiated.
However,	the	principle	of	‘common	but	differen-
tiated	 responsibilities’	 remains	 the	 cornerstone	
of	the	UNFCCC.	It	is	recognized	that	developing	
nations	do	not	share	the	same	historical	burden	
as	 developed	 nations	 for	 the	 current	 levels	 of	
GHGs.	 Accordingly	 the	 UNFCCC	 is	 calling	 on	
developed	nations	to	take	the	lead	in	mitigation	
efforts	and	to	provide	financial	and	technical	as-
sistance	to	developing	nations.
Another	element	that	will	contribute	to	the	un-
derstanding	and	definition	of	the	role	of	secto-
ral	 approaches	 in	 GHG	 markets	 is	 the	 experi-
ence	gained	so	far	with	market	mechanisms:	the	
Clean	 Development	 Mechanism	 (CDM),	 Joint	
The participation of developing countries 
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as developing countries now account 
for 45% of global GHG emissions.
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Implementation	(JI)	and	Emissions	Trading	(ET).	
These	 were	 defined	 in	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 and	
the	post-Kyoto	period,	 largely	without	practical	
experience,	and	have	evolved	to	meet	the	 levels	
of	mitigation	ambition	that	were	defined	there.	
The	Copenhagen	Agreement	will	be	different	in	
all	these	respects.
This	 paper	 seeks	 to	 examine	 the	 new	 concepts	
that	have	emerged	and	that	involve	taking	a	sec-
toral	approach	to	GHG	markets,	as	well	as	to	un-
derstand	the	viability	of	such	an	approach,	espe-
cially	as	it	relates	to	participation	by	the	private	
sector.	It	starts	by	examining	the	evolution	of	the	
GHG	architecture	and	that	of	the	various	market	
mechanisms,	as	well	as	how	the	goals	and	mecha-
nisms	have	interacted	with	each	other.	The	ori-
gins	of	sectoral	approaches	and	their	place	with	
the	Bali	Plan	of	Action	are	discussed,	as	are	some	
of	the	debates	that	are	taking	place	around	the	
interpretation	of	what	 is	meant	by	 sectoral	 ap-
proaches	in	the	context	of	the	UNFCCC.	It	goes	
on	 to	 examine	 the	 main	 points	 of	 discussion,	
including	 impacts	 on	 GHG	 market	 prices	 and	
environmental	 integrity,	 as	well	 as	other	design	
options.	 The	 last	 part	 of	 the	 paper	 focuses	 on	
two	options	that	have	emerged	as	main	contend-
ers	for	the	use	of	sectoral	approaches	in	carbon	
markets:	sectoral	crediting	and	sectoral	trading.	
In	 each	 case	 it	 looks	 at	 basic	 design,	 finance	
structure	 and	 incentive	 structure.	 Throughout	
the	paper,	one	issue	that	I	have	tried	to	address	
is	the	way	in	which	the	models	proposed	can	be	
deployed	to	pave	the	way	towards	the	creation	of	
global	 cap	and	 trade	 system,	which	 is	 regarded	
as	 the	ultimate	goal	 in	 the	evolution	of	a	GHG	
market.
 
the evolution of the global 
gHg architecture
It	 is	 important	to	view	sectoral	approaches	and	
the	important	role	they	play	in	the	context	of	the	
evolving	global	architecture.	
First,	CDM	and	JI	were	defined	in	the	Kyoto	Pro-
tocol,	 with	most	 of	 the	 detail	 coming	 not	 only	
in	 the	 Marrakesh	 Accords	 (MA),	 but	 more	 im-
portantly	 in	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 CDM	 Execu-
tive	 Board	 (CDM	 EB).	 While	 the	 CDM	 EB	 was	
conceived	as	a	technical	body,	business	has	long	
argued	that,	given	its	composition	and	the	roles	
that	many	of	 its	members	played	as	both	mem-
bers	of	 the	EB	and	negotiators	and/or	consult-
ants,	 it	 inevitably	became	politicized.	 It	 can	be	
argued	that	the	interpretations	that	the	EB	gave	
to	the	MA	and	the	KP	led	to	a	mechanism	that	
fit	 the	 ambition	 of	 the	 targets.	 In	 other	words,	
this	was	a	serious	attempt	at	reverse	engineering,	
which	succeeded.	
At	Copenhagen,	to	meet	what	science	tells	us	the	
targets	 should	 	 be	 radically	 steeper.	 The	 inter-
national	 community	 will	 establish	 the	 political	
framework	 and	 corresponding	 market	 mecha-
nisms	to	meet	 those	 targets.	The	expectation	 is	
that	in	the	long	term	this	will	lead	to	the	emer-
gence	of	a	global	cap	and	trade	system.	For	ex-
ample,	the	vision	of	the	European	Union	is	that	
by	2013	all	developed	nations	will	have	a	cap	and	
A viable proposition?
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trade	system	in	place,	resulting	in	an	OECD-wide	
carbon	market	by	2015.	
A	 considerable	 amount	 of	 momentum	 is	 being	
directed	 towards	 this	 result.	One	critical	devel-
opment	 is	 the	 shift	 in	 political	 attitude	 in	 the	
United	States.	The	success	of	 the	Waxman-Mar-
key	Bill	in	the	U.S.	House	of	Representatives	has	
substantially	 increased	 the	 likelihood	 that	 the	
United	States	will	have	a	national	cap	and	trade	
program	after	2012	linked	to	the	EU	ETS.		Others	
are	 also	 in	 the	 pipeline,	 namely	 Australia	 and	
New	Zealand.
To	date,	the	role	of	developing	countries	in	the	
global	carbon	markets	–	essentially	through	the	
demand	for	offsets	from	the	EU	ETS	–	has	been	
limited,	but	encouraging.	The	CDM	has	enabled	
the	participation	of	developing	countries	in	the	
solution	and	has	contributed	to	the	build-up	of	
critical	 technical	 and	 institutional	 expertise	 in	
these	 countries.	 But	 it	 cannot	 possibly	 deliver	
the	supply	that	is	expected	to	be	required	by	the	
post-2012	demand	if	emission	reduction	targets	
are	set	according	to	science	levels	and	no	other	
mechanisms	are	put	in	place	(e.g.	carbon	capture	
and	storage,	or	nuclear	energy).
The	EU	sees	sector-based	market	mechanisms	as	
the	 next	 stage	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 carbon	mar-
kets	 for	 developing	 countries,	 with	 program-
matic	CDM	as	an	intermediate	step,	all	forming	
a	progression.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 ‘classic	offset	
mechanisms’,	 namely	 CDM	 and	 JI,	 will	 remain	
options	 for	 developing	 countries,	 but	 will	 not	
be	targeted	at	what	are	now	called	‘advanced	de-
veloping	 countries’,	 that	 is,	 Brazil,	Russia,	 India	
and	China	(BRIC).	These	mechanisms	will	enable	
developing	countries	 to	establish	the	necessary	
domestic	 frameworks	to	 facilitate	the	 formation	
of	domestic	cap	and	trade	systems.	
Therefore,	 the	 establishment	 of	 sector-based	
market	mechanisms	is	seen	as	a	key	step	for	de-
veloping	 countries	 towards	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	
global	cap	and	trade	system.		
sectoral approaches in the context 
of the bali action Plan
In	paragraph	1(b)	the	BAP	addresses	‘enhanced	
national/international	 action	 on	 mitigation	 of	
climate	change’,	a	provision	(iv)	for	‘cooperative	
sectoral	approaches	and	sector-specific	actions’,	
in	order	to	enhance	implementation	of	the	Con-
vention	Article	4,	paragraph	1(c),	addressing	the	
commitments	of	all	Parties	with	regard	to	secto-
ral	 cooperation,	 including	 technology	 transfer,	
which	is	being	discussed	by	the	Ad	Hoc	Working	
Group	on	Long-term	Cooperative	Action	under	
the	Convention	(AWG-LCA).	
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that,	 in	 the	 context	 of	
the	negotiations	leading	to	Copenhagen,	secto-
ral	approaches,	while	separated	in	the	BAP	from	
para	1b	(ii)	on	Nationally	Appropriate	Mitigation	
Actions	 (NAMAs)	 by	 developing	 countries,	 are	
very	much	linked	to	NAMAs.	Essentially,	whether	
they	take	the	form	of	market	mechanisms	or	not,	
sectoral	approaches	are	seen,	by	some,	as	a	type	
of	NAMA.	This	implies	that	NAMAs	could	be	im-
plemented	through	sectoral	approaches.	
Like	NAMAs,	any	sectoral	engagements	that	de-
veloping	countries	may	wish	to	take	are	expect-
ed	to	be	voluntary,	 to	be	supported	by	finance,	
technology	and	capacity-building	by	developed	
The creation of global cap and trade 
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countries,	and	to	meet	certain	criteria	for	moni-
toring,	 reporting	 and	 verification	 (MRV).	 They	
will	 have	 different	 options	 for	 finance,	 but	 at	
the	time	of	writing,	there	was	serious	opposition	
from	developing	countries	to	NAMAs	and	secto-
ral	approaches	to	be	used	as	offsets	by	developed	
countries	to	meet	their	obligations.	
Should	that	be	the	case,	some	forms	of	coopera-
tive	sectoral	approaches	may	continue	to	be	pos-
sible,	especially	those	that	involve	public	money	
and/or	are	linked	to	technology	transfer.	As	long	
as	they	do	not	produce	offsets,	it	is	unlikely	that	
such	NAMAs	will	attract	private	 investment.	We	
can	 expect	 the	 outcome	 from	 Copenhagen	 to	
include	a	serious	base	load	of	public	money,	on	
which	the	private	sector	will	superimpose	private	
money	 through	 credited	 NAMAs,	 including	 in	
the	form	of	sectoral	approaches.
It	must	be	recognized	that,	at	the	same	time,	due	
to	the	lack	of	clarity	of	how	the	process	will	move	
forward,	 sectoral	 approaches	 are	 also	 currently	
covered	 under	 the	 Ad	 Hoc	Working	 Group	 on	
Further	Commitments	for	Annex	I	Parties	under	
the	Kyoto	Protocol	(AWG-KP)	as	a	way	for	Annex	
I	 Parties	 to	 achieve	 emission	 reductions	 cost-
effectively.		
definition of sectoral approaches
There	continues	to	be	a	 lack	of	clarity	on	what	
a	 sectoral	 approach	 is.	 Discussions	 within	
UNFCCC	have	helped	define	what	they	are	not,	
as	 well	 as	 to	 determine	 the	 concerns	 of	 devel-
oping	 countries.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 issues	
covered	 under	 sectoral	 approaches,	 including	
aviation	and	maritime	transportation,	which	are	
specific	to	sectors	and	do	not	imply	a	sectoral	ap-
proach.	Developing	countries	continue	to	focus	
sectoral	approaches	on	Article	4,	paragraph1	(c)	
of	the	Convention	and	link	it	directly	with	tech-
nology	transfer.	Article	4,	paragraph1	(c)	states:	
	article 4 on cOMMitMeNts:
All Parties, taking into account their common 1. 
but differentiated responsibilities and their 
specific national and regional development 
priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall:
(c) Promote and cooperate in the de-
velopment, application and diffusion, 
including transfer, of technologies, prac-
tices and processes that control, reduce 
or prevent anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol in all relevant sectors, 
including the energy, transport, industry, 
agriculture, forestry and waste manage-
ment sectors;
Among	 developed	 countries,	 the	 EU,	New	 Zea-
land	and	Korea	have	presented	specific	proposals	
that	address	the	introduction	of	market	mecha-
nisms.		Japan	also	continues	to	be	supportive	of	
this	approach.	
sectoral approaches and carbon Markets 
Before	 entering	 into	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 issues	
that	 need	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 respect	 of	 the	
options	on	sectoral	approaches,	as	well	as	their	
advantages	 and	 disadvantages,	 it	 is	 important	
to	discuss	the	impact	of	sectoral	market	mecha-
nisms	 on	 the	 carbon	market	 as	 we	 understand	
them	now	and	see	them	evolving	in	the	future.
A viable proposition?
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demand and supply in the carbon Market: 
Price and design Options 
3.1.1 Price Considerations
The	GHG	market	 is	 still	 young	 and	 in	 its	 cur-
rent	configuration	has	many	variable	parts.	The	
big	issue	in	the	market	for	both	Annex	I	public	
institutions	 (EC,	 Members	 States,	 US	 govern-
ment,	etc)	and	the	private	sector	is	the	so-called	
balance	 between	 demand	 and	 supply	 that	 will	
ensure	a	price	that	everyone	can	live	with,	that	
is,	that	can	meet	their	objectives.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 private	 sector,	 for	 many	 on	
the	emitter	 side	of	business,	 that	 is,	 those	 that	
have	obligations,	the	objective	is	cost	minimiza-
tion.		For	those	whose	primary	activity	is	carbon	
finance,	 the	objective	must	be	profit	maximiza-
tion,	or	at	a	minimum,	if	only	in	the	short	term,	
survival	of	the	industry.	This	will	require	a	mini-
mum	price	that	will	allow	those	companies	that	
have	 created	 the	 infrastructure	 for	 trading	 and	
offset	project	management	 to	operate	 and	pro-
vide	a	reasonable	return	on	investment.	
In	the	case	of	public	authorities,	as	for	the	pri-
vate	sector,	 there	could	be	more	 than	one	view	
of	the	world.	It	seems	that	the	EU	wants	a	high	
enough	 price	 to	 trigger	 changes	 towards	 a	 low	
carbon	economy,	especially	in	the	energy	sector.	
Meanwhile,	the	debates	in	the	US	on	the	Waxman	
Markey	Bill	seem	to	point	to	a	desire	to	minimize	
the	 costs	 of	 compliance	 for	 the	 economy	 as	 a	
whole,	as	well	as	for	individual	installations	and	
the	final	consumer.	
One	of	the	issues	that	is	always	brought	up	when	
sectoral	 approaches	 are	 debated	 is	 the	 supply	
that	may	come	from	sectoral	market	mechanisms	
and	its	effect	on	market	balance.	This	may	seem	
strange:	given	that	the	market	will	always	reach	
an	 equilibrium,	 all	 that	 will	 differ	 is	 the	 price	
level	where	that	equilibrium	is	reached.
The	production	of	offset	credits	from	the	Kyoto	
mechanisms	was	difficult	to	predict	at	the	time	of	
the	Marrakech	Accords.	However,	as	discussed,	it	
can	be	claimed	that	the	regulator,	the	CDM	EB,	
with	the	support	of	the	COP,	has	in	the	end	cre-
ated	a	mechanism	that	meets	the	ambitions	set	
in	the	KP,	thus	keeping	CERs	at	a	price	that	kept	
most	people	happy	until	the	recent	downturn	in	
the	global	economy.
The	threat	of	the	Assigned	Amount	Units	(AAUs)1	
surplus	from	the	former	Soviet	bloc	(‘hot	air’)	is	
still	present	and	is	just	starting	to	emerge	as	an	
option	for	sovereign	compliance.	
The	 supply	 of	 credits	 from	 the	 ‘classic’	 CDM	
projects	 can	 be	 considered	 relatively	 predict-
able,	 given	 that	 each	 project	 has	 to	 provide	 a	
forecast	of	the	amount	of	offsets	it	will	produce.	
This	 supply	 becomes	 more	 unpredictable	 with	
sectoral	mechanisms,	as	the	total	amount	that	a	
sector	will	produce	will	be	dependent	on	many	
variables,	 depending	 on	 the	 sector	 –	 tempera-
ture,	price	of	energy,	economic	growth,	etc.	
The	 argument	 against	 sectoral	 market	 mecha-
1  A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to 1 metric tonne of CO2 equiva-
lent. Each Annex I Party issues AAUs up to the level of its assigned 
amount, established pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Assigned amount units may be exchanged through emis-
sions trading. 
The EU sees sector-based market mechanisms 
as the next stage in the evolution of carbon 
markets for developing countries, with 
programmatic CDM as an intermediate 
step, all forming a progression.
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nisms	is	that	they	will	‘destroy’	the	GHG	market.	
GHG	markets	are	 invoked	to	help	minimize	the	
cost	 of	 addressing	 climate	 change	 and	 are	 not	
there	to	deliver	a	targeted	price.	If	price	level	is	
the	target,	then	a	carbon	tax	is	a	much	simpler	
and	more	certain	delivery	vehicle.	
As	such,	we	perceive	this	as	being	a	serious	con-
cern	only	to	the	extent	that	the	emission	reduc-
tion	 targets	 being	 set	 for	 developed	 countries	
show	a	total	lack	of	political	courage	and	ambi-
tion	on	the	part	of	the	political	class.		
3.1.2 Environmental integrity
A	 second	 issue	 that	 is	 raised	when	 it	 comes	 to	
sectoral	 mechanisms	 is	 that	 of	 environmental	
integrity.	 The	 argument	 is	 that	baseline	 setting	
could	become	politicized,	resulting	in	baselines	
that	will	generate	credits	 from	what	would	oth-
erwise	be	‘business	as	usual’.	It	is	a	concern	that	
must	 be	 taken	 seriously,	 but	 not	 to	 the	 point	
where	we	allow	ourselves	to	become	paralyzed.	It	
must	be	treated	as	another	technical	 issue	that	
needs	to	be	addressed,	and	there	is	a	substantial	
body	of	literature	dealing	with	it.	It	is	not	a	po-
litical	issue	and	need	not	become	one,	but	it	pro-
vides	a	good	excuse	 for	 those	Parties	 that	have	
different	agendas.	
In	 their	papers,	 the	Organization	 for	Economic	
Cooperation	and	Development	(OECD),	the	Öko	
Institut	and	others	have	discussed	the	potential	
problems	related	to	sectoral	approaches,	as	well	
as	different	options	to	address	these	issues.	Some	
of	the	options	that	are	put	forward	in	these	stud-
ies	are	absolute	emissions	baselines	and	indexed	
baselines,	 which	 can	 be	 established	 functions	
of	one	or	more	indices.	It	is	considered	that	de-
veloping	 countries	 will	 find	 indexed	 baselines	
more	palatable,	as	 they	allow	for	the	possibility	
of	growth,	as	well	as	factoring	in	changes	in	the	
indices	used.		
3.1.3. Other design options
The	two	issues	mentioned		above	–	pricing	and	en-
vironmental	integrity	–	have	been	raised	directly	
in	UNFCCC	negotiations.	There	are	a	number	of	
other	issues	that	are	also	worth	mentioning	and	
that	need	to	be	addressed	in	any	effort	to	estab-
lish	sectoral	market	mechanisms.		
They	include	issues	such	as	geographical	cover-
age	(there	are	countries	with	one	or	more	elec-
tricity	grids	and	 there	are	electricity	grids	 that	
cross	 national	 boundaries)	 and	 definitions	 of	
sectors	(sectors	such	as	steel	and	chemicals	have	
a	wide	range	of	processes	and	products	that	make	
it	difficult	to	define	a	sector).	Similarly,	coverage	
of	gases,	including	whether	we	are	dealing	with	
upstream	or	downstream	coverage,	is	something	
that	needs	to	be	analyzed.
3 .2 definition of sectoral approaches
While	there	 is	still	no	consensus	on	the	defini-
tion	of	‘sectoral	approaches	and	sectoral	specific	
action’,	 the	debate	is	 focusing	on	two	concepts:	
sectoral	crediting	and	sectoral	trading.	
Sectoral	crediting	would	result	in	emis-a.	
sion	 reductions	 in	 certain	 sectors	 in	 a	
developing	 country	 from	 a	 pre-defined	
sectoral	 baseline.	 That	baseline	 can	be	
defined	as	an	intensity	target	or	an	ab-
solute	cap.	There	are	two	different	types	
of	sectoral	crediting	currently	under	se-
rious	consideration.	One	is	the	sectoral	
crediting	mechanism	 (SCM)	 or,	 as	 it	 is	
The threat of the Assigned Amount Units 
(AAUs) surplus from the former Soviet bloc 
(‘hot air’) is still present and is just starting to 
emerge as an option for sovereign compliance. 
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sometimes	 called,	 ‘sectoral	 no-lose	 tar-
gets’.	 The	 other	model	 relies	 on	multi-
project	 sectoral	 baselines	 and	 is	 often	
referred	to	as	the	‘sectoral	CDM’	model.	
There	 are	 clear	 differences	 between	
these	two	approaches,	each	with	its	ad-
vantages	 and	 disadvantages.	 However,	
hybrids	are	also	possible.	 	What	unites	
them	is	the	fact	that	the	credits	are,	 in	
principle,	being	issued	post-facto.	
The	second	approach	that	we	can	iden-b.	
tify	 is	 that	 of	 sectoral	 trading.	 In	 this	
case,	 an	 allowance	 type	 instrument	 is	
issued	 with	 an	 ex-ante	 allocation	 that	
has	 to	 fall	 within	 a	 sectoral	 baseline	
of	 emissions.	 That	 baseline	 can	 be	 ex-
pressed	in	the	intensity	of	relative	terms,	
but	absolute	caps	will	certainly	be	easier	
to	understand	and	accept,	especially	by	
those	 concerned	 about	 environmental	
integrity.
3 .3 sectoral crediting
The	essential	difference	between	the	two	credit-
ing	models	mentioned	above	is	that	in	the	SCM	
the	whole	sector	must	be	under	an	agreed	base-
line,	while	 for	 sectoral	CDM	the	baseline	 is	 set	
at	a	sectoral	level,	but	reductions	are	counted	at	
the	enterprise	level,	and	only	individual	installa-
tions	must	be	under	the	baseline.	
3.3.1 Sectoral Crediting Mechanisms (SCM)/ no–
lose targets.
This	is	the	option	designed	to	generate	emissions	
credits	where	an	entire	sector	satisfies	a	prede-
termined	emissions	target.	The	establishment	of	
the	 target	 for	 a	 specific	 sector,	 referred	 to	 as	 a	
crediting	 baseline,	 would	 be	 determined	 upon	
assessment	 of	 both	 domestic	 and	 international	
commitments	to	the	sector.	
The	determination	and	calculations	 involved	 in	
establishing	a	baseline	are	complex	and	the	sub-
ject	of	 their	own	analysis.	The	baseline	may	be	
measured	in	terms	of	an	intensity	calculation,	a	
fixed	emissions	goal	for	the	sector,	or	a	technol-
ogy	penetration	goal.	The	essential	factor	is	that	
emissions	 credits	will	 be	 granted	on	 an	 ex post	
basis	if	the	sector,	as	a	single	entity,	exceeds	the	
standard	established	by	the	crediting	baseline.	
Beyond	this	a	number	of	options	have	been	con-
sidered,	 but	 in	 this	 paper	we	will	 consider	 two	
with	different	levels	of	mitigation	and	crediting.
 
Option 1: centralized coordination 
of Mitigation and crediting
Basic Design.	 A	 sectoral	 crediting	 baseline,	 set	
somewhere	 below	 a	 Business	 as	 Usual	 baseline	
(BAU),	is	agreed	by	the	country	and	the	Parties.	
The	developing	country	government	is	responsi-
ble	for	designating	or	establishing	a	‘coordinat-
ing	entity’,	which	could	be	either	a	government	
or	a	non-governmental	sectoral	body,	such	as	an	
association,	with	some	government	involvement.	
The	coordinating	entity	has	discretion	as	to	how	
the	target	 is	achieved,	 that	 is,	 the	policy	 initia-
tives	undertaken	to	improve	sector	performance,	
such	as	 feed-in	 tariffs,	minimum	efficiency	per-
formance	standards,	etc.
In other words, this option is likely to take 
a top-down, one-size-fits-all approach to 
lowering emissions, rather than actually using 
the market to drive emissions reductions.
105
CD4CDM
No	matter	what	policy	initiatives	are	chosen,	the	
coordinating	entity	would	be	responsible	for	de-
termining	how	and	 if	 any	 credits	 achieved	as	 a	
result	of	these	initiatives	would	be	distributed	to	
sector	participants.	Distribution	to	installations	
in	the	sector	would	not	be	mandatory,	but	could	
be	retained	by	a	government.	
Any	 such	 approach	will	 have	 to	 assume	 a	 high	
level	 of	 coordination	 and	 discipline	 in	 order	
to	reduce	emissions	across	a	wide	range	of	dis-
parate	 installations.	 In	 most	 jurisdictions	 this	
would	make	government	intervention	an	inevita-
ble	reality.	The	flip	side	of	this	proposition	is	that	
the	crediting	will	also	go	to	a	government	agency	
which	will	become	 the	holder	of	 large	pools	of	
credits.		
The	same	agency	will	largely	determine	how	the	
reductions	are	achieved,	and	how	many	and	the	
number	of	offset	credits	that	would	be	available	
to	compliance	buyers	from	this	mechanism.	
From	a	business	perspective	this	option	faces	two	
types	of	 risk.	The	first	 is	 sovereign	 risk,	 that	 is,	
having	 to	 deal	 with	 sovereign	 national	 govern-
ments.	 This	may	 translate	 into	 the	 government	
having	the	discipline,	or	will,	to	enforce	rules	and	
achieve	reductions.	Alternatively,	 it	may	choose	
not	 to	 fulfil	 agreements	 depending	 on	 many	
factors,	including	the	going	price	for	CERs.	En-
forcement	options	on	governments,	should	these	
occur,	are	nowhere	close	to	those	available	in	en-
forcing	private	sector	contractual	obligations.	
Secondly,	it	may	be	that	the	policy	tools	chosen,	
despite	 being	 fully	 implemented	 and	 well	 en-
forced,	 simply	 prove	 inadequate	 to	 meet	 the	
emission	reduction	goals	of	the	sector	and	there-
fore	contracted	credits	may	fail	to	be	delivered.	
However,	this	may	be	a	type	of	risk	that	investors	
understand	and	mitigate	or	hedge	against.
Finance Structure.	The	involvement	of	the	private	
sector	is	more	complex	to	understand,	as	well	as	
the	 financing	 models	 for	 such	 an	 approach	 in	
general.	Since	sovereign	risk	 in	 this	case	 is	not	
well	understood,	new	risk	management	strategies	
for	contracting	to	buy,	sell	and	finance	emission	
reductions	may	be	required.	
The	financing	under	this	option	could	be	struc-
tured	 in	 several	 different	 ways.	 One	 issue	 is	
whether	the	covered	entities,	or	the	government,	
will	be	responsible	for	acquiring	the	financing	to	
meet	their	own	emission	reduction	objectives.	
The	 second	 issue	 is	 whether	 we	 would	 look	
mainly	 at	 self-finance	 or	 at	 the	 need	 to	 secure	
other	public	or	private-sector	investors.		For	the	
latter	question	we	assume	that	few	installations	
in	developing	countries	have	the	ability	 to	self-
finance	such	programs	or	 to	do	so	 in	a	coordi-
nated	way.
If	private	entities	will	need	to	finance	the	meas-
ures,	 this	will	provide	a	great	challenge,	as	 it	 is	
unlikely	that	such	a	coordinated	effort	in	a	devel-
oping	country	will	be	easy	to	achieve.	
It	 is	therefore	more	likely	that	a	 large	buyer,	or	
someone	 that	 can	 act	 as	 an	 amalgamator,	 will	
have	to	emerge,	such	as	a	development	bank	or	
large	financial	institution.	In	addition,	any	such	
institution	 would	 have	 the	 power	 to	 deal	 with	
governments.	However,	this	will	essentially	leave	
out	 smaller	 start-ups	 that	 have	 been	 the	 back-
bone	of	the	industry	activity	so	far.	The	same	ap-
This is the simplest, most straightforward 
way to transmit the carbon price signal to 
non-covered entities in developing countries.
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plies	to	cases	in	which	governments	are	called	on	
to	finance	these	measures.
In	addition,	governments	will	need	to	find	ways	
to	reduce	the	risks	inherent	in	financing	secto-
ral	crediting	projects,	such	as	securing	a	forward	
sale	price	that	makes	the	undertaking	financially	
attractive,	thereby	motivating	participating	enti-
ties	and	the	government	to	completion.	
If	covered	entities	are	required	by	regulation	to	
achieve	reductions,	they	may	be	able	to	acquire	
financing	via	a	local	bank	or	through	a	govern-
ment	 loan	 program.	 However,	 their	 ability	 to	
repay	that	financing	is	directly	related	to	the	un-
known	of	whether	or	not	 the	sector	as	a	whole	
over-achieves	its	crediting	baseline.	
Where	 private-sector	 finance	 is	 needed,	 for	
either	 installation-	 or	 government-level	 activi-
ties,	government-backed	guarantees	(likely	from	
developed	country	governments)	may	prove	 es-
sential	 for	 encouraging	 engagement	 with	 an	
SCM.	 Investors	 have	 become	 more	 risk-averse	
towards	offset	mechanisms	as	a	result	of	engage-
ment	with	the	CDM,	but	they	will	need	to	have	an	
appetite	for	much	higher	levels	of	risk	under	an	
SCM.	Government	guarantees	could	help	bridge	
that	divide.
Incentive Structure.	 If	 all	 of	 the	 other	 entities	 in	
the	sector	failed	to	make	equitable	emission	re-
ductions,	 then	 an	 individual	 installation	would	
not	be	rewarded	in	proportion	to	its	effort,	and	
would	 face	 the	 risk	 of	 not	 being	 rewarded	 at	
all.	Covered	 entities	would	have	 little	 incentive	
to	 lower	 their	 own	 emissions	 individually	 be-
cause	those	efforts	could	be	wholly	or	partially	
neutralized	 by	 another	 installation’s	 increasing	
emissions	profile	or	inferior	effort.	This	is	why	a	
strong	coordinating	entity	is	critical.	
Smoothing the Transition to Cap-and-Trade.	 The	
probable	 use	 of	 command-and-control	 regula-
tion	under	this	option,	even	though	it	may	prove	
effective	in	meeting	the	goals	of	any	given	pro-
gram,	 generally	 runs	 contrary	 to	 the	 principles	
of	 a	 market-based	 system.	 A	 system	 whereby	 a	
target	is	met	solely	through	standards	and	feed-
in	tariffs	does	not	transmit	a	carbon	price	signal	
to	private	entities.	In	so	doing,	it	does	not	teach	
them	to	integrate	such	a	price	into	their	bottom	
line,	nor	does	it	provide	them	with	the	flexibility	
to	identify	installation-specific,	inexpensive	and	
efficient	ways	to	lower	emissions.	In	other	words,	
this	option	is	likely	to	take	a	top-down,	one-size-
fits-all	 approach	 to	 lowering	 emissions,	 rather	
than	actually	using	the	market	to	drive	emissions	
reductions.	
	Some	conclusions:
Transactions	at	the	scale	likely	to	be	re-•	
quired	under	this	design	are	bound	to	
entail	extensive	and	complicated	negotia-
tions,	as	well	as	complicated	finance	and	
risk-sharing	arrangements.	These	arrange-
ments	threaten	to	slow	the	process	of	imple-
mentation	and	may	lead	to	stop-and-start	
implementation	along	the	way.	
Finding	private-sector	investors	with	a	high	•	
risk	appetite	seems	unlikely	without	pub-
licly	financed	investment	guarantees.	
The	choice	to	implement	wide-ranging	•	
command-and-control	regulation	runs	the	
In this instance, a developing country will have 
to agree to a cap on a sector or sectors, in 
agreement with the international community.
107
CD4CDM
risk	of	raising	mitigation	costs	by	removing	
flexibility	and	taking	decisions	about	how	to	
make	emission	reductions	out	of	the	hands	
of	the	private	sector.		
Given	the	significant	uncertainty	surround-•	
ing	whether	or	not	and	the	extent	to	which	
the	sector	may	over-achieve	its	emission	
reductions	objective,	and	the	all-or-nothing	
approach,	a	strong	urge	to	regulate	the	
supply	and	demand	of	credits	is	likely.	
Option 2: installation-level 
Mitigation and crediting 
Basic Design.	A	 sectoral	crediting	baseline,	fixed	
somewhere	below	BAU,	is	set	with	the	agreement	
of	 the	 international	 body	 responsible.	 The	 de-
veloping	country	government	 is	responsible	 for	
setting	an	emission	 reduction	objective	 for	 the	
sector	and	for	each	individual	installation	within	
the	 sector.	 The	 emission	 reduction	objective	 is	
necessarily	 set	 at	 some	point	 below	 the	 credit-
ing	baseline	to	ensure	that	some	crediting	takes	
place,	with	the	difference	between	the	baseline	
and	 the	 objective	 constituting	 the	 number	 of	
credits	projected	to	result.
Each	 installation	 is	 eligible	 for	direct	 crediting	
from	the	credit-issuing	agency	(e.g.	the	UNFCCC)	
to	the	extent	that	 it	over-achieves	 its	 individual	
emission	 reduction	 objective	 (i.e.	 its	 individual	
crediting	 baseline).	 Installations	 have	 discre-
tion	as	to	how	they	reduce	their	emissions,	with	
some	caveats	(see	‘Incentive	to	Act’	below).	They	
may	request	issuance	periodically	(e.g.	annually)	
throughout	the	mechanism’s	crediting	period.	At	
the	end	of	the	crediting	period,	a	true-up	proc-
ess	is	required	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	sector	
as	a	whole	has	achieved	its	crediting	baseline.	
To	the	extent	that	crediting	to	individual	instal-
lations	has	occurred	without	the	aggregate	sec-
toral	baseline	having	been	met,	the	host	govern-
ment	is	responsible	for	obtaining	and	cancelling	
an	amount	of	emission	reduction	credits	equal	to	
the	over-crediting.
Given	that	the	basic	intention	in	creating	a	sec-
toral	crediting	mechanism	is	to	ensure	aggregate	
emission	reductions	across	the	sector,	a	 ‘check’	
is	 required	 on	 the	 aggregate	 achievement	 in	 a	
case	where	installation-level	crediting	is	still	per-
mitted.	Requiring	the	host	country	government	
to	hold	the	liability	(i.e.	 take	the	risk)	 is	a	valid	
option,	but	it	is	likely	to	be	resisted	by	some	de-
veloping	countries.		
To	allay	concerns	over	government	liability,	a	re-
serve	pool,	populated	by	a	levy	on	credits	issued	
to	 installations,	 could	 be	 created	 to	 cover,	 par-
tially	 or	 wholly,	 the	 over-crediting	 that	 occurs.	
The	government	could	also	pass	the	liability	on	
to	the	installations	themselves,	mandating	them	
to	achieve	individual	emission	reduction	objec-
tives	or	else	pay	a	penalty,	which	could	be	used	to	
cover	the	government’s	obligations	to	obtain	and	
cancel	offset	credits	in	the	case	of	over-crediting	
at	the	aggregate	level.	
Finance Structure. 
Under	this	option,	external	risk	to	investment	will	
be	largely	minimized.	Regulatory	risk	is	less	than	
with	 the	CDM	because	 there	 is	 no	question	of	
project	eligibility.	Sovereign/political	risk	is	also	
minimal	because	governments	are	not	 required	
to	approve,	impose	or	enforce	measures	or	plans	
to	lower	emissions.	
The	government	will	have	to	set	the	installation’s	
objective	before	the	start	of	the	crediting	period,	
but	this	move	will	take	place	before	emission	re-
duction	 plans	 are	 made	 and	 contracts	 signed,	
A viable proposition?
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so	 it	will	not	 factor	 into	 investment	 risk.	There	
is	some	concern	that	in	a	number	of	developing	
countries	the	 larger	 industries	are	state-owned,	
suggesting	 that	 there	 could	 be	 an	 incentive	 to	
set	‘weak’	objectives.
Financing	 under	 this	 option	 would	 closely	 re-
semble	 typical	 project	 finance,	 even	 more	 so	
than	 with	 project-based	 CDM.	 Installations	 in	
the	host	country	could	sign	Emission	Reduction	
Purchase	 Agreements	 (ERPAs)	 with	 compliance	
buyers	or	offset	aggregators,	using	them	to	boost	
the	attractiveness	of	the	project	and	help	secure	
finance	 for	 their	 emission	 reduction	 activities.	
In	fact,	because	of	the	low	regulatory	risk,	ERPAs	
may	even	prove	able	to	drive	financing	decisions	
under	this	mechanism.	
Installation-level	 reductions	 will	 be	 on	 such	 a	
manageable	scale	that	they	can	be	monitored	by	
investors	and	compliance	buyers	if	desired,	thus	
reducing	 the	perceived	 risks	of	 investment	 and	
non-delivery.	 A	 relatively	 small	 group	 of	 inves-
tors	or	a	domestic	bank	could	prove	sufficient	to	
obtain	the	capital	required	in	most	cases.
Incentive Structure.	Under	this	option,	 individual	
installations	 face	 a	 direct,	 positive	 incentive	 to	
lower	emissions	as	long	as	their	own	cost	of	re-
ducing	emissions	is	less	than	the	price	of	carbon.	
This	is	the	simplest,	most	straightforward	way	to	
transmit	the	carbon	price	signal	to	non-covered	
entities	in	developing	countries.
The	fact	that	the	government	is	liable	for	any	fail-
ure	to	meet	the	sectoral	reduction	target	in	the	
event	that	some	crediting	takes	place	provides	it	
with	an	incentive	to	become	more	active	in	the	
sector’s	efforts	to	reduce	emissions.	
Smoothing the Transition to Cap-and-Trade.	 By	
providing	a	direct,	positive	incentive	to	private-
sector	 entities,	 this	 option	 transmits	 a	 carbon	
price	signal	directly	to	the	installations,	leading	
them	to	internalize	the	price	of	carbon	into	their	
bottom	line.	In	so	doing,	it	prepares	those	entities	
for	the	transition	to	an	economy-wide	cap-and-
trade	system,	in	which	carbon	price	internaliza-
tion	 will	 be	 the	 key	 to	 meeting	 their	 emission	
reduction	obligations	at	the	lowest	cost.	Govern-
ments	will	also	help	pave	the	way	by	developing	
the	 infrastructure	 and	capacity	 required	 to	use	
this	option.	
3 .3 .2  sectoral cdM .
This	is	a	tool	that	business	likes	for	a	number	of	
reasons.	It	is	simple	and	straightforward,	with	
clarity	regarding	who	the	projects	participants	
are,	where	the	private	investor	intervenes,	and	
the	relatively	limited	role	for	the	government	in	
reaching	the	reduction	targets	and	monetizing	
the	reductions.	It	largely	eliminates	subjectivity	
on	the	issue	of	additionality	by	establishing	a	
sectoral	baseline.	
Guidelines	for	how	baselines	will	be	set	up	will	
have	to	be	agreed	at	the	international	level,	and	
different	 options	 have	 been	 presented	 under	
whose	jurisdiction	this	will	be	done:	the	CDM	Ex-
ecutive	Board	(EB),	the	COP,	or	another	agency.	
Unless	 and	 until	 such	 a	 time	 when	 the	 whole	
GHG	market	mechanisms	regulatory	machine	is	
run	from	an	independent	agency,	the	task	of	de-
fining	international	guidelines	should	stay	with	
the	 only	 institutions	 that	 have	 a	 mandate,	 the	
CDM	EB	and	the	UNFCCC	Secretariat.	
However,	 the	 practical	 implementation,	 data	
collection,	 etc.	 should	be	 allocated	 to	different	
regional	 institutions	 that	 have	 the	 necessary	
capacity	and	are	 seen	as	 impartial,	 such	as	 the	
Asian	Development	Bank,	the	Inter	American	De-
velopment	Bank,	the	African	Development	Bank,	
etc.	
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3 .4  sectoral trading
In	this	 instance,	a	developing	country	will	have	
to	agree	to	a	cap	on	a	sector	or	sectors,	in	agree-
ment	with	 the	 international	 community.	 Coun-
tries	 will	 have	 to	 adopt	 allocation	 systems	 that	
should	be	national	prerogatives.	 It	 is	clear	 that	
all	 the	 elements	 related	 to	 the	 MRV	 of	 emis-
sions	are	components	of	 the	Emissions	Trading	
System	(ETS)	that	will	be	critical.	Different	types	
of	NAMAs	will	require	different	levels	of	MRV,	but	
a	sectoral	trading	NAMA	will	require	a	sophisti-
cated	MRV	system.
In	 the	 case	 of	 sectoral	 trading	 in	 a	 developing	
country,	 an	 auctioning	 system	 is	 less	 likely	 to	
be	put	in	place.	While	the	type	of	allocation	will	
determine	primarily	 the	economic	efficiency	of	
distributing	 allowances,	 auctioning	will	 impose	
additional	 costs	 on	 that	 sector.	 Should	 that	be	
a	globalized	sector,	such	an	approach	is	likely	to	
be	 resisted	 by	 industry	 and	 the	 government	 of	
such	jurisdiction.	However,	it	is	likely	to	be	seen	
in	a	very	positive	light	by	business	in	developed	
countries.		Some	other	type	of	allocation,	grand-
fathering	 or	 benchmarking,	 is	 more	 likely	 to	
emerge	as	the	preferred	alternative	 in	the	early	
stages.	 Individual	 installations	 will	 have	 their	
own	allocation.	
In	 this	 case,	 the	 allowances	 allocated	would	be	
fully	fungible	with	Assigned	Amount	Units	(AAUs)	
for	the	purpose	of	accounting,	and	they	would	be	
good	for	compliance	at	the	sovereign	level.	Dif-
ferent	 domestic	 emissions	 trading	 systems	 will	
have	 to	 make	 their	 own	 decisions	 whether	 to	
accept	these	units	for	compliance	under	domes-
tic	emissions	trading	systems.
The	 advantage	 in	 the	 case	of	 sectoral	 trading	 is	
the	fact	that	units	are	issued	ex-ante	and	can	be	
traded	under	standardized	contracts,	as	opposed	
to	primary	Certified	Emission	Reductions	(CERs).
This	 will	 also	 result	 in	 exchange-based	 trading	
for	 developing	 countries.	 This	 eases	 trading,	
as	 exchanges	 will	 help	 to	 address	 many	 of	 the	
issues	dealing	with	‘know	your	customer’	legisla-
tion,	which	has	become	common	place	in	OECD	
countries	but	is	difficult	to	put	into	practice	in	
relationships	with	counterparties	 in	developing	
countries.	This	would	also	start	creating	the	in-
frastructure	 and	 capacity-building	 for	 a	 global	
cap	and	trade	system,	making	the	future	transi-
tion	much	easier.	
Another	element	that	needs	to	be	taken	into	ac-
count	in	order	to	make	the	system	credible	is	the	
risk	 of	 non-compliance	 for	 the	 sector	 and	 any	
penalties	 that	 may	 ensue.	 After	 all,	 allowances	
from	that	system	would	have	been	sold	to	buyers	
outside	 the	 system,	 and	 they	 cannot	 be	 called	
back	 without	 the	 risk	 of	 unravelling	 the	 whole	
international	emissions	trading	system.
For	the	market	to	believe	in	this,	a	system	other	
than	penalties	should	be	envisaged	and	a	reserve	
of	some	sort	should	be	put	in	place:	something	
like	a	commitment	period	reserve	could	be	put	
in	place	allowing	only	a	certain	number	of	allow-
ances	 to	flow	outside	a	 sectoral	 trading	system.	
National	 government	 liability	 in	 the	 interna-
tional	arena	for	non-compliance	is	an	alternative	
solution.
In	this	case,	benefits	will	devolve	to	enterprises	
as	they	make	reductions.	Governments	will	also	
be	tempted	to	grab	some	of	the	revenues,	and	the	
simple	way	to	do	so	will	be	to	auction	some	of	the	
allowances	and	establish	an	insurance	scheme	to	
address	non-compliance	at	the	national	level.	
A viable proposition?
This is a tool that business likes for a number 
of reasons
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conclusions
The	 carbon	market	 is	 at	 an	 intermediate	 stage	
in	 terms	 of	 development,	 but	 with	 little	 doubt	
about	the	role	that	it	will	play	in	the	future.	CDM	
and	 JI	 have	 proved	 better	 than	 many	 had	 ex-
pected,	but	they	cannot	possibly	meet	the	deep	
emission	reductions	expected	for	the	post-2012	
period.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 we	 must	 remember	
that	 offset	 mechanisms	 have	 always	 been	 seen	
as	a	transitional	phase	to	a	full	global	cap-and-
trade	system.	Sectoral	approaches	could	address	
many	of	the	issues	identified,	but	they	could	also	
create	 serious	 drawbacks,	 especially	 in	 relation	
to	the	role	that	private	finance	will	play.	
We	 must	 remember	 that	 carbon	 markets	 were	
created	 to	 unleash	 the	 entrepreneurial	 spirit	
of	 the	business	community	and	provide	a	clear	
market	 signal	 that	 will	 change	 behaviour	 and	
influence	economic	choices.	They	were	also	cre-
ated	to	make	sure	that	private	funds,	which	were	
seen	 as	 essential	 to	 finance	 the	 transformation	
to	a	low	carbon	economy,	could	be	tapped.	If	the	
private	sector	is	somehow	shut	out,	then	one	of	
the	 important	criteria	 for	 success	will	not	have	
been	met.	 If	we	are	not	careful,	we	will	 end	up	
with	a	government-to-government	solution.	
Sectoral	 approaches	 are	not	 perfect.	 Any	prob-
lems	must	simply	be	recognized,	and	addressed,	
as	 is	 done	 in	 every	 other	 field	 of	 human	 activ-
ity.	The	challenge	is	grave	and	will	not	be	dealt	
with	by	being	paralyzed	in	search	of	perfection	
or	by	being	afraid	of	compromises.	From	a	busi-
ness	 perspective,	 we	 need	 to	 welcome	 new	 ap-
proaches	that	will	allow	for	a	more	efficient	and	
effective	 production	 of	 offsets.	 This	 will	 help	
business	meet	 the	 obligations	 that	 society	 will	
place	upon	it	at	a	cost	that	will	free	resources	for	
other	priorities.	
While	governments	have	a	key	role	to	play	in	sec-
toral	 approaches,	 it	 is	 far	 from	 clear	 how	busi-
ness	can	participate	in	a	realistic	way.	CDM	has	
succeeded	better	 than	expected	because	of	 the	
entrepreneurial	 spirit	 it	 has	 unleashed,	 which	
has	countered	many	of	the	conservative	instincts	
of	COP	and	 the	 regulator.	CDM	has	 thrived	on	
adversity.	Unless	business	can	drive	sectoral	work	
within	the	framework	created	by	governments	it	
is	unlikely	to	succeed,	in	spite	of	the	great	prom-
ise	it	holds	out.	
Sectoral	crediting	poses	a	number	of	challenges,	
but	it	will	be	certainly	tried.	Based	on	the	discus-
sion	above	it,	may	meet	the	criteria	 for	success	
in	a	limited	way	and	may	be	less	attractive	to	the	
private	sector.	It	will	be	attractive	to	negotiators	
as	it	does	not	impose	absolute	hard	caps	on	de-
veloping	 countries,	making	 it	 a	more	 palatable	
solution.	
While	more	challenging	to	include	in	a	Copen-
hagen	 agreement	 as	 an	 option	 for	 those	 who	
wish	 to	 take	 it,	 sectoral	 trading	 presents	 many	
advantages.	 The	 challenge	 comes	 from	 the	 fact	
that	sectoral	trading	needs	a	hard	cap,	which	de-
veloping	countries	will	be	reluctant	to	embrace.	
On	the	positive	side,	it	would	create	a	commod-
ity,	 allocated	 ex-ante,	 and	 eliminate	 the	 whole	
uncertainty	associated	with	project	mechanisms,	
additionality,	etc.	It	will	also	send	a	clear	market	
signal	to	those	who	have	to	take	action,	namely	
enterprises.	
CDM and JI have proved better than 
many had expected, but they cannot 
possibly meet the deep emission reductions 
expected for the post-2012 period.
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What	 it	 may	 come	 to	 is	 a	 hybrid	 approach,	
through	 the	 use	 of	 that	 often	 quoted	 but	 ill-
defined	concept,	the	public-private	partnership.	
Something	 is	 needed	 that	 looks	 like	 a	 ‘no-lose	
sectoral	 target’	 for	 a	 developing	 country	 and	 a	
hard	cap	 from	 the	perspective	of	 the	global	ar-
chitecture.	 This	 amounts	 to	 having	 one’s	 cake	
and	eating	it	too.	
A	developing	country	may	take	a	sectoral	no-lose	
target	and	allocate	allowances	to	the	enterprises	
covered,	which	can	then	trade	them	inside	their	
domestic	ETS,	or	outside,	if	linked	to	other	ETS,	
such	as	the	EU	ETS.	However,	there	is	a	risk	that	
the	cap	will	not	be	met,	thus	putting	at	risk	the	
environmental	integrity	of	the	whole	approach.	
In	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	 hard	 cap,	 someone	 has	
to	take	the	sovereign	risk	for	environmental	de-
livery.	 As	 developing	 countries	 will	 likely	 resist	
that	 since	 they	 accepted	 a	 no-lose	 target,	 this	
risk	could	be	carried	by	an	international	finan-
cial	institution,	such	as	the	Global	Environmen-
tal	Facility,	which	 is	 the	financial	 instrument	of	
the	Convention.	Clearly	any	such	institution	will	
have	to	have	the	means	to	ascertain	that	all	ef-
forts	 have	 been	 undertaken	 to	 meet	 the	 cap.	
Other	 instruments,	 such	 as	 a	 pool	 approach,	 a	
reserve	or	insurance	scheme	could	help	meet	the	
same	objective.	It	is	most	likely	that	all	these	in-
struments	will	finally	come	to	co-exist	in	the	ini-
tial	phase.	In	the	market	place	of	ideas	for	market	
approaches,	 they	will	all	either	find	their	niche	
or	 simply	 fade	 away	 and	 be	 remembered	 as	 an	
interesting	experiment.	
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